

# Εγκληματολογία

ΕΞΑΜΗΝΙΑΙΑ ΕΚΔΟΣΗ

ΙΔΡΥΤΗΣ - ΔΙΕΥΘΥΝΤΗΣ  
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## A' EDITORIAL

CHRISTINA ZARAFONITOU, Professor of Criminology, Department of Sociology, Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences.

Research on fear of crime began in the 1960s<sup>1</sup> and continued with an ever increasing interest, so that the 1980s to be considered as its 'golden age'<sup>2</sup>. These surveys are continued with undiminished interest in our days, while they also evolve methodologically aiming at the necessary interdisciplinary approach and the thorough examination of the phenomenon<sup>3</sup>.

The difficulty of the conceptualization of fear of crime, stemming from its complexity, has led to different epistemological approaches. A tipping point is the inconsistencies observed between crime rates and fear of crime. And this is so, due to the fact that although it had been initially observed that the intensity of fear of crime coincided with that of criminality, it soon became apparent that this intensity did not decrease at the same rate that crime decreased<sup>4</sup>. This "paradox"<sup>5</sup> is explained through various factors associated with fear of crime and not summarised solely in criminality, as has been observed by the international research experience<sup>6</sup>. For this reason, moreover, a distinction<sup>7</sup> was made from early on between the *direct fear of victimisation* (concerning the subject himself/herself and his/her family) and the perception of criminality as *a serious social problem* (causing anxiety, even if not directly concern the subject).

The aforementioned important observation for the development in the study of the phenomenon cannot, however, lead to the opposite "aphorism". In other words, the fact that fear of crime is not *causally* associated with crime does not mean that it is never associated with it. In the examination of this relationship, an important role is played by the area of residence and its particular characteristics.

In this perspective, the study of Sutton & Tseloni "Area Crime and Fear of Crime Levels: Has analysis of the British Crime Survey diluted crime concentration and homogenised risk?", proposes the methodological improvement of British Crime survey via a complementary real neighbourhood booster sample which would

'representatively' sample and analyse real high crime neighbourhoods. As they argue, *this would allow measuring the prevalence, incidence and concentration of crimes as well as their correspondence to fear of crime levels within real high crime neighbourhoods*.

The residents of modern cities are concerned mainly about street crime and "signs of incivility"<sup>8</sup> which appear to be associated with the perception of life as degraded as well as with the feeling that state does not care and abandons citizens. The victimisation surveys which are referred in this special issue are indicative of this approach. According to Bisi & Sette ("*Security and territory: a complex relationship comprising fears old and new*"), *the city becomes a place able to cause suffering and vulnerability, liable to make it increasingly difficult to stay on our feet, which requires a minimum of wakeful attention*. Their study is based on a victimisation study carrying out in March-April 2007 in a significant sample of the population of the Emilia-Romagna Italian region.

Citizens' dissatisfaction from the provided by the state services for the improvement of the quality of their everyday life intensifies residents' critical attitudes towards police effectiveness as well as their demands for its more intense presence. Given the absence of informal social control in this context, the police is perceived as "an organization in the service of the local population" and, as such, satisfaction from police services "constitutes a 'logical' criterion for its assessment"<sup>9</sup>.

The findings of the Italian survey presented infra by Cabras, Raccis and Agus in their paper on "*Unsafety and incivility in the urban context*" indicate that the *most effective security devices show the importance of the presence of Police Force and Institutions in the area*. In this case the police function in terms of prevention, *by acting upon individual responsibility, stimulating active participation in the neighbourhood's life, increasing the citizens' sense of community and sense of belonging to their place of living*.

The lack of social bonds is an important factor in the emergence of citizens' insecurity as is argued by Vošnjak, Šifrer, Meško in their study on "*Fear of crime factors*" based on 2009 survey in Ljubljana, Slovenia. According to this research findings, a negative connection is observed between social networks and fear of crime, since *respondents who have more trust in people living in the same neighbourhood, have more friends and know more people who they can rely on, so feel less threatened*.

These facts intensify the insecurity stemming from the perception of crime as a serious threat, and if coinciding with personal events such as victimisation experience, it contributes significantly to the increase of fear of crime<sup>10</sup>. The research evidence presented in "*Fear of crime*

1. President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice: The challenge of crime in a free society (1967) & Task force report: Crime and its impact - An assessment (1967a), Washington D.C., Government Printing Office. Commission d'enquête sur l'Administration de la Justice en matière criminelle et pénale, La société face au crime, Montréal, Éditions officielles du Québec, 1968, 1970.
2. Ditton J. with S. Farrall, J. Bannister and E. Gilchrist, (2000). "Crime surveys and the measurement problem: fear of crime", in V. Jupp, P. Davies, P. Francis (Eds), Doing criminological research, Sage, 142-156(142).
3. Gray E., Jackson J., and Farrall ST. (2008). "Researching everyday emotions: Towards a multi-disciplinary investigation of the fear of crime", in Kury H. (Ed.), Fear of crime - Punitivity. New developments in theory and research, Universitätsverlag Dr. N. Brockmeyer: 3-24, Bochum.
4. Taylor R., M. Hale, (1986) "Testing alternative models of fear of crime", The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, vol. 77, 151-189(152).
5. Zarafonitou Ch. (2009). "Criminal victimisation in Greece and the fear of crime: A 'paradox' for interpretation". International Review of Victimology 16, 277-300.
6. Hale C. (1996). "Fear of crime: A review of literature", International Review of Victimology, 4, 79-150.
7. F. Furstenberg, (1984). "Public reaction to crime in streets", American Scholar, vol.40, 1971, 601-610, Ch.Louis-Guérin, "Les réactions sociales du crime : peur et punitivité", Revue française de sociologie, vol. 25, 623-635.

8. Skogan W., and Maxfield M. (1981). Coping with crime: Individual and neighbourhood reactions. B.Hills: Sage publications, Lewis D.A. & Salem G., (1986). Fear of crime: Incivility and the production of a social problem, New Brunswick, Transactions, Reiss A., (1986). "Why are communities important in understanding crime?" in A. Reiss & M. Tonry (Eds) Communities and crime, Univ. of Chicago Press, 1-33. This concept refers to factors related to what is defined also as "disorder perspective" (Taylor & Hale, 1986: 154).
9. Killias M. (2001). Précis de Criminologie. Berne: Staempfli Editions, 429.
10. St. Box, C. Hale, G. Andrews, Explaining fear of crime, ó.n., 1988, 352.

in contemporary Greece" (Zarafonitou) reflects the association of citizens' insecurity with the perception of the quality of their everyday life as degraded as well as their dissatisfaction with the state services. In this context, the interpretation of the examined phenomenon is based on the fundamental assumption that a feeling of general social insecurity is expressed through fear of crime.

The approach of Vanderveen is based on the critical perception of fear of crime as a "social construction". As she argues in her article "Fear of crime: its social construction in the Netherlands", to suggest that something is socially constructed, is not to say that it is non-existent, not a problem or that it should not be influenced or measured but that without statistics, surveys and the (governmental) need for knowledge on attitudes and opinions, the concept 'fear of crime' would not have been born.

It is a fact that the interdisciplinary study of fear of crime involves the psycho-social and political aspects of the phenomenon. For this reason, it has been argued that it consists a "criminological sub-discipline", which apart from its scientific status, it has also a political and a popular status<sup>11</sup>. Beneath this light, fear of crime is considered to be "a natural object of criminological inquiry and governmental regulation"<sup>12</sup>. The complexity of this subject of the associated with crime insecurity is reflected also in its consequences at personal and social level, combined with the significant role of the expression of punitive attitudes as well as demagogic policies based primarily on "penal populism"<sup>13</sup>.

The relation between fear of crime and punitivity is examined by Kury & Kuhlmann in their study on "Punitiveness and Fear of Crime in European Countries". This overview points out the differentiated conceptualisation of fear of crime as well as of punitivity and focuses on the role of popular attitudes towards criminal sanctions, intensification of legislative and sentencing policies, as well as practices by law enforcement and other social control agencies.

This question is approached also by Kuhn & Vuille, who examine if "Judges are too lenient according to public opinion?" through the 2000 Swiss survey. The study shows that the population pronounced average sentences that were significantly harsher than those of the

judges. Nevertheless, a more refined analysis shows that a majority of the population would actually be satisfied with less severe sentences than those pronounced by the judges.

At a time when social problems are intensified and financial crisis affects mainly the vulnerable social groups, citizens' insecurities as well as the social conflicts are increased. In this context, the role of the safety governance from the state services is very important and the comparative approach of Cachet, Hughes, Ponsaers, Prins, in their study "Fragmentation and Interconnection in Public Safety Governance in Belgium, England and Wales and the Netherlands: Empirical Explorations and Imagined Futures" contributes in this direction. Public safety governance is conceptualised here as all the actions of relevant actors on the local level that are meant to establish public safety and, of particular relevance to this Special Issue, reduce the fear of crime, insecurity and disorder on the municipality level.

Greece experiences the aforementioned problems along with the increase of criminality and especially violent criminality motivated by profit. In this context, criminological research can contribute decisively to the rational confrontation of the phenomenon.

This special issue is dedicated to the comparative approach of fear of crime and its consequences, at the European level. The studies included examine both the above-mentioned aspects of fear of crime/insecurity expressions and its consequences in punitiveness as well as in policies for its confrontation. This special issue is, indeed, an attempt which can be characterised as pioneering for the relevant Greek editions, but at the same time well-timed, taking into consideration that the Greek society faces significant social changes and intensified social and criminal problems. In any case, this project could not be achieved without the willing response of the distinguished colleagues who accepted my invitation and participate in this special issue with studies of high scientific quality and for this reason I would like to thank them. It could not also be achieved without the trustfulness of the Director of the Journal *Criminology* Professor Emeritus Iakovos Farsedakis as well as the "Legal Library" Publications (Nomiki Vivliothiki) that reinforce the efforts of Greek criminologists for several years, and for these reasons I would like to thank them both for their cooperation and trust. I would like to thank also my PhD student Ioanna Gouseti for her collaboration in the stages of preparation of this edition.

11 M. Lee, The genesis of 'fear of crime', στο Theoretical Criminology, vol. 5(4), 2001, 467-485(481).

12 Ibid.

13 Garland D. (2001). The culture of control. Crime and social order in contemporary society. Oxford - N.York: Oxford University Press.

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## B' ARTICLES

# Security and territory: a complex relationship comprising fears old and new\*

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*Security is a particularly complex, and in many ways slippery issue; yet it is equally true that its opposite, insecurity, is also an extremely complex, multi-faceted question. As is often the case with the trickiest of social issues, the gap that separates scientific research from public opinion tends to widen rather than narrow, because the perception of the seriousness of crime is largely dependent, as highlighted earlier, by personal and emotional elements, as well how the various episodes are covered in the media. The attempt to shed light on the problems that derive from this situation and that fuel the demand for greater security led to the carrying out in March-April 2007 of a victimisation study, based on a questionnaire supplied using the CATI technique to a significant sample of the population resident in the Emilia-Romagna Italian region.*

## 1. Perception of crime and feeling of insecurity

There are few issues that trigger such heated debate among public opinion and in the media as the question of security, which is also a key element in election campaigns at both national and local level.

The perception of crime and the feeling of insecurity that goes hand in hand with it are now firmly installed at the top of the political agenda, and have a central role to play in public opinion, bolstered also by the persistent contribution made by the echo chamber effect of the mass media.

Given its complex nature and the multitude of visions and approaches it comprises, security may well be considered a multi-dimensional concept that means different things to different people in different contexts, because each individual has a precise awareness of his or her own "space". This awareness varies in accordance with the relationship each has with the world, since even in everyday life, the individual's particular environment is determined by the specific activities he or she carries out.

In addition to geographical roots, i.e. those determined by birthplace and subsequent position in space and time, spiritual roots may also develop, and it is these that ideally allow individuals to survive anywhere throughout the course of their lives. Thus, while our place of origin indeed represents the vital element in the course our lives take, and acts as a repository of our feelings and affections, it is equally true that that sense of belonging may either afford a sense of protection and continuity through the generations, or, on the contrary, become an intensely destructive source of conflict.

This sense of place therefore takes on a psychological value, becoming the subjective index of the relationship between individuals and the space that surrounds them; a relationship within which are comprised the inner, intimately significant aspects, together with collective elements determined by history: in other words, by the spirit, from archetypal forms to the actual situation of the places and environments where daily life is played out<sup>1</sup>.

\* This article is the fruit of shared reflections: specifically, paragraphs 1, 3 and 7 were written by Roberta Bisi and paragraphs 2, 4, 5 and 6 by Raffaella Sette.

Therefore, the choices regarding the means through which citizens may be guaranteed security today represent a crucial arena, a "place" fundamental to the wielding of power<sup>2</sup>.

Security is certainly a particularly complex, and in many ways slippery issue; yet it is equally true that its opposite, insecurity, is also an extremely complex, multi-faceted question.

Any attempt to free insecurity from concern about crime – notoriously conditioned also by ideological factors and the action of the media – leads us to take into consideration the fear of falling victim to criminal acts, a more pertinent indicator of an actual sense of unease. As is often the case with the trickiest of social issues, the gap that separates scientific research from public opinion tends to widen rather than narrow, because the perception of the seriousness of crime is largely dependent, as highlighted earlier, by personal and emotional elements, as well how the various episodes are covered in the media.

The attempt to shed light on the problems that derive from this situation and that fuel the demand for greater security, often pervaded by contradictory aspects, led to the carrying out in March-April 2007 of a victimisation study<sup>3</sup>, based on a questionnaire supplied using the CATI (Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing) technique to a significant sample of the population resident in the Emilia-Romagna region<sup>4</sup>, aged 18 or over and with a land-line

1. E. Liotta, *Su anima e terra*. Il valore psichico del luogo, Magi, Roma, 2005.

2. P. Ceri, *La società vulnerabile. Sicurezza e libertà*, Laterza, Roma-Bari, 2003

3. The results of the research, partially illustrated in this article, may be found in full in *Legalità e comunicazione. Una sfida ai victimisation processes* by A. Balloni, R. Bisi and S. Costantino, published by FrancoAngeli, Milan, 2008.

4. Emilia-Romagna is a region in north-western Italy, officially established on 7 June 1970. It has a population of 4,417,113, and the regional capital is Bologna. Emilia-Romagna has a highly developed economy, with – as in the rest of Italy – numerous small, family-run businesses that produce a variety of goods. There are also a large number of cooperatives, especially in the provinces of Reggio Emilia, Modena, Bologna and Forlì-Cesena. Emilia-Romagna is considered one of the wealthiest regions in Europe, with employment rates of over 70% (80% in Modena and Reggio Emilia): <http://www.emiliaro-magnalavoro.it/numerilavoro.htm>



telephone. 10,500 telephone calls were made, yielding a response rate of 22.5%, and 1824 questionnaires were collected<sup>5</sup>.

Victimisation processes deriving from violent behaviours come in many shapes and forms. This disturbing social phenomenon raises a number of issues, because it calls into question society in its entirety and requires a range of responses.

This range of responses must be based on the observation that Man shapes the unit that is his individual personality not only from a series of interests, feelings and thoughts that blend perfectly with each other as a result of logical, religious or ethical principles, but also – indeed *above all* – thanks to the contradictions and the struggles that preceded the formation of this unit. There is no social unit in which the convergent elements are not continually intersected by divergent elements: it is the closeness of the relationship between these elements in the group that determines the multitude of meanings hostility may assume, because, on the one hand, the group may be able to withstand – precisely as a result of this measure of cohesion – a certain amount of conflict without coming apart, yet on the other, the group may – again precisely because of the cohesion and sense of unity within it – feel threatened by any element perceived as discordant. What determines the group's ability to stand up to pressure is its centripetal force<sup>6</sup>.

In this sense, those we interviewed, when faced with the problem of the measures that should be adopted by the government in order to protect them more effectively from crime, split into two groups: the larger of the two believes that the most appropriate solution is to apply a variety of criminal sanctions as the principal means of social control, and therefore that the social fabric may be held together only through a sort of isolation in which everything is moved away from the damage caused by the conflict, just like in the belly of a boat, composed of a series of spaces rigidly isolated from one another by watertight partitions, in such a way that even if the hull is damaged, the water is kept out of the boat; the second, much smaller, of the two groups is composed of those leaning towards solutions we might describe as "softer", mentioning alternatives such as "improving the appearance of cities" in order to cut the likelihood of crime being committed.

It is clear that for this latter group cohesion may be obtained through a sort of organised solidarity approach in which action is aimed at lessening the damage caused by the conflict that generates insecurity.

Insecurity and processes of victimisation are distinctive elements of daily life in urban settings.

The city is the backdrop to hostility towards others connected to living processes, all the more so in societies such as ours where

5. An analysis of the main sociodemographic characteristics reveals a sample comprising 52% women and 48% men, composed mainly of people who are married or in a relationship (66.1%), 80.2% of whom live with their families, composed of 2,3 or 4 members.

The average age of those interviewed is 50.8: 49.5 for the men and 52 for the women.

As regards educational qualifications, analysis reveals that over half of the respondents (55.8%) have a medium-high level of education.

Employment status among the group varies: those in employment account for 51.7% of the sample. Therefore, 32.6% do not currently work: 4.6% are unemployed and 28% are retired. To these must be added housewives (10%) and students (5.6%).

With regard to the size of the municipalities of residence, more than half of those interviewed (57.24%) live in small towns or villages (with a population of up to 50,000). It should be noted that the only municipality in the Emilia-Romagna region with a population of over 250,000 is the city of Bologna.

6. G. Simmel, "Sur la psychologie sociale de l'hostilité", *L'année sociologique*, vol.56, n°1, 2006, pp.169-175.

communication almost invariably takes place in complex situations. In this regard, the interviewees resident in cities with a population of over 250,000 (Bologna only in the case of the Emilia-Romagna region), when asked about the main consequences suffered by crime victims, are more likely than others in the sample to mention the psychological consequences deriving from the crime.

In this sense, it is worth recalling the comment on a passage from the gospel according to Mark that was made some years ago by Cardinal Carlo Maria Martini during an international convention<sup>7</sup>, in which he specifically referred to the episode of the man from Gerasa, known for his strange, violent behaviour: when Jesus asks him his name, he replies "My name is Legion, for we are many", thus revealing a fracture that prevents him from expressing himself clearly, precluding him from the pleasure of relating to others.

This is a man who has no name of his own, who is known by the collective name of suffering and exclusion.

The people we interviewed who live in cities are thus familiar with the intense colours of life; they come into contact daily with the amplified effects of a disconcerting, often dramatic, existential fatigue, and the city thus becomes that physical space in which "the nation of the men of Gerasa live": men that make up the Legion of those who adopt strange, violent behaviour, but also those who form the Legion that laments the absence of a genuine spatial closeness, a real sense of human attachment and community.

## 2. The concerns of the citizens of Emilia-Romagna

In general terms, it is fair to say that the relationship between actual crime rates in a given area and the sense of insecurity perceived by the citizens who live there is very complex, and the two are certainly not directly proportional. Today, more than ever before, people have high expectations, as well as a very acute perception of the risks posed to them by the fragmented, individualised global world, in which everything appears ephemeral and in constant flux, and this perception helps to explain why feelings of insecurity are not always exclusively linked to crime rates. Indeed, today as never before, a sense of insecurity is made up of an extremely wide range of fears and concerns, of which crime is one factor, but not the only factor.

With this in mind, the first aspect of the questionnaire provided covered precisely this "security concern", posed through the classic question that asked respondents to choose from the list indicated the two social problems they believed should take top priority for the government. Thus, by answering this question, the interviewees indirectly expressed their level of concern regarding the social phenomena listed.

The survey showed that according to the citizens of Emilia-Romagna, the problems of today's society requiring the most urgent attention are delinquency (50%), followed by unemployment (37%) and immigration (31.15%) and then, in virtually the same measure, poverty (25.6%) and pollution (25.5%), followed by drug addiction (16.2%). A very small percentage of the sample also mentioned problems such as urban decay (1.43%) and the lack of social services (around 1%).

Concern regarding delinquency is perceived by population groups situated at opposing ends of the sociodemographic scale, with at one extreme the youngest respondents (those aged between 18

7. C. M. Martini, "Impegnarsi per realizzare una città abitabile", in *La città - nanza è terapeutica. Confronto sulle buone pratiche per la salute mentale*, Milano, 15-17 April 2002.

and 29, accounting for 44.8% of the responses) and at the other the oldest (65 and over, accounting for 55.7%); those with either a very low level of education (primary school diploma, 57.9%) or a very high level (university degree, around 41%); those who live in towns with a population of between 10,000 and 50,000 (53.5%) or those who live in Bologna (54.2%).

In the sub-group formed by the elderly (composed of those aged 65 and over), delinquency also tops the list, with the highest response rates: 56.5% of the women interviewed and 53% of the men. This means that if we compare the sample as a whole with the group formed by men aged 65 and over, there is a 6% rise in the percentage of those who perceive delinquency as one of the major concerns in our society. This gap more than doubles (increasing to 13.2%) if we consider the women aged 65 and over interviewed.

Also, with reference to the problem of drug addiction, the response rate rises from 16.2% for the sample as a whole to 22.7% among the sub-group formed by women aged 65 and over, representing a significant increase of 40.1%.

One possible interpretation of this finding may be that greater attention is paid to the issue of drug addiction by this section of the sample (women aged 65 and over) as a result of the common, widespread images that link drugs with crime, placing particular emphasis on the figure of the "druggie" as an immoral individual who will resort to any means, including violence, to procure the money required to buy drugs<sup>8</sup>. If this is the case, the decision to focus on the problem of drug addiction might represent a synecdoche, a figure of speech that, as we know, extends the use of a term beyond its specific meaning and uses it in a figurative sense to convey a wider, or narrower, concept. In this particular case, a part is used to refer to the whole, and drug addiction becomes synonymous with delinquency.

Closely connected with this first question on the problems the Italian government ought to tackle with the greatest urgency is the question that, moving from the general to the specific, asked the sample for their views on the measures the Italian government should adopt in order to guarantee citizens more effective protection from crime.

The items proposed in the question focused, on the one hand, on a number of aspects regarding the actual existence or the threat of the penalties ("greater police presence", "tougher sentences", "ensuring jail sentences are served in full") and, on the other, on indications more closely related to prevention policies of a situational nature ("more CCTV cameras on the streets", "improving the appearance of cities") or a social nature ("promoting the rehabilitation of offenders", "more help centres"). The question also left a space for respondents to specify an opinion that was not covered by the options proposed.

A clear majority of answers leaned towards the view that criminal sanctions, in their various forms, are the social control tool best able to protect citizens from crime. In this sense, among the various aims criminal sanctions attempt to achieve we find, as is well known, both general prevention or deterrence (linking back to the options "tougher sentences" and "greater police presence", with the latter outlining the scope of territorial control) and individual prevention

(an aim represented in the questionnaire by the item "ensuring jail sentences are served in full").

Under the "other" option in the questionnaire we find responses that, though small in number, link up with both approaches, i.e.: "education and awareness-raising campaigns" (an answer given by 45 respondents), "quicker trials" (22 respondents) and "reintroduction of capital punishment" (7 respondents).

The remainder of the sample (22.7%) showed greater sensitivity towards the direct prevention of delinquency as a means to more effectively protecting citizens from crime: this group were more inclined to select items such as "promoting the rehabilitation of offenders", "more help centres", "more CCTV cameras on the streets" and "improving the appearance of cities".

Crime prevention regards all those measures that help combat crime and diminish the sense of insecurity generated thereby among citizens, by directly discouraging criminal activity or adopting policies and taking action aimed at reducing the potential for crime and limiting the causes of it<sup>9</sup>. In order to achieve its objectives, prevention employs solutions other than those provided for by criminal sanctions, meaning, broadly speaking, that it relies on institutions and operators other than those at work in the traditional criminal system, who may, nonetheless, work in synergy with the latter. Therefore, going back to the questionnaires, the residents in Emilia Romagna included in the sample appear clearly divided into two groups of different sizes: on the one hand, the majority (73.8%), who believe that resorting to the traditional criminal system is the best way to protect citizens from delinquency; and on the other, a smaller group (22.7%), composed of those leaning towards alternative solutions that consist both of trying to prevent crime from being committed and of reducing the frequency of other "anti-social" manifestations, with the help of a variety of resources (for example, "more CCTV cameras in the streets", as featured in the questionnaire) to be used with individuals, groups and situations.

The faith demonstrated by the interviews from the Emilia-Romagna region in criminal sanctions is further indicated by the responses given to the question regarding how effective tougher sentences are in combating crime (the options were: "very effective", "quite effective", "not very effective", "ineffective"). The importance of this question lies in the fact that the content of legislative measures may depend on how punitive public opinion is<sup>10</sup>. This is ancient history: from time immemorial, criminal policy has never coincided exactly with the will of the ruler, but is rather the zealous response to the demands of the populace.

77.8% of those interviewed are inclined to believe that tougher sentences are "very effective" or "quite effective" in combating crime. This opinion may be influenced by a variety of factors, and in our sample it is principally linked to two particular sociodemographic characteristics: level of education and gender.

A significant statistical correlation is evident between the variable regarding the effectiveness of tougher sentences to combat crime and the gender of respondents<sup>11</sup>. This means that the gender of those interviewed helps to create the dichotomy of decisions regarding the

8. For a closer look at the relationship between crime and drugs: Balloni A., *Criminologia e psicopatologia. Analisi di 110 perizie psichiatriche*, Patron, Bologna, 2004; Balloni A., "Prefazione", in Bisi R. (a cura di), *Tossicodipendenze, comunità e trattamento. Strumenti di analisi*, Clueb, Bologna, 2006, pp. 7-14; Bisi R., "L'ascolto creativo che riapre uno spazio", in Bisi R. (a cura di), *Tossicodipendenze, comunità e trattamento. Strumenti di analisi*, Clueb, Bologna, 2006, pp. 299-314; Sette R., "Strumenti di lettura per un fenomeno in mutamento", in Bisi R. (a cura di), *Tossicodipendenze, comunità e trattamento. Strumenti di analisi*, Clueb, Bologna, 2006, pp. 81-116.

9. Cf. article 1 of Decision no. 2001/427/GAI of the Council of Europe of 28 May 2001 that set up a crime prevention network (published in the *Official Journal of the European Community* on 8/6/2001).

10. Dowler K., «Media consumption and public attitudes toward crime and justice: the relationship between fear of crime, punitive attitudes, and perceived police effectiveness», in *Journal of Criminal Justice and Popular Culture*, vol. 10, n. 2, 2003, pag. 112.

11. Pearson's coefficient for men = 0.9242 and for women = 0.9039; confidence interval 99% - one tail.

issues raised by the question posed: women have greater faith than men in the effectiveness of tougher sentences to combat crime.

The ways in which citizens perceive the issues linked to the area of criminal justice are undoubtedly complex, and must be placed in relation with a number of different factors, including, as explained, gender.

In this regard, the recent findings of the European Crime and Safety Survey on the attitudes of European citizens towards crime, crime prevention and police forces, dubbed the age and gender factors the "Big Two" (with reference above all to Germany), i.e. the demographic variables most closely related with a punitive attitude on the part of respondents<sup>12</sup>.

To return to our survey, it emerges that the level of education also has a significant effect on how interviewees respond to the question on the effectiveness of tougher sentences to combat crime<sup>13</sup>.

The conviction that tougher sentences are effective at combating crime is found along a sort of unbroken line that runs from a higher percentage among those with a lower level of education down towards a lower percentage among those with a medium to high level of education: from 73.3% among those with no qualifications to 29.7% among those educated to degree level. The opposite is also valid: if we analyse the responses of those who believe tougher sentences are "not very effective" or "not at all effective" in combating crime, we find that 10.2% of respondents with a primary school diploma only consider this solution "not very effective", while the figure rises to 22.8% among graduates. For the option "not at all effective", the figures are, respectively, 5.3% and 10.8%, i.e. more than double. These differences are also reflected in the less unequivocal response "quite effective", where the percentages rise from 28.7% among those with a primary school diploma only to 35.8% among graduates.

It is therefore possible that the less punitive attitude demonstrated by those with a higher level of education derives from the fact they may be better able to recognise the inequalities inherent in the justice system, and therefore to identify solutions to the "crime problem" (for example, promoting the rehabilitation of offenders, opening more help centres and improving the appearance of cities) that differ from those traditionally adopted and widely known, which contemplate only severe criminal sanctions<sup>14</sup>.

### 3. Experience of self and objectual relations in the process of victimisation

In an individual who has experienced the role of victim, subjected to severe, prolonged frustration, feelings of personal failure and anxiety may emerge, followed by behaviours aimed at defending self-image. It is important to bear in mind that the essentially psychological

connotation of identity also takes on a social dimension, in that it places the individual within the sphere of rights and obligations of the community.

Indeed, acknowledging that the individual has an identity as a single human being means taking concrete action to update the principle and the value borne by him or her.

In this sense, the concept of identity achieves total fulfilment at the level of the everyday practices in which Man engages with the world around him, through what he knows and how he acts.

Therefore, self is not merely the awareness of a thinking subject; to take up the ideas of William James, it is rather the sum of a set of elements that, through the constant flow of thought, are perceived by the individual as belonging to him or her: first and foremost the body loved ones, social roles and so on.

"Between what a man calls *me* and what he simply calls *mine* the line is difficult to draw. We feel and act about certain things that are ours very much as we feel and act about ourselves"<sup>15</sup>.

In all cases and "in its widest possible sense, a man's Self is the sum total of all that he can call his, not only his body and his psychic powers, but his clothes and his house, his wife and children, his ancestors and friends, his reputation and works, his lands and horses, and yacht and bank account. All these things give him the same emotions. If they wax and prosper, he feels triumphant; if they dwindle and die away, he feels cast down, - not necessarily in the same degree for each thing, but in much the same way for all"<sup>16</sup>.

If the first level of self is what James defines as *material self*, in which our being and a number of particular contexts are identified, closely related to this is the *social self*, i.e. how we perceive the regard we are held in by others: "A man's social self is the recognition which he gets from his mates"<sup>17</sup>, and indeed, where physically possible, few more cruel fates can be imagined for a man than being free to move within society, yet going completely unnoticed by all the components that society is made up of.

Acknowledging that the view others have of us and the image we see reflected in the individuals around us go towards shaping our being means seeing each person as a set of interconnections with his or her surroundings: in particular with objects (as emerges from the analysis of the material self) and with what we perceive as being most similar to us, namely other people.

This is why James believed that "a man has as many social selves as there are individuals who recognize him [...]. To wound any one of these images is to wound him"<sup>18</sup>. The result of this is a division of the individual into numerous selves, and this may be a discordant splitting, as where the individual is afraid to let one set of his acquaintances know him as he is elsewhere; or it may be a perfectly harmonious division of labour, as where a person who is affectionate towards his children becomes inflexible towards his subordinates.

With this in mind, our sense of individuality and personal uniqueness may be seen as the product of the dynamic equilibrium between the "leaning towards the exterior", which tends to perceive our self as part of a whole, and the "leaning towards the interior", which tends to perceive our self as part of the whole. Therefore, the direct, symbolic interaction with the experience of others becomes the

12. Cfr. Künrich B., Kania H., *Attitudes Towards Punishment in the European Union. Results from the 2005 European Crime Survey (ECSS) with Focus on Germany*, 2008 (see the Website: [http://www.europeansafetyobservatory.eu/euics\\_rp.htm](http://www.europeansafetyobservatory.eu/euics_rp.htm)).

13. 2way ANOVA: the level of education accounts for 48.08% of the total variance;  $F=7.40$ .

14. Other research, although conducted in different places and at different times, has also highlighted this relationship between educational qualifications and punitive attitudes. See, for example, the following study based on the US figures of the National Opinion Survey on Crime and Justice: Dowler K., "Media consumption and public attitudes toward crime and justice: the relationship between fear of crime, punitive attitudes, and perceived police effectiveness", in *Journal of Criminal Justice and Popular Culture*, vol. 10, n. 2, 2003, pp. 109-126.

15. W. James, *Il flusso di coscienza*. I principi di psicologia (a cura di L. Demartis), Mondadori, Milano, 1998 pp. 115-116.

16. *Ibidem*, p.116.

17. *Ibidem*, p.120.

18. *Ibidem*, p.121.



fundamental process able to transform subjective evolution into an unceasing assimilation of personal experience.

Thus, the perception of our personal identity – which corresponds to our very sense of reality – cannot exist without others; at the same time, it is through the process of differentiation from others that we discover the equally necessary basis on which to build an experience of self.

The relationship between Ego and self is invariably also a relationship with things and with other people. The difficulties and the wounds caused by this relationship leave their mark on us, because the unity of the Ego is never absolute and the relationship with others is frequently problematic.

It is essentially for this reason that for an individual who has fallen victim to a crime, victimisation not only causes psychological damage, but also opens a breach in that group binding at the origin of what has been described as “community rupture”<sup>19</sup>. When interpersonal relationships become difficult or unstable, living becomes increasingly arduous, also as a result of the diffidence perceived in the expressions and behaviour of the people we are called upon to interact with.

The victimisation process has a detrimental effect on the sense of belonging to a community, interlinked with an intense feeling of abandonment and the sense that core cultural values are being called into question.

#### 4. Too much psychology in everyday life?

“In your opinion, what are the main consequences suffered by a person who has been the victim of a crime”?

Analysing the responses to this question helps to highlight the fact that emotions have today become a matter of intense cultural interest, also in terms of the representation of crime and crime victims.

What stands out is that almost 80% of those interviewed believe that the main consequences of victimisation are of a psychological nature, followed – but very much at a distance – by observations on the consequences affecting relationships with others (33.3%) and those of a physical (25.7%), economic (24.5%) and material (17.4%) nature.

Given that the lives of respondents to our questionnaire are characterised by the security of material wellbeing (damaging economic consequences are taken into consideration by just a quarter of the sample), it is other types of anxiety that are likely to torment them, such as concern for psychological suffering and the potential (further?) deterioration of their relationships with others following a victimisation experience.

It has become the norm to believe that emotional damage is more serious than physical damage, and while the idea of psychological damage undoubtedly derives from a heightened cultural sensitivity, much more attentive than before to emotional problems, it must be said that the effects of this approach are not devoid of ambiguity.

To follow the thread of this reasoning, the approach adopted must be based on an analysis of the emergence of the so-called “therapy culture” as a widespread way of thinking that influences the general perception of events in life, but actually has little to do with genuine mental suffering and is closer to a radical redefinition of the concept of the human being, also associated with the authority crisis.

It has become almost simple common sense to identify the fragmentation of social life, the marked individualisation of private

life, and the crumbling of social solidarity and community rules with a rise in anxiety and a sense of uncertainty.

According to a number of those sociologists who have labelled our contemporary world the “risk society”, uncertainty regarding the rules and regulations that govern people’s lives triggers the demand for psychological responses. This approach links the disorganisation of individual identity with the demise of tradition and the crumbling away of a system of shared convictions able to regulate human relationships<sup>20</sup>. In this regard it is worth recalling Giddens, who believes that the rise in uncertainty and risks has engendered a reflexive, self-referential process, within which therapy is used as a tool for the conscious planning of our existence.

The spread of rhetoric and the emphasis placed on psychological syndromes would therefore appear to be the product of a post-traditional society where a sense of continuity is missing, in which the process of individualisation weakens our links with others and gives increasing rise to social isolation, with the result that personal relationships become more difficult to deal with.

It is here that the therapy culture comes in. Highly individualised and with a close eye on emotions, the reason for entering therapy is to attempt to make sense of our existential confusion. The advantage offered by therapy culture is its ability to provide individuals with a series of moral compass points they can use to navigate their way through social life; this is achieved, however, through a celebration of the culture of self, and the result, as in a sort of vicious circle, is a further fragmentation of private life<sup>21</sup>. The disorganisation of the private sphere clearly has important implications, and the lack of a network of stable, structured relationships risks leaving the individual without any support. Compelled by our own experiences in life to expect little from personal relationships, we end up with an extremely weak, vulnerable perception of our self<sup>22</sup>.

In support of this vision, it is interesting to take a closer look at the responses given by people with a victimisation experience behind them<sup>23</sup>. While some aspects that emerged from their observations were predictable, others were unexpected, and these latter aspects link up with the considerations above regarding the spread of the therapy culture.

It might have been reasonable to expect those respondents who have suffered what we define a crime against the person (this general definition covers a series of different crimes such as armed robbery, assault, personal injury, physical abuse, sexual and psychological violence, verbal abuse, threats) to complain more than victims of theft (33.3% in the former case against 23% in the latter) of physical consequences, which are intrinsic to such manifestations of aggression. It was equally to be expected that the same pattern should emerge with reference to consequences impacting relationships with others (37.5% among those who have suffered a victimisation experience against their person undermining their physical and/or mental wellbeing; 31.1% in the group who have been burgled and 28.3% among those who have fallen victim to theft in general) and that victims of theft or burglary should complain of

20. Furedi F., *Il nuovo conformismo. Troppa psicologia nella vita quotidiana*, Feltrinelli, Milano, 2005, pp. 107-110.

21. Ibidem, pag. 114.

22. Ibidem, pag. 130.

23. The type of crime respondents have had direct experience of influences their opinions on the consequences suffered by crime victims. 2way ANOVA: the variable regarding the type of crime experienced accounts for 42.75% of the total variance;  $F=6.51$ . The effect of this variable is considered very significant.

19. C. Barrois, *Les névroses traumatiques*, Dunod, Paris, 1998.

greater economic consequences (27.8% for victims of burglaries; 27.2% for victims of theft; 25% for crimes against the person).

What is particularly odd is that those who have fallen victim to theft complain of psychological consequences to a greater extent than those who have suffered a crime against their person (84% and 77.1% respectively).

Men aged 65 and over, on the other hand - to an extent that may appear small in percentage terms but is statistically very significant by virtue of the findings of the statistical analyses carried out<sup>24</sup> - place greater importance on the psychological consequences deriving from a burglary than those caused by a theft in more general terms.

In victimological literature, there is strong evidence to support the idea that a burglary may be considered a violation of the privacy of those who live in the house, and indeed the rooms of our home are very much our own private space, where our personal life is played out, and they become a repository of the history of their occupants. These are spaces accessible to the family only, or perhaps to others selected by the family group; on the latter, however, limits may be placed, because these spaces reveal a part of us, our habits, the objects we are attached to. When a stranger enters these areas uninvited, probably forcing his way in, this intrusion may be perceived as a violation of the private sphere that belongs to the house's occupants, in the sense that the malefactor has entered this private space, gained access to the private dimension of those it belongs to, trampling over their property in both a physical and psychological sense. From this point of view it is understandable that some of our respondents with direct experience of such a situation are more likely to complain of psychological suffering than those who have been robbed outside of the home.

In addition, the group comprising men of 65 and over also believes that physical consequences are more likely to be experienced among victims of crimes against the person, while their female counterparts, oddly enough - as was also the case, as already highlighted, for the rest of the sample - indicate the opposite. Another sociodemographic variable that influences the responses to the questionnaire is the size of the municipality of residence of those interviewed<sup>25</sup>.

A number of interesting aspects emerge from a closer look at the responses regarding psychological consequences and the effects on relationships with others. In the former case, this type of repercussion is mentioned much more frequently by citizens of Bologna (85.8%) than by other respondents, while these same residents of Bologna place less importance on the effects on relationships with others than the rest of the sample (27.7%, the lowest figure, as compared to 39.2%, the highest figure, among those that live in towns of between 50,001 and 100,000 inhabitants).

The idea, therefore, is that the citizens of Bologna, the largest city in Emilia-Romagna, when it comes to tackling problematic situations, such as post-victimisation, must rely to a greater extent on their

own personal resources than on those deriving from their relations with others (for instance the support network formed by their own *entourage*). This explains why they are mainly concerned with the psychological - i.e. strictly individual - consequences deriving from crime. Life in big cities undermines and weakens social relations, rendering them more fragile and vulnerable to the emergence of a hedonistic, narcissistic form of individualism<sup>26</sup>, the prerogative of those who live immersed within a system of different recognitions and identifications that are fundamental to making sense of everyday life.

By contrast, in smaller towns (up to 100,000 inhabitants), it may be imagined that spending time with others is a more widespread practice, and that networks of social relations remain structural components connected to the way of living in relation with others. In this area, there is a more acute perception that victimisation - which can, for example, bring about a radical change in daily activity, or, if the terms of interaction are inverted, rejection on the part of the community - may have repercussions on relationships with others.

## 5. What happens after a crime?

It is interesting to analyse the approaches to two situations that link up with the broad subject of reactions to criminal acts. In the first, interviewees were asked to choose, from a list of given subjects, who they would count on for help and support following a burglary, while the second referred to a hypothetical post-victimisation phase following a physical assault, already tackled thanks to medical care.

It emerged that if our respondents were burgled, they would look to the following for help and support: the police (83%), a loved one (13%), a doctor (1%), the social services (1%), other (2%).

With regard to the police, it is now well known that the decision to report a crime is based very much on personal considerations, which may be linked to the advantages or risks liable to derive from such action. In this case, it is reasonable to assume that with reference to crimes against property, such as in the event referred to in the questionnaire, it is important to report the crime for "practical" reasons, i.e. for insurance purposes, or in order to obtain duplicates of documents that may have been stolen. It may also be imagined that since burglary is a particularly serious crime, people are likely to decide that the State should be informed; or we might suppose that the victim feels morally obliged to publicly reveal the injustice he or she has suffered. Furthermore, the fact that the police are the first port of call denotes a need for certainties on the part of those who have experienced a sense of impotence when faced with an action that has trampled over their own personal space, and not only in a physical sense.

What is not clear is the extent to which retribution is sought, i.e. the extent to which crimes are reported in the hope those responsible are captured and punished, given that in Italy some 92% of crimes against property brought before the courts are filed against persons unknown (and this figure rises to around 96% for theft alone)<sup>27</sup>, so those responsible are extremely likely to go unpunished.

13% of those interviewed say they would talk to a loved one about the event and seek comfort there, while no more than 2% of total respondents would seek help from other institutional figures, such as a doctor or the social services.

But what happens once a victim has been treated for a physical assault?

24. The type of crime respondents have had direct experience of also influences their opinions regarding the consequences suffered by crime victims aged 65 and over.

2way ANOVA (group of men aged  $\Rightarrow$  65): the variable regarding the type of crime suffered accounts for 42.72% of the total variance;  $F=6.93$ . The effect of this variable is considered very significant.

2way ANOVA (group of women aged  $\Rightarrow$  65): the variable regarding the type of crime suffered accounts for 49.17% of the total variance;  $F=7.99$ . The effect of this variable is considered extremely significant.

25. The size of the municipality of residence influences opinions regarding the consequences suffered by crime victims. 2way ANOVA: the variable regarding the size of the town of residence accounts for 19.07% of the total variance;  $F=8.37$ . The effect of this variable is considered extremely significant.

26. Cfr. D'Andrea D., Pulcini E. (a cura di), *Filosofie della globalizzazione*, ETS, Pisa 2001.

27. See the Website: <http://giustiziaincifre.istat.it>.

Predictably, here recourse to the police falls sharply: just 30.8% of respondents would seek assistance from a police officer, while a much higher percentage (56.8%) would prefer to talk to a loved one (clearly, the deliberately generic reference to physical assault was largely interpreted as referring to an aggressor outside of the respondents' circle) or someone from the health professions (the social services, 22.4%, or a psychologist, 36%). Almost 5% checked the "other" box, specifically adding either that they would not seek any kind of help, or that they would take justice into their own hands.

Why do more than two thirds of respondents fail to consider seeking help from the police? Here again, there are a number of different possible explanations: firstly, we believe we can exclude reasons connected to scepticism regarding the efficacy of formal social control, because this would be partially in contrast with the responses given to the question regarding burglary; for the same reason – partial contrast with the responses to the previous question – it also appears reasonable to exclude the idea that a "minor" crime has been committed (for various reasons, physical assault is objectively more worrying than burglary).

Some of the more plausible explanations for not seeking help from the police in this specific case may be linked to the fear of retaliation on the part of the aggressor, or to the fact that victims prefer alternative solutions (confiding in loved ones, or contacting help professionals or religious figures, who may be seen as closer to them and more understanding). Other possible motives may be linked to the perception interviewees have of these institutions: they may fear the reaction of the operator when they decide to report the crime and show how vulnerable they are.

## 6. Security emergency vs responsible citizenship?

A fresh look is taken here at a number of aspects that emerged from the survey conducted, in order to highlight, on the one hand, opinions that still appear to be linked to stereotypes, and on the other, actual victimisation experiences.

a) While 50% of respondents expressed concern regarding delinquency, almost 70% of the sample has never come into direct contact with crime.

Concern over delinquency is higher among those that have either never been the victim of a crime or have been a victim of crimes against the person (the latter group – fortunately – is composed of just 54 people, around 3% of the total).

So is it fair to speak of induced concern?

b) From the point of view of respondents to our questionnaire, what type of reaction would they like to see to this concern?

On the one hand we find those who place excessive faith in the criminal justice system in its broader sense (always deserved?), while on the other we find those who would prefer a justice system that is certainly efficient, but different: one in which punishment – still seen as an essential instrument of social control – can be accompanied by treatment and re-education for both the criminals and their victims, with the aim of helping to spread the culture of lawfulness.

c) A close look at the 65-and-over age group reveals both predictable opinions and unexpected aspects.

Elderly women express greater concern for delinquency and drug addiction than men from the same age bracket, but – as has now been amply demonstrated by other research – the survey also reveals that the elderly are less likely than the other groups to fall victim to

crime. In spite of this, the women are more likely to express punitive opinions compared to the average for the sample.

As regards the consequences of crime, elderly men demonstrate more realistic attitudes than their female counterparts: unlike the latter, men aged over 65 believe that the psychological consequences of a burglary are more significant than those deriving from other kinds of theft, and that physical consequences are perceived to a greater extent by those who have been the victim of a crime against the person than those who have been robbed.

Following a crime, the elderly are more inclined to seek help locally from the certainty and security represented by the institutions: the police and the social services. This is indicative of their faith in the principle of collective security and the free nature of support services.

d) The perception of the victim remains imbued with ambivalence and commonplaces. The victim is seen as a suffering individual who awakens a sense of solidarity and compassion, yet at the same time surrounded by an aura heavy with doubt and perplexity.

In addition, solidarity and compassion begin to wane when the victim is perceived as a player in society able to decide to actively combat the injustice suffered even after his or her unwilling entry into the world of post-victimisation experiences.

e) In such a scenario, what prospects are opened up? Once again, they are ambiguous.

If the victim is manipulated as part of a "dramatisation strategy" that calls for the adoption of urgent, circumstantial measures based on the wave of emotion triggered by events reported in the press, the battle against insecurity and concern over delinquency moves from being problems to be solved to solutions in themselves, through which determination and the will to take action are manifested<sup>28</sup>.

Conversely, if we become aware that a victim is a person who has suffered an injustice, we must proceed to considering the situation he or she finds himself in, encouraging the kind of social engagement within which the victim is assisted and supported throughout a process that, *mutatis mutandis*, must present more analogies with than differences from the process undertaken by the person convicted of the crime. To borrow a symptomatic oxymoron from the language of politics, we might speak of parallel convergences between the two processes, because both, despite their individual characteristics, make their way through a similar programme, the aim of which is to help reconstruct a sense of belonging within society.

Helping crime victims is not welfare statism as an end in itself, but rather a social culture of solidarity seen as a service. This is linked to our duty to provide help and assistance in a positive sense - i.e. in a way that is respectful of the person's dignity and motivational as regards the opportunity to regain control of their potential, which may have been weakened as a result of the experience undergone – to those least fortunate, those to whom suffering and pain have been caused by others. To put it another way, we must place ourselves on the line that links a culture of lawfulness with the rights of victims, without ignoring the inequalities that persist in society<sup>29</sup>.

Uncertainty, therefore, lies in the continual shift back and forth towards one model or the other: the one where the security emergency wave is ridden exclusively in the name of victim idolatry, or the one rooted in responsible citizenship and real protection for victims.

28. See: Mucchielli L., «Introduction», in Mucchielli L. (sous la direction de), *La frénésie sécuritaire. Retour à l'ordre et nouveau contrôle social*, La Découverte, Paris, 2008, pp. 8-10.

29. See: A. Balloni, *Etica, cultura della legalità e prevenzione della victimisation*, Clueb, Bologna, 2006.

## 7. Victims and how they are represented: a repository of unfathomable conspiracy

The repository within which a sense of belonging to a community lied is a receptacle that may be closed, half open or fully open, and evokes a sense of shelter, a safe haven to return to. It is nonetheless true that this repository may mutate and may lose those protective, welcoming features once attributed to it.

The city thus becomes a place able to cause suffering and vulnerability, liable to make it increasingly difficult to stay on our feet, which requires a minimum of wakeful attention.

As clearly highlighted by Blumenberg<sup>30</sup>, for two-legged "Man", staying upright on the ground is an action, an effort, and this is evident from the fact that it tires the body. While a stone lies on the earth, thus satisfying the principle of inertia and the force of gravity constantly acting upon it, and while the vase stands erect on the table so long as the latter supports it and no-one removes it from underneath, Man, in standing upright on the ground does not merely satisfy the principle of inertia, and is not supported by gravitation: on the contrary, it is gravitation that forces him into an endless succession of balancing acts that are in conflict with his intrinsic instability.

The more difficult it is to maintain balance and harmony, the more likely the will to achieve them is to be elevated to the ranks of a cult – which like all cults, demands both victims and ministers.

This consideration is rather pertinent to our sample: perhaps the most significant finding that emerges from the survey is that almost 70% (1269 people) of our sample declared they had never been the victim of a crime, and that this majority is composed for the most part of women and pensioners who, nevertheless, indicate the "delinquency problem" as their main source of concern.

This naturally begs the question – as indeed posed by a psychoanalyst and a lawyer in a French publication<sup>31</sup> – of whether the victim, disregarding the hardly irrelevant fact that he or she has not expressly chosen the situation that has threatened his or her existence – may paradoxically represent a sort of modern hero, someone who has managed to emerge from the shadows of anonymity, to stand out from the crowd.

Therefore, the principle of equality, compassion, the need to distinguish ourselves from our peers, to control our lives by demanding that society acknowledge our individuality would all appear elements instrumental to having victims embody a new form of heroism. An ample majority of those interviewed believe victims are entirely blameless with regard to the victimisation experience they have been subjected to. This result can be linked up with another two findings that emerge from the questionnaire: the first regarding the most serious problems the State should be tackling, which 50% of respondents believe is delinquency, and the second regarding how victims are treated by the legal system, responses to which clearly indicate a widespread conviction (59.3%) that the victim invariably receives poorer treatment than the guilty party.

These findings, which have emerged from the responses given by a sample of the population that, for the most part, has never been a victim of crime may also lead us to believe that the help and solidarity shown towards victims is increasingly indicative of exemplary citizenship, precisely because, when faced with a society that offers a divided and divisive response to the suffering it produces, these

victims offer citizens a glimpse of something they can grasp onto, an anchor able to attenuate the sensation of being adrift at sea.

It is perhaps just this sense of disorientation experienced by these observers of the cracks in history and the traces of melancholy that turns solidarity and arms outstretched towards victims into an excellent opportunity to create perfect harmony – which would otherwise be unfeasible – within the social group.

By behaving thus, each of us can open up a route to invisible solidarity towards all of humankind: this may be a means of atonement for what has been defined as "metaphysical guilt". It is well known that Karl Jaspers<sup>32</sup> launched the hypothesis that among humankind there exists a sense of solidarity able to allow each individual to feel joint responsibility for all the injustices and abuses of power that take place in the world, especially those for which the individual has not done everything in his or her power to prevent.

So it may be reasonable to believe that the "Time of the Assassins" by Rimbaud has today given way to the "time of the victims", in which the players are characterised by a narcissistic approach that places them in tune with an increasingly divided, fragile social framework that exalts the psychological sphere of the individual without thereby strengthening their character.

This is a form of narcissism that is not limited to mere self-contemplation in the "languid tasting characteristic of reflexive knowledge"<sup>33</sup> that Sartre speaks of; it involves seeing others not as independent beings, but above all as objects at the individual's disposal, which carry out a precise function in the economy of the drives, either procuring immediate pleasure or clearly highlighting a singular identity, superior to the average.

Within this form of reasoning we may also find the victim represented in a way that is not immune from manipulation and manoeuvring, in a position that may give rise to an unfathomable conspiracy in which we find a mix of seduction, demonstration, consolation or self-satisfaction.

It may serve a cathartic function, in that it allows us to break free from the contamination brought by those private anguishes that torment us when we are faced with a spectacle of horrors even greater than those we have experienced individually: the comparison with the situation of the victim is horrifying, yet at the same time liberating.

Over-exposure of victims may lead to the rumination of horror, thus allowing it to be processed more effectively and ultimately neutralised. The image of a victim may serve to nourish our fantasies of subjugation and power, may cradle our passions, may represent a surrogate for making sense of our lives and our conduct.

Playing at self-victimisation: in art history there are numerous examples (from Goya to Caravaggio) in which the artist purposefully indulges in self-victimisation, degrading and injuring himself. This imitation of self-victimisation for image purposes can also be explained through the possibility it offers for the individual to invent their own life through the invention of their own suffering: one example of this is the "Crimes to Order" organised by the French artist Yann Toma.

For the sum of around € 3000, anyone who so wishes can fake their own death, choosing the method (strangling, attack, etc.), the location (a road, a room, a car park) and the position and the condition of the corpse when it is presumed to be found (face down, rapt, bloody, badly decomposed).

30. H. Blumenberg, *L'ansia si specchia sul fondo*, il Mulino, Bologna, 2005, p.101.

31. C. Eliacheff, D. Soulez Larivière, *Le temps des victimes*, Albin Michel, Paris, 2007.

32. K. Jaspers, *La questione della colpa*. Sulla responsabilità politica della Germania, Raffaello Cortina, Milano, 1996.

33. J.P. Sartre, *Baudelaire*, Gallimard, Paris, 1947.

The website advertising these "Crimes to Order" explains that the artistic character is a pretext to get to know oneself better. There are two paradoxically interesting elements in this operation: on the one hand, the photographic image that dwells on the anthropometric signalling and the photographic descriptive method, and therefore the conclusion of the whole operation will consist of an image that will make a further contribution to the annals of criminal imagery that the scientific police have been using since the 19<sup>th</sup> century.

The other interesting – and disquieting – element is the interview during which the artist patiently questions the victim in order to understand the reasons underlying his or her preferences regarding the type of crime chosen and the motives. Here the individual is a "self-victim": there is no real victim, just a phantom of victimisation that turns into a – real or presumed – opportunity to ask oneself questions, to reflect on the choices made<sup>34</sup>.

The need to reflect, to retreat into ourselves: 80% of respondents believe that the principal consequences of victimisation are of a psychological nature; these are followed, but very much at a distance in percentage terms, by the mention of consequences for relationships with others, as well as physical, economic and material implications. It is also rather surprising to note that those who have been robbed complain of the succession of psychological consequences to an even greater extent than those who have been the victim of a crime against the person.

Faced with a society perceived as intolerable and threatening, withdrawal from the outside world and "retreat into interiority"<sup>35</sup> once again become the least sophisticated, yet most effective, response, regardless of the type of victimisation suffered.

Retreat promises a safe haven, away from the burdens of social life, from calculation and disappointment, and in this process, even solidarity towards victims can become a sort of buttress for a Self that is fragmentary at its very root: hence the need for criminological and victimological sciences to have access to studies and research able to grasp the change at work and thus the unpredictability of the process, so that working to help victims does not become synonymous with that pathetic predilection for the clouds manifested by the stranger described by Baudelaire, who, as we know, believes in nothing, yet believes in the clouds: misleading yet marvellous figures the human intellect can use at will, conferring upon them an entirely arbitrary significance and appearance<sup>36</sup>.

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34. P. Ardenne, «Aimer regarder la victime comme soi-même», in S. André, P. Ardenne et al., *La passion de la victime*, Editions Luc Pire, Bruxelles, 2007, pp. 29-50.

35. K. Strzyz, *Narcisismo e socializzazione*, Feltrinelli, Milano, 1981, p. 176.

36. A. Piperno, *Il demone reazionario*. Sulle tracce del Baudelaire di Sartre, Gaffi, Roma, 2007.

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# Unsafety and incivility in the urban context

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*This article describes a study about feeling of unsafety in 513 residents of an Italian urban context. Our empirical model examines the effects of predictors (like sociodemographic characteristics, type of urban area, length of residence in the same urban area, past victimization experience, citizens' perception of incivility signs in their neighborhood) on fear of crime. We examine a general fear of crime measure ("how safe do you feel walking alone in your neighborhood after dark?").*

## 1. Introduction

Several studies and investigations (Skogan, 1990; Barbagli, 2003; Killias and Clerici, 2000; Garland, 2001; Gray et al., 2006; Fitzgerald, 2008; Tseloni and Zarafonitou, 2008; Farral, Jackson and Gray, 2010) underline the multidimensional nature of the feeling of unsafety as related to different variables: demographic and socio-economic characteristics; personality characteristics; previous victimization experiences; presence of physical and social incivility in the urban context of reference (LaGrange et al., 1992.)

1. In particular, the perception of incivility in one's place of living has a strong impact on the feeling of unsafety as well as, consequently, on life quality and psychosocial well-being (Skogan and Maxfield, 1981; Wilson and Kelling, 1982; Taylor et al., 1985; LaGrange et al., 1992; Ferraro, 1995; Sampson, Raudenbush and Earls, 1997; Taylor, 1999; Jackson, 2004; Jackson and Sunshine, 2007). Social incivility signs represent the violation of shared social norms, while physical signs imply a lack of both formal and informal social control in the citizens' place of living.

Burney (2005) stresses the fact that disturbing behaviours or messy environments can have a higher psychological impact on people than objectively far more serious crimes. This is due to the fact that some incivility signs are more conspicuous than certain types of crime that often remain unknown to citizens. Some recent investigations (Innes et al., 2004, 2006) have pointed out that people regard certain incivility signs (like graffiti, or youngsters screaming and abusing passers-by in the neighbourhood) as potentially more threatening to local safety than some serious crimes such as residential robberies.

Moreover, the lasting presence of incivility signs can seriously compromise the sense of belonging to one's place of living, as it hinders the use of public spaces and the maintenance of social ties, thus providing more opportunities for crimes to take place.

One of the most investigated variables with regard to the feeling of unsafety is victimization. Although numerous studies maintain the theory that victims of a crime experience a higher fear of crime (Balkin, 1979; Liska, 1988; Skogan, 1987; Lewis and Salem, 1980; Box et al. 1988; Hale, 1996; Killias and Clerici, 2000; Killias, 2001), more recent investigations have pointed out that the relationship between the two variables is not always positive (Quann and Hung, 2002.) They emphasize the importance of such factors as the type of crime suffered, the relationship with the perpetrator, indirect victimization as well as the role of the media, which often amplify the risk perception of becoming the victim of a crime (Hough, 2004; Jackson, 2004, 2006.)

## 2. The present study

Starting from these assumptions, we wanted to investigate the feeling of unsafety in residents of an Italian urban context<sup>1</sup> according to their living in either of two different types of urban area, i.e. "council housing" areas and "residential" areas, which can be considered different in terms of density of population, territorial width and prevailing building type.

In line with the most authoritative literature on the subject, we have built a model investigating the effects of a series of variables (like the type of area, the length of residence in the same area, the perception of incivility signs within the neighbourhood of residence, and previous victimization experiences) on the dependent variable of fear of crime.

We hypothesize that a higher feeling of unsafety is to be found in those subjects who: live in a council housing area; have been living in the neighbourhood for a short time; perceive a number of incivility signs in the neighbourhood; perceive a low presence of police force in the neighbourhood; have been victims of a crime.

The **tool** used for this purpose is a questionnaire consisting of 27 items, divided into 4 sections (Wilson and Kelling, 1982; Skogan, 1990; Barbagli, 2003) as follows:

- "socio-demographic" (age, marital status, level of schooling, length of residence in the neighbourhood);
- "victimization experience" (crimes suffered within the neighbourhood/elsewhere, direct/indirect victimization experience)
- "incivility" (perception of incivility signs in two representative places of the neighbourhood of reference, i.e. the main street and the main square);
- "neighbourhood safety" (overall evaluation in terms of safety/unsafety, perception of police force presence, use of security devices.)

## 3. Findings

In this article the results presented refer to a balanced subsample of **513 subjects**, selected by the representative item method, stratified according to the main socio-demographic variables relevant for the aims of the investigation.

1. The urban context investigated is the city of Cagliari, the main town in the island of Sardinia, with a metropolitan area of over 158,000 inhabitants.

Table n. 1 - Sample Characteristics

	N(%)	Min-Max	Mean	Sd
Male	224 (43.7)			
Age		18-86	39.38	17.13
18 through 30	221 (43.1)			
31 through 45	122 (23.8)			
46 through 60	90 (17.5)			
Over 61	80 (15.6)			
Council housing areas	235 (46)			
Residential areas	278 (54)			
Length of residence				
less than 1 year	57 (11.1)			
1 through 5	142 (27.7)			
6 through 10	109 (21.2)			
11 through 20	150 (29.2)			
Over 20	55 (10.7)			


	N(%)	Min-Max	Mean	Sd
<b>Education level:</b>				
elementary school	29 (5.7)			
lower secondary school	75 (14.6)			
qualification	51 (9.9)			
vocational qualification	221 43.1)			
upper secondary school	112 (21.8)			
qualification degree	25 (4.9)			
post-graduate qualification	146 (28.5)			
Past victimization experience				

Prior to elaborating our model, we carried out, for exploratory and descriptive purposes, a multivariate classification analysis through a decision tree (graph no. 1.)

The target variable is always "How safe do you feel when walking alone in your neighborhood after dark?" The answer has been evaluated in dichotomic terms (a medium-low unsafety level vs. a medium-high one.)

We have taken into account all the dimensions measured through the questionnaire in order to detect the different decision nodes.

Graph n. 1 - Decision tree



The graph highlights a medium-low unsafety level for the majority (55%) of our sample subjects, regardless of the type of area they live in.

Those living in "council housing" areas, nevertheless, experience a higher feeling of unsafety when perceiving high levels of incivility of

the social kind. In the same areas, among the subjects perceiving a low presence of social incivility, those who have had previous victimization experiences show a higher sense of safety.

The subjects living in residential areas experience a medium-low level of unsafety, especially if men. Women residing in these areas, moreo-

ver, feel more unsafe than men despite the perceived "high" presence of police in their neighbourhood.

The perception of a frequent presence of police force in the area may increase the citizens' feeling of unsafety, as they associate it to the need for police intervention and do not see it as aimed at prevention.

In order to verify the research hypothesis, we have used a Binomial Logistic Regression model. In line with the latest theoretical-methodological considerations on the subject, it takes into account, as a criterion variable, the presence (1) / absence (0) of a medium-high level of unsafety on the citizens' part, measured through the item *"How safe do you feel when walking alone in your neighbourhood after dark?"*

The following predictors have been entered into the hierarchical model:

- in the first step, the socio-demographic variables (age, gender: 1=women/0=men, level of schooling);
- in the second step, the structural variables of the area (type of area: 1=council housing/0= residential, length of residence, perception of

incivility signs in the neighbourhood, perception of police presence in the neighbourhood.) Incivility signs have been grouped into three factors: physical incivility signs (alpha = .86) such as run-down buildings, holes in the streets, walls covered with writings and/or graffiti; incivility signs due to vandalizing acts in the neighbourhood (alpha = .66) such as damaged or burnt garbage cans, damaged benches, vehicles set fire to; social incivility signs (alpha = .60) such as people prostituting, people taking alcohol or drugs and driving vehicles at an excessive speed.

- In the third step, previous victimization experiences (1=presence / 0=absence.)

Such variables have been previously submitted to univariate and multivariate analyses of a descriptive and inferential nature, aimed at entering them into the regression model.

The model correctly fits 69.2% of the subjects (-2 Log likelihood =550.185; Cox & Snell R Square =.192; Nagelkerke R Square =.256.)

Table n. 2

Predictors	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)	95,0% C.I. for EXP(B)	
							Lower	Upper
Gender	.992	.221	20.135	1	.0001	2.697	1.749	4.160
Perception of social signs of incivility	1.027	.232	19.612	1	.0001	2.793	1.773	4.399
Perception of Police Force presence	.477	.136	12.287	1	.0001	1.611	1.234	2.103
Past victimization experience	-.882	.268	10.867	1	.001	.414	.245	.699
Type of area	.602	.222	7.349	1	.007	1.825	1.181	2.821
Length of residence (less than 1 year)	-1.138	.491	5.374	1	.020	.320	.122	.839

The **results** (table n. 2) show that, all conditions being equal, the ones with the highest likelihood of feeling medium-highly unsafe are:

- **women;**
- those perceiving a **high frequency of social incivility signs** in their neighbourhood;
- those perceiving a high presence of police in their neighbourhood;
- those who have **not had victimization experiences;**
- those residing in a council housing area.


The model highlights the predictive importance of variables such as the type of area and the perception of frequent social incivility signs

within one's neighbourhood, as also pointed out by the decision tree shown above.

With respect to these two variables, below are some more detailed analyses showing that the residents in "council housing" areas perceive a significantly higher frequency of all the incivility signs considered in our research.

The following graph shows in detail the difference between the residents in the two types of area as regards their perception of incivility signs.

Graph n. 2 – Perception of incivility signs



The greatest differences can be seen with respect to:

- **run-down buildings** (factor 2 – physical incivility signs);
- **vandalized garbage bins** (factor 1 – incivility signs due to vandalizing acts);
- presence of **prostitution** (factor 3 – social incivility signs.)


The average frequency of these three signs in the subjects' answers is significantly higher among the residents in council housing areas.

These results are in line with the ones obtained through the method of naturalistic observation of the selected areas, applied for comparative purposes. Our intention was to employ a "multi-method" methodology of study, with the purpose of comparing different evaluation procedures for the same phenomenon, i.e. the residents' perceptions

with the observations made contextually by specially trained observers. The observation has been carried out by means of an **observation grid**, adapted from previous international studies (Wilson and Kelling, 1982; Skogan, 1990). Specially trained observers have gathered the data in the main street and square of each neighbourhood, i.e. the same places referred to in the questionnaire. The selected streets and squares have been observed for a week, in 4 time intervals during 3 days (two weekdays and one at the weekend), concurrently with the administering of the questionnaires in the same period.

The results of the observation are reported in the following graph, which emphasizes a higher presence of incivility signs in the "council housing" areas.

Graph n. 3- Observation of incivility signs



From the comparison of the results obtained through the two procedures, a significant difference emerges, in both types of area, between the mean occurrence of incivility signs perceived by the subjects and the one gathered by the observers. Specifically, the analyses carried out using Student's t-test revealed an overestimation in the citizens' perception of social incivility signs (residential area  $t=12.291$ ,  $df=277$ ,  $p<.001$ ; council housing area  $t=16.172$ ,  $df=234$ ,  $p<.001$ .) Such a difference might be explained by the fact that social incivility signs are more difficult to detect than physical ones, due to their "dynamic" nature (e.g. prostitution).

The results obtained from the model allow us to validate our research hypothesis only partially: council housing areas host the people who feel the most unsafe and who perceive a higher presence of incivility signs, especially social ones, compared to the people living in residential areas. The results of the naturalistic observation made in the selected areas confirm the significantly higher presence of such incivility signs, especially prostitution, in the "council housing" type of area.

Contrary to what we expected, the model highlights a medium-high level of unsafety among the ones perceiving a high presence of police within the neighbourhood as well as the ones who have not had victimization experiences. As regards the perception of police presence, in accordance with what is described in the commentary on the decision tree, citizens may associate it to the occurrence of crimes and/or social disorder, according to the equation "high police presence = high criminality"; "low police presence = low criminality level".

As regards the "victimization" variable, the analyses show that a medium-high level of unsafety is experienced by those citizens who have not suffered direct victimization. This seems to be in line with the statements made, among others, by Hough (2004) and Jackson (2004, 2006), who underline the importance of considering further variables likely to affect more deeply one's feeling of unsafety, such as indirect victimization and the role of the media, the latter often amplifying the risk perception of becoming the victim of a crime.

Finally, the model has not revealed a significant relationship between the length of residence in the neighbourhood and the feeling of unsafety, contrary to what we had hypothesized. We actually expected that a lengthy residence in the same neighbourhood might contribute to increased social ties, active participation and a sense of belonging to the place of living, consequently keeping the citizens' feeling of unsafety under control.

In the light of this result, we deem it necessary to extend the analysis by including the potential effects upon the citizens' feeling of unsafety on the part of other variables concerning the organization of the area, such as the sense of belonging to one's own neighbourhood (place of living vs. dormitory suburb), the level of diversity in residents and the mobility rate within the area.

## 4. Discussion

What emerges from our data makes evident the need for the building of new models:

- by increasing the number of criterion variables, as suggested by the latest research on the topic (Kanan and Pruitt, 2002; Tseloni and Zafaronitou, 2008; Meško, Fallshore, Muratbegović, Fields, 2008);
- by entering further variables among the "predictors" of the unsafety feeling, such as the following:
  - composition of the area (presence of immigrants, families vs. single people, students, people with temporary jobs etc.);
  - mobility rate within the area;
  - presence of stereotypes and/or prejudices;
  - attributional style and locus of control;
  - trust in institutions and in the police force ("public confidence").

On a practical level, the results concerning the most effective security devices show the importance of the presence of Police Force and Institutions in the area. Such presence, nevertheless, must not be used instrumentally, for example by the media or by actors of politics, who may sometimes amplify or belittle both the criminality phenomenon and the worry/fear phenomenon. It is the Institutions' duty to intervene not only in terms of atonement/repression to reduce unsafety, but most of all in terms of prevention, by acting upon individual responsibility, stimulating active participation in the neighbourhood's life, increasing the citizens' sense of community and sense of belonging to their place of living.

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# On fear of crime factors - 2009 survey in Ljubljana, Slovenia

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*The results of the Slovenian study on fear of crime show that the influence of perceived probability of victimization in an emotional reaction is strongest among those who believe that consequences of victimization can be serious, and their own effectiveness to defend is low. Analyses have shown that the feeling of being endangered is strongest in women and the elderly. In addition, the results demonstrate that personal experience with crime, in the population of Ljubljana, do not result in an increase in perceived probability of victimization, or have a pessimistic impact on the feeling of safety, and nor do they affect the anticipation of seriousness of the potential consequences of victimization.*

## 1. Introduction

Researchers exploring fear of crime (Van der Wurff, Van Staalduinen, & Stringer, 1989; Farrall, Bannister, Ditton, & Gilchrist, 1997; Hale, 1996; Meško, 2001, 2002, 2006; Stanko & Hobdell, 1993; etc.) have tried to explain a large number of fear of crime factors, and tested various research models of fear of crime in their analyses. Important progress from the early research of exclusively demographic characteristics of respondents and their fear of crime was a study that included socio-demographic and socio-psychological variables (Van der Wurff et al. 1989).

In this section we also outline the development of fear of crime research in Slovenia. The beginning reaches back to the period after 1990, when Pavlović (1998), investigated fear of crime, in 1992 and 1997, using a questionnaire about 13 descriptively defined types of

cause of damage, as part of an International Crime Victims Survey (ICVS). Meško and Umek (1999) translated and adapted, in co-operation with Stephen Farrall, the socio-demographic and socio-psychological model of fear of crime research. With research of fear of crime in Ljubljana, in 1998, they replicated Van der Wurff's study. Meško and Farrall (1999) compared the results of this study with results from Scotland and the Netherlands to find out that there are no relevant differences in fear of crime between the countries compared. In the following decade, Meško and his colleagues continuously used this model in several surveys of fear of crime in Slovenia (Table 1). The results of fear of crime research, based on factorisation of the 6 vignettes of Van der Wurff's socio-psychological model – for a 10 year period, in Slovenia and Ljubljana – show that the importance of the fear of crime factors in the population of Slovenia do not change significantly.

**Table 1:** Results of the previous surveys on fear of crime in Slovenia

	Ljubljana and the sub-urbs, 1999			Slovenia, 1999			Slovenia, 2001			Ljubljana, 2006			Ljubljana, 2008		
	N=44 3			N=74 1			N=1760			N=75 8			N=48 0		
Situation	M	SD	FL	M	SD	FL	M	SD	FL	M	SD	FL	M	SD	FL
Door Bell	3.31	1.01	0.77	3.14	0.80	0.76	3.12	1.01	0.71	3.43	0.98	0.66	3.25	0.94	0.64
Parked Car	2.41	0.92	0.76	2.45	0.91	0.73	2.44	0.92	0.71	2.59	0.96	0.73	2.52	0.85	0.73
Party in the n.	2.05	0.86	0.69	2.11	0.80	0.64	2.21	0.86	0.68	2.39	0.96	0.68	2.19	0.86	0.68
Bus Stop	2.76	0.86	0.71	2.60	0.83	0.63	2.66	0.86	0.69	3.00	1.00	0.64	2.83	0.97	0.63
Phone Ring	3.27	1.01	0.71	3.18	0.70	0.64	3.29	1.01	0.68	3.16	1.10	0.64	3.02	0.99	0.64
Café	3.24	0.95	0.67	3.01	0.91	0.59	2.48	0.95	0.61	3.63	0.91	0.57	3.58	0.89	0.55

In the following sections we will outline the factors included in the analysis which is introduced in the present article. These factors are gender, age, and socio-economic factors, social networks and interpersonal relations, disorder in the neighbourhood, probability of victimization, impact on life in case of victimization, and gravity of the offence, trust in public institutions, and preventive measures.

## 2. Selected fear of crime factors

### *Gender, age, and socio-economic factors*

Every model aimed at explaining fear of crime derives from an idea of a person's vulnerability. Common sense suggests that the fear of crime is stronger in people who are not confident about their abilities

to protect themselves, either because they cannot run fast, are physically not strong enough to defend themselves, cannot afford protection of their homes, or need more time to recover after material or physical damage has been done to them. Socio-demographic factors, such as gender, age, and socio-economic status, are related to individual vulnerability and influence the fear of crime (Hale, 1996).

Killias (1990) tried to clarify the concept of vulnerability. He points out that different perceptions of vulnerability probably stem from socialisation, which can be particularly noticed in differences between men and women. When we take into consideration personal vulnerability factors, gender seems to be a suitable starting point, because it continuously appears as a fear of crime indicator in surveys. Numerous surveys have confirmed the hypothesis that women are more afraid of victimization than men, even though men are much more frequent victims of all sorts of criminal offences, with the exception of sexual violence. In women, fear of sexual violence increases fear of other criminal offences (Ferraro, 1995). As a result of continuous contact with sexual harassment women become more alert to the possibility of danger from their environment and feel the need for a safer lifestyle in order to protect themselves. However, we have to be careful with the interpretation of the results. In one of the fear factors, gender, we have noticed an obvious paradox: fear of crime is strongest in elderly women, although victimization is lowest in this group, and fear of crime is least expressed in young men, while they are most frequently victimized. Meško and Areh (2003), and Gilchrist, Bannister, Ditton, and Farrall (1998) mention the stereotypes of the so-called 'frightened woman' and 'fearless man'. They relativise these two stereotypes with examples of fearless women and frightened men. The stereotype of a worried and frightened woman supposedly originates from socialisation involving fear of the unknown and strangers, dependence on known men (father, brother, partner), and socialisation involving fear of public places.

Feminist writers have established that the criticism of women's hysterical and over-reactions can, in fact, reveal the fact that they are more sensitive and perceptive to things than men. They have also established that women witness more violence (physical and sexual) at work, in the street, and at home.

Stanko and Hobdell (1993) studied the relationship between victimization, gender, and dealing with victimization. They learned that men, who were victims of violent criminal offences, experienced great fear, suffered from phobias, sleep disorders, became excessively careful, underwent personality changes, and became significantly more vulnerable, which bears strong resemblance to the reactions that were initially attributed to women.

According to Gilchrist et al. (1998), differences between the fear of crime between genders are supposedly only one more consequence of conclusions drawn from inadequate methodology, as is demonstrated by the above-mentioned feminist criticism. Even if it seems unlikely that fear of crime in women is exaggerated, it is increasingly evident that, in the past, fear of crime in men was assessed as too low. The low rate of fear of crime in men has always seemed unusual, since men (as a group) experience a high rate of violence, most often in public places, and usually from strangers. It seems that in surveys men do not want to answer in a way that would undermine their image of the invulnerable men, which is often the cause of their fear of crime remaining unidentified (Pain, 2000).

Fear of crime in the elderly and its influence on the quality of their life are discussed in comprehensive research literature (Hale, 1996; Pain, 2000; Gray, Jackson, & Farrall, 2008; etc). The age factor stands out in discussing vulnerability, and increases fear in people. There are a number of studies (Yin, 1982; Clarke & Lewis, 1982; Warr, 1984; Ferraro & LaGrange, 1987; Meško 2002) claiming that this relation

is of little or negligible importance, or conditioned by other factors, such as low income, single status, and health problems, there are others (LaGrange & Ferraro, 1987; Pain, 2000) indicating that, under certain circumstances, the elderly experience less fear of victimization than the young.

Meško (2002) stated that the elderly are more dependent on monthly income (pensions), and that any loss of money, damage, or cost of medical treatment represents a larger expense for them than for other groups. In addition, recovery of the elderly, mainly victims of violent criminal offences (robbery, bodily injury), takes a longer time and is often related to more problems than with the young.

Income and education are important additional fear of crime factors. The rate of fear amongst the poor and lower-educated population is higher than in the white, rich, and more educated population. The higher rate of fear amongst people with low income and low education can be explained by environmental and contextual factors. They often live in neighbourhoods with a high crime rate. People from the lower socio-economic groups find it harder to protect themselves or their property, or avoid circumstances that generate fear (Hale, 1996). In addition to material sources, we must, from a perspective of the feeling of safety, pay some attention to social sources, conditioned by the quality of social networks, as being significant fear of crime factors.

#### *Social networks, social capital, and social cohesion*

A certain level of cohesion, solidarity, loyalty, group and interpersonal attraction, and responsibility for objectives and tasks of the group is typical of living in a society. All these characteristics of internal group life are addressed with the term 'social atmosphere' in a group. A good atmosphere is demonstrated by a high rate of social cohesion, predominance of positive emotions in group members, feeling of responsibility for the group's success or failure, feeling of belonging to the group, and the group's appeal to group members. Low social cohesion is reflected in predominance of negative feelings in group members, hostility and conflicts between group members, insufficient feelings of belonging, absence of feeling of responsibility for the group's success or failure, and insufficient appeal of the group to its members (Ule, 2009).

Networking is a typical characteristic of modern society. The level of involvement in the network structure of the society conditions a person's level of social integration and the quality of their life. Social capital is what helps spread the network and supplying the provisions necessary for enabling and maintaining integration in the modern networked world. Both formal and informal social networks are essential components of social capital (Martinjak, 2004).

Numerous studies in the field of criminology (Kawachi, Kennedy, & Wilkinson, 1999) point out the relation between a low supply of social capital and a high crime rate. They supported the thesis of social disorganisation, suggesting that the rate of social cohesion or social capital is essential for understanding the relationship between the crime-rate and a neighbourhood, a community, and even a society. Researchers (Cohen & Prusak, 2001; Martinjak, 2004) have established that communities with a large stock of social capital have higher health-rates, better educational structures and economic growth, and a lower crime-rate.

#### *Fear of crime and disorder in the neighbourhood*

In addition to social relations in neighbourhoods, an important fear trigger is the disorder in neighbourhoods. Meško (1999) links fear of crime with characteristics of the physical environment in which people live, but this relation has not been fully clarified despite numerous surveys. Literature mentions two forms of disorder: physical and social. Signs of physical disorder are untidiness, run-down buildings,

piles of rubbish, graffiti, vandalism, deserted cars, etc. The most typical signs of social disorder are drinking bouts in public places, tramps, beggars, groups of youngsters roaming the streets, harassment, unconcealed drug trafficking, and using drugs in public places (Meško, 2006). Physical and social disorder is an indicator of a neighbourhood's disarray, the cause of crime, and increased fear of crime. Signs of disorder and untidiness attract potential offenders. Solving untidiness and disorder in a neighbourhood should increase the risk for offenders, decrease crime-rates, and strengthen the feeling of safety (Meško, 2001).

One's neighbourhood should be a safe environment, and not represent a threat. The mere awareness that social and emotional support is available contributes to a lower rate of fear, and, consequently, to a feeling of lesser vulnerability for people. The feeling of belonging to the community can help people establish trust in their own abilities, and thus decrease the feeling of possible victimization and fear. If fear of crime is related to anti-social behaviour in the neighbourhood, both social and physical, the inhabitants of the neighbourhood recognise its signs, on the grounds of co-operation, and suppress its influence. Integration in the community also helps in developing more detailed mental-maps of safe and unsafe places in the neighbourhood (Hale, 1996).

Anxiety about becoming victims of criminal offences (such as theft, robbery, burglary, fraud, bodily injury, rape, sexual harassment, or even murder) is widely spread nowadays, because, apparently, the predominant impression is that anybody is a potential victim (the »it could be you« idea). Furthermore, it seems that nobody can be safe anywhere, with anybody. You run some risk every step you take (practically anybody is a potential victimizer). This state (paranoid, according to Kanduč, 2004) requires more or less continuous caution, and, finally, a whole range of more or less inventive preventive measures (Kanduč, 2004).

#### *Probability of victimization and fear of crime*

Victimology researchers have established a special meaning of understanding the likelihood of victimization. However, the role of this factor has several definitions: perceived probability of victimization is the fundamental factor in developing fear – it can function together with other factors, such as gender, age, place of living, formal statistics, awareness of people, or other factors influence the fear indirectly, through generating a perception of potential victimization.

The basic value of Ferraro's survey (Ferraro, 1995) is the conclusion that assessment of victimization probability is an important – yet not the most important, nor even the only – factor in developing the fear of crime. In addition, an important discovery is also that the likelihood of victimization can result in various reactions and consequences. It does not affect only what people feel (fear), but also what they do (change of behaviour). Behaviour changes are demonstrated by purchasing safety systems, avoiding means of public transport, or changing daily routines. However, the question of how such behaviour affects fear is still open. It can intensify fear, it can decrease it, or it can have no impact on it at all. In his research Ferraro (1995) discovered that behaviour changes can, over a longer time period, decrease the victimization risk assessment, but they do not decrease the fear. Implementation of preventive measures for a decrease in victimization cannot generate fear if it did not exist previously, but it can increase existing fear.

#### *Victimization impacts - direct and vicarious victimization*

Skogan (1987) established that fear of crime is related to victimization. The results of his transparent survey, in Houston, Newark, which was conducted at 6-month intervals, confirm this relationship. Both bodily and material victimizations are related to fear of crime, especially the fear of recurrence of such events. Fear is also affected by re-

cent victimization and its frequency. Skogan (1987) also indicates that victimization has merely a short-term effect on the fear of crime, and that temporal distance from the victimization act was not given sufficient attention by researchers (Meško, 2002). Fear of the crime-rate can be proportionate to the gravity of the criminal offence.

It was concluded that people are more afraid of violence than property offences. However, according to statistics, the frequency of criminal offences decreases with their gravity – the more serious an offence, the less frequently it is committed. Therefore, if gravity of a criminal offence was the only (or the most important) determinant of fear, individuals would be most afraid of criminal offences with the least likelihood of it happening. The strongest would, thus, be the fear of a murder. Warr (1993) indicates that this conclusion is incorrect, and enumerates other factors in this phenomenon, such as exposure to risk, the gravity of the consequences of a criminal offence, inability to resist a criminal act, social factors (size of the neighbourhood, tidiness, crime-rate), individual characteristics (gender, age, education, socio-economic status), perception of social disorganisation (vandalism, drugs), cognitive judgment of potential victimization, the crime-rate, police work, and direct experiences of victimization.

Gravity of a criminal offence can, therefore, only be one of the determinants of fear (Warr, 1993). In addition, indirect experiences, such as knowing victims, or learning about victimized people from the mass media, can contribute to the increased perception of victimization risk (Skogan & Maxfield, 1981). They are the so-called 'crime multipliers', or processes, that take place in neighbourhoods and »spread« the influence of criminal offences (Taylor & Hale, 1986).

Data shows that news about victimized friends or neighbours intensifies the feelings of endangerment in individuals, and indirect experiences with victimization increase anxiety about victimization as a direct experience. However, it has to be noted that many inhabitants of a neighbourhood are informed about crime indirectly, through channels which can inflate, reduce, or disfigure the real picture (Skogan, 1986). An individual's perception of risk can be additionally instigated by interpersonal communication with peers, while it can only be moderated by their own experiences (Rollinger, 2008).

Meško (2002) asks two questions: »What arguments would justify the explanation of the fear of crime and the likelihood of actual victimization?« and »Why do various surveys reveal different characteristics of people who are afraid of crime?« There are no definite answers to these questions, but, as Meško (2002) suggests, we can think about vicarious victimization, the rate of perceived risk and damage, disorder, and various methodology factors.

One of the possible explanations is vicarious victimization. Knowing somebody who was a crime victim and tells their story to others results in compassion and empathy with their problems. An even more direct source of vicarious victimization is the media, which dramatically or realistically depicts various criminal offences. The most influential is television which shows an increasing number of TV series about police work, violence, and crime. The channels have been flooded with these series, which determine an individual's view of society and affect their perception of crime reality. Scenes from TV are not only limited to »street crime«, but they often emphasise vulnerability of homes, and show potential consequences of not behaving in a self-protective way and exposure to danger. In addition, the printed media have an important influence on the fear of crime. In an analysis of British newspapers, Williams and Dickinson (1993) established that fear of crime also depends on the way crime is presented in the crime section. With the help of a telephone survey, Chiricos (Chiricos, Hogan, & Gertz, 1997) established that people who watch TV a lot and listen to radio news, experience more fear of crime, which is especially characteristic of women. Some theorists claim that criminal behaviour can be learned

from the media; in the same way we can assume that the media is the principal generator of the fear of crime (Meško, 2006).

#### Trust in public institutions

On gaining independence in 1991, institutions of the state and the political system of Slovenia were burdened with high expectations about democratic institutionalisation. The expectations were quite explicit. People evaluated very specific social, economic, and political »returns«, or effects and changes in the everyday life of individuals and groups.

Confidence in the political-system institutions had gradually decreased with the years, to increase at the end of the 1990's, at the beginning of the new decade, which Rus and Toš (2005) reiterate with empirical measurements, and then confidence partially decreased again. Nevertheless, it is the political-system institutions that people do not trust, with the least trusting people being the most active section of the population development: the younger, better-educated, socially high-ranked, less discriminatory, and less egalitarian. In short, the carriers of mistrust represent important potential for the democratic development of society.

The authors emphasise again: trust is not everything; the power of democracy also lies in mistrust, provided that it is justified in the democratic system value-baselines, and expressed by sophisticated, better-informed citizens, or active individuals and groups trained and prepared to reform systems. Nevertheless, on the international scale Slovenia has been ranked »somewhere in the middle«. As far as the extent of expressed mistrust is concerned, it does not deviate significantly from traditionally democratic countries, with the exception that, in Slovenia, there is a lower rate of trust in political system institutions, and trust in the judicial system has disintegrated, whilst trust in state welfare institutions is adequately high; and, in addition to high confidence in the educational system, there is a high rate of confidence in the mass media (Rus & Toš, 2005).

### 3. Current study

In February 2009, we made a survey of the fear of crime in Ljubljana and used a questionnaire (Figure 1) relying on the previously used model (Meško, Hirtenlehner, Vošnjak, & Virjent, 2009) in combination with a socio-psychological and socio-demographic model (Farrall et al., 1997). The questionnaire was modified and tested. The aim of the research was to identify the relation between various factors affecting fear of crime. These factors are social networks, disorder in the neighbourhood, trust in public institutions, anxiety due to criminal offences, probability of victimization in the next 12 months, consequences of crime, ability to self-defence, inter-personal relationships, impact on life in case of victimization, and preventive measures.




Figure 1: Ljubljana 2009 research model (Meško, Hirtenlehner, Vošnjak, & Virjent, 2009)

### 4. Research context

Ljubljana is the capital of the Republic of Slovenia. At the time of this research, Ljubljana had a population of 264,225, according to the Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia, of which 254,021 are in urban settlements (data obtained from the Statistični letopis Ljubljane [Statistical Yearbook of Ljubljana], 2008, as of 31 December 2007). The number of processed criminal offences in 2009 was 42,250, which is 1,287 more than in the previous year (Table 2).

Table 2 shows that, in 2008, the Police Directorate of Ljubljana dealt with 40,936 of all reported criminal offences, which was 50% of all the criminal offences dealt with in Slovenia. Whereas, in 2009, the Police Directorate of Ljubljana dealt with 42,250 of all reported criminal offences, representing 51% of all criminal offences dealt with in Slovenia.

Table 2: Reported criminal offences in the jurisdiction of the Police Directorate of Ljubljana, and Slovenia, in 2008 and 2009

	2008		2009	
	f	%	f	%
Slovenia	81.917		81.917	
Ljubljana	40.963	50,01	42.250	51,58

Source: <http://www.policija.si/index.php/statistika>

### 5. Method

#### Sample

We surveyed the citizens of Ljubljana in the period from 27 February to 10 March, 2009. The survey comprised a sample of 400 respondents older than 18 years. The surveying was made in households of Ljubljana, involving every fifth household in multiple-dwelling quarters, and every third house in house estates. The sample comprised only the population of urban quarters and urban parts of mixed estates.

Table 3 shows characteristics of the sample for the fear of crime research in the population of Ljubljana.

Table 3: Demographic characteristics

		n	%
Age	18 to 20	29	7.3
	21 to 30	85	21.5
	31 to 55	125	31.6
	56 to 70	89	22.5
	71 and more	67	17.0
Gender	Female	237	61.4
	Male	149	38.6
Marital status	Single	103	26.1
	Married	152	38.5
	Divorced	69	17.5
	Widowed	25	6.3
	Common-law marriage	46	11.6

		n	%
Education	Primary school	27	6.9
	Secondary school	210	53.3
	Higher education	42	10.7
	Faculty	115	29.2
Employment status	Permanent contract of employment	131	32.8
	Fixed-period employment contract	25	6.3
	Student	63	15.8
	Unemployed	14	3.5
	Temporary layoff (still employed)	1	0.3
	Housewife, house husband	2	0.5
	Retired	153	38.3
	Other	11	2.8
Financial position	Good	336	84.8
	Bad	60	15.2

Table 3 shows that the survey comprised 149 men (37.3%) and 237 women (61.4%). According to statistical data (Ljubljana, 2008), at the time of the survey Ljubljana's population was represented by 48.1% men and 51.9% women. The respondents were divided into 5 age groups. The highest frequency is noticed in the age group of 31 to 55 years, which is the same for the total population. We can, therefore, establish that the sample is representative. The majority of respondents are married, with secondary-school education, and a good financial position.

#### Survey instrument

The questionnaire is comprised of 109 questions about the feelings of safety among the population. To evaluate questions or statements we used the Likert scale. The questionnaire is comprised of sections about the location of living, feelings of safety, solving difficult situations, experiences with crime, and family, relatives, friends, and acquaintances. The section about the living location is comprised of components and questions about the rates of social cohesion, social capital, social networks, and impact of social disorder on feelings of endangerment in the population, and the corresponding anxiety about disorder in neighbourhoods. The section about feelings of safety takes into account affective perspectives of fear of crime, distinguishing between fear in terms of an emotion resulting from awareness, or expectations of danger; and general anxiety.

Identification of feelings of safety is based on the questions: "How safe do you feel in your neighbourhood at night, if you are alone?"; "How much do certain situations upset you?"; "Is there a part of the city that you would not go to alone at night?"; "What is the probability that in the next 12 months certain things will happen to you, and how serious would the consequences of illegal actions be for you?".

The cognitive aspect of the fear of crime, in terms of perception of risk to personal safety, is expressed in the section about »solving difficult situations« with questions and statements related to health condition, assessment of own abilities to defend against an assailant, interpersonal relations, and the impact of victimization on future life. The

section about 'experience with crime' consists of statements about victimization of respondents. The section about family, relatives, friends, and acquaintances contains questions and statements about the behavioural aspect of respondents, identifying impacts of vicarious victimization.

The completed Van der Wurff's model is comprised of 2 sub-models: socio-demographic and socio-psychological. The socio-demographic model focuses on characteristics such as victimization, health assessment, physical fitness assessment, financial abilities, assessment of potentially dangerous locations, period of living at the latest address, etc. The socio-psychological model is based on the assumption that fear of crime is related to 4 socio-psychological components: attraction (how attractive does somebody think they are as a potential victim, and how attractive do they think is their property), strength (how competent does somebody think they are to manage an assailant), evil intentions (assessment of somebody's intention to harm others), and a dangerous place (how safe or unsafe does somebody think a particular area is).

The fear of crime, as the dependent variable, is represented in the questionnaire by 6 vignettes (short stories) of Van der Wurff's model, which describe 6 dangerous situations which can happen to an individual. The vignettes in the questionnaire are entitled: a Door Bell, a Parked Car, a Party in the Neighbourhood, a Bus Stop, a Phone Ring, and a Café. At the end of the questionnaire, there are questions on basic demographic information about respondents.

#### Measures

We made a factor analysis of individual sections for the entire questionnaire (tables 9 and 10, in the appendix). In all cases a single-factor structure was obtained, with the lowest share of the total variance explained of 50.2%; the lowest KMO measure of sampling adequacy of 0.58; and the lowest  $\alpha$ -coefficient of reliability of 0.74. The factor analysis provided 11 new variables, which we designated in the following way:

- Fear of crime (53.4% var.; KMO = 0.84;  $\alpha$  = 0.82;  $m$  = 2.91;  $s.d.$  = 0.75)
- Social networks (59.2% var.; KMO = 0.72;  $\alpha$  = 0.77;  $m$  = 2.25;  $s.d.$  = 0.60)
- Disorder in the neighbourhood (58.8% var.; KMO = 0.77;  $\alpha$  = 0.82;  $m$  = 3.20;  $s.d.$  = 0.67)
- Trust in public institutions (50.2% var.; KMO = 0.72;  $\alpha$  = 0.80;  $m$  = 2.65;  $s.d.$  = 0.84)
- Anxiety due to criminal offences (65.2% var.; KMO = 0.88;  $\alpha$  = 0.89;  $m$  = 2.23;  $s.d.$  = 0.93)
- Probability of victimization in the next 12 months (70.4% var.; KMO = 0.90;  $\alpha$  = 0.91;  $m$  = 3.16;  $s.d.$  = 0.95)
- Consequences of crime (62.9% var.; KMO = 0.86;  $\alpha$  = 0.88;  $m$  = 2.37;  $s.d.$  = 0.85)
- Ability to self-defence (56.4% var.; KMO = 0.58;  $\alpha$  = 0.74;  $m$  = 3.25;  $s.d.$  = 0.82)
- Inter-personal relationships (59.8% var.; KMO = 0.81;  $\alpha$  = 0.83;  $m$  = 1.50;  $s.d.$  = 0.63)
- Impact on life in case of victimization (67.6% var.; KMO = 0.88;  $\alpha$  = 0.90;  $m$  = 2.35;  $s.d.$  = 0.88)
- Preventive measures (55.2 % var.; KMO = 0.81;  $\alpha$  = 0.79;  $m$  = 2.94;  $s.d.$  = 1.05)

## 6. Results

### *Anticipating the fear of crime*

The regression analysis comprised 30 variables of the new model of the fear of crime survey. Table 4 shows 9 statistically significant variables.

**Table 4:** Regression analysis of fear of crime

Variables	Beta
Social networks	-0.106 *
Trust in public institutions	0.098 *
Anxiety due to criminal offences	0.168 **
Consequences of crime	0.177 *
Impact on life in case of victimization	0.176 *
Preventive measures	0.243 **
Have you ensured that your home is secured so as to recover all damage expenses in case of a burglary?	0.129 **
Do you know anyone that has been robbed?	0.117 *
Do you know anyone that has been double-crossed resulting in monetary damage?	-0.134 **
R <sup>2</sup>	53.5 %
F	12.353 **

\* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01

The largest impact on the fear of crime is exercised by the variable "preventive measures" (the variable related to preventive measures is also statistically significant: "Have you ensured that your home is secured so as to recover all damage expenses in case of a burglary?"), followed by variables related to crime (namely its consequences, impact on life, and anxiety), and variables related to vicarious victimization ("Do you know anyone that has been double-crossed resulting in monetary damage?" and "Do you know anyone that has been robbed?"). A slightly lesser impact is exerted by two more variables, "social networks" and "trust in public institutions". The new model in our research shows 54% of total variance explained in the fear of crime (R<sup>2</sup> = 0.535).

### *Differences in gender*

Differences between factorised variables, given the gender, were identified with a discriminatory analysis. Table 5 shows only statistically significant variables.

**Table 5:** Differences in gender

	Men		Women		F
	M	S.D	M	S.D	
Fear of crime **	3.17	0.71	2.71	0.71	36.6
Anxiety due to criminal offences **	2.50	0.94	2.08	0.91	18.5
Consequences of crime **	2.68	0.90	2.20	0.76	30.7
Preventive measures **	3.50	0.92	2.58	0.97	83.6
Inter-personal relationships **	1.62	0.70	1.44	0.58	7.0
Impact on life in case of victimization **	2.69	0.91	2.16	0.81	36.0
Ability to self-defence **	2.99	0.80	3.41	0.80	24.2

\*\* p<0.01

In all the factors that affect the feelings of endangerment in the population, a significantly lower rate can be noticed in men, as all values in men reach, sometimes even far, beyond the average values of the responses, whilst in women all the results are below average values. The values of standard deviations also show the unity of response in all analysed variables.

The classification analysis reveals 74% of correctly classified units, of which 59% are male and 83% are female.

### *Differences with regard to age, financial positions and victimization*

By using a one-way analysis of variance, we determined the differences between the factored variables with regard to age, financial position, and victimization. In the following, the results of individual analyses are presented.

**Table 6:** Differences with regard to age

	18-20		21-30		31-55		56-70		71+		F
	M	S.D	M	S.D	M	S.D	M	S.D	M	S.D	
Fear of crime **	2.99	0.52	3.03	0.68	3.06	0.77	2.85	0.72	2.50	0.73	8.0
Social networks **	2.55	0.56	2.41	0.63	2.29	0.59	2.14	0.55	2.03	0.57	6.7
Disorder in the neighbourhood *	3.13	0.69	3.32	0.58	3.20	0.64	3.02	0.73	3.30	0.66	2.9
Trust in public institutions **	2.81	0.54	2.82	0.72	2.82	0.83	2.48	0.89	2.26	0.87	7.3
Anxiety due to criminal offences *	2.59	0.69	2.37	0.94	2.31	0.93	2.06	0.84	2.03	1.08	3.3
Consequences of crime **	2.83	0.68	2.60	0.83	2.50	0.81	2.16	0.75	1.99	0.91	10.0
Ability to self-defence **	2.84	0.58	2.87	0.78	3.03	0.73	3.54	0.73	3.90	0.69	27.9
Impact on life in case of victimization **	2.76	0.82	2.60	0.85	2.58	0.87	2.11	0.79	1.81	0.75	15.1
Preventive measures **	3.20	0.47	3.31	0.95	3.08	1.08	2.60	0.92	2.58	1.24	8.3

\* p<0.05; \*\* p<0.01



Those who feel most threatened are senior citizens over 56. The youngest age group (aged 18-20) feels somewhat more threatened than the middle age group (aged 21-55). Involvement in social networks, trust in public institutions, anxiety due to criminal offences, consequences of crime, and impact of crime on life in the case of victimization - constantly increase with age. The ability to self-defence decreases with age. The middle age group (aged 21-55) and the senior group (aged over 71) feel least threatened by disorder in the neighbourhood. The most preventive measures are taken by those aged 56 to 70, and somewhat less by other age groups.

**Table 7:** Differences with regard to financial position

	Good		Bad		F
	M	S.D	M	S.D	
Consequences of crime *	2.42	0.84	2.17	0.84	4.1
Inter-personal relationships **	1.45	0.59	1.76	0.64	14.0
Impact on life in case of victimization *	2.40	0.87	2.11	0.90	5.7
Preventive measures *	3.00	1.03	2.65	1.13	5.9

\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$

»The consequences of crime in the next 12 months« would have a greater impact on the lives of the respondents who are in a weak financial position. A similar ratio can be observed in the impact of crime on life, which is stronger for respondents who are in a weak financial position. The connection between inter-personal relationships and the financial position of respondents plays no significant role. However, the respondents who are better-off also have better inter-personal relationships. Preventive measures are more frequently taken by those who are in a weaker financial position.

A classification analysis has revealed that 85% of the units were correctly classified; among these, 99% of those in a strong financial position and only 7% of those in a weak financial position.

**Table 8:** Differences with regard to victimization

	Victim of crime - anytime				
	Yes		No		
	M	S.D	M	S.D	F
Probability of victimization in the next 12 months **	3.34	0.66	3.04	1.08	9.7
Consequences of crime *	2.49	0.74	2.30	0.91	4.8
Impact on life in case of victimization **	2.50	0.80	2.25	0.92	8.6

\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$

Previous victimization has a more positive influence on the estimation of the probability of victimization in the next twelve months, since respondents who have already been victimized at any time in their lives estimate that, in the next 12 months, they are less likely to become a victim of any of the crimes - such as street robbery, fraud, physical assault, theft, and street harassment. Moreover, possible victimization in the next 12 months would mean less severe consequences for the respondents who have already been victimised and would have a smaller impact on their lives.

A classification analysis reveals that 57% of units were correctly classified; among these, 24% of those who have already been victimised and 82% of those who have not yet been victimised.

## 7. Discussion

This research has established that the new model for researching feelings of threat shows significantly more of the total variance explained ( $R^2 = 54.0\%$ ) than other models so far (Slovenia, 2001,  $R^2 = 43.0\%$ ; Croatia, 2002,  $R^2 = 42.7\%$ ; Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2002,  $R^2 = 45.1\%$ ) (Meško, Kovčo-Vukadin, & Muratbegović, 2008).

By using factor analysis, a number of factors were established which, from an affective, cognitive, and behavioural point of view of the individual, influence the perceived likelihood of victimization. By factoring six short stories, which are included in the socio-psychological model, the new variable was named »Fear of Crime«. By determining the dependent variable called »Fear of Crime« a regression analysis is used to establish the correlation of the predictors of the new model with 'fear of crime' (Table 4).

The people of Ljubljana relate fear of crime to the impacts of different crimes on their lives. However, research did not confirm that the level of fear of individual crimes is proportional to their severity. It was established that the severity of a crime does not have the greatest influence on Ljubljana people's fear, since they feel more threatened by financial rather than violent crimes.

Among all the listed crimes in the questionnaire, in all the variables they contain, robbery stands out the most (rather than physical assault or beating, for example, which is considered a violent crime), since on average it emphasises the characteristic of the factors connected with crime the most (factor loadings in Table 10, in the appendix).

Regarding vicarious victimization, the conclusions are somewhat different because the results of a regression analysis (Table 4) indicate a negative correlation for the variable "Do you know anyone who was a victim of fraud and suffered financial damage (financial crime)?" and a positive correlation at the variable "Do you know anyone who was robbed (violent crime)?" with fear of crime. Thus, the perception of a violent crime, by which another person was victimized, has a greater influence on increasing fear of crime levels, than the perception of a financial crime.

Regarding the perception of the probability of direct victimization, financial crimes cause greater fear than violent crimes, the results of the influence of vicarious victimization show the opposite. Knowing someone who was a victim of a violent crime has a greater influence on the fear of crime than knowing someone who was a victim of a financial crime.

Research confirms that perceived probability of victimization influences subsequent emotional responses; mostly in those who believe victimization consequences may be severe, and their defensive effectiveness insignificant. In the research, gender and age may be highlighted. Women estimate that they feel more threatened than men, and senior citizens feel more threatened than other age groups (Table 5 and 6). However, we should be careful when interpreting these results because a classification analysis has shown a higher percentage of correctly classified units among women (83%) and a lower percentage of correctly classified units among men (59%). The results of the analysis indicate that the stereotype of the worried, frightened woman is justified, and a lower percentage of correctly classified men confirms that the statements in general are true that exaggerate the estimations that men do not get frightened.

The respondents who feel most threatened are senior citizens over 56. Respondents in the youngest age group (aged 18-21) feel less threatened and the middle age group (aged 31-55) feel the least threatened.

The senior citizens of Ljubljana (over 56) also have the greatest trust in public institutions. The anxiety due to criminal offences, the consequences of crime, and the impact on life in case of victimization, constantly increase with age, whereas confidence in the ability to defend oneself constantly decreases with age (Table 6).

A regression analysis has shown a negative connection between social networks and fear of crime, since respondents who have more trust in people living in the same neighbourhood, have more friends and know more people who they can rely on, so feel less threatened. Involvement in a social network is most typical of senior citizens, who also find it most valuable. The results of determining the level of social involvement by establishing to what extent the respondents agree with the statements such as »The people in our neighbourhood can be trusted«, »I have many friends in our neighbourhood«, »There are many reliable people in our neighbourhood«, and »When going shopping or for a walk, I meet many acquaintances« show that it is the senior respondents (over 71) who agree the most with the listed statements, which indicates that senior citizens are more satisfied with living in the neighbourhood together with other people and that they establish social relations more frequently. The youngest respondents (aged 18-20) agree with these statements the least (Table 6).

Apart from social relations in neighbourhood, an important factor which also triggers fear is disorder in the neighbourhood (Meško, 1999, 2006; LaGrange, Ferraro, & Supancic, 1992). However, according to the results of a regression analysis, this factor is not an important predicting variable of the fear of crime.

In the introduction to this contribution, it is stated that income is an important factor which influences people's feelings of threat, since the level of fear is higher among the poor, and poorly-educated, than among the wealthy and well-educated. In the research part of this paper, this statement cannot be confirmed, since a regression analysis has shown no statistically relevant differences between fear of crime and the financial position of respondents (Table 7), but it does indicate a greater tendency towards preventive measures among those who are financially well-situated (Table 6). In accordance with the theoretical basis it could be assumed that those who are in a strong financial position can afford more "protection" than their fellow citizens. Hale (1996) states that people from lower socio-economic groups are less able to defend or protect themselves and their property. However, the results of this research do not confirm this thesis. The respondents with a lower socio-economic status do not have less fear of crime. Thus, in the research, a social class as one of the main elements of social vulnerability, and as a factor in the fear of crime, is excluded, and we establish that the respondents from lower socio-economic groups would feel a greater consequences due to crime, and possible victimization would influence their lives to a greater extent. The connection between inter-personal relationships and the financial position of respondents is not of great significance. However, those who are financially better situated do have better inter-personal relationships (Table 7).

Table 8 indicates that the previous victimization of respondents has a more positive influence on the estimation of the probability of crime in the next 12 months, since the respondents who have already been victimized in their lives estimate ( $m = 3.34$ ) that, in the next 12 months, they will less likely to become a victim of any crimes, such as street robbery, fraud, physical assault, theft, and street harassment. Moreover, possible victimization in the next 12 months would have less severe consequences for respondents who have already been victimised than for those who have never been victims of any crime.

At the same time, we establish that an independent variable of the probability of victimization in the next 12 months is not a statisti-

cally significant predictor of the fear of crime. Regression analysis has shown that the estimation of people of Ljubljana, on the probability of victimization in the next 12 months, has no influence on their fear of crime.

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## APPENDIX: FACTOR ANALYSIS

Table 9: Factor Fear of Crime

Variables / vignettes / short stories			FL	M	SD
<b>F1: Fear of crime (53.4% var.; KMO = 0.84; <math>\alpha</math> = 0.82)</b>				2.91	0.75
S 25	Door Bell	You are alone in the evening. It is late. Someone rings the doorbell, but you are not expecting anyone.	0.75	3.36	1.03
S 26	Parked Car	In the evening you carry garbage to the dumpster. You notice two men walking past a parked car. Noticing that, you watch them, they approach you.	0.78	2.57	0.97
S 27	Party in the Neighbourhood	You are invited to a party in the neighbourhood that you do not know well. In the early evening you take a bus there. From the bus stop you have to walk to the party location. Suddenly you realize that you got lost and notice a group of teenagers following you and making unpleasant remarks about you.	0.72	2.30	0.96
S 28	Bus Stop	One afternoon you are standing at the bus stop, when a group of 15- to 16-year old teenagers comes by. They start hitting the bus stop poles and drawing graffiti.	0.76	2.76	1.08
S 29	Phone Ring	You are going out in the evening. Coming to the door, the phone starts ringing. You answer the phone and introduce yourself. There is no response on the other side, all you can hear is irregular breathing. You inquire about the person on the other side, but then the caller hangs up.	0.70	3.12	1.10
S 30	Café	You are in a different area of your hometown where you have never been before. You enter a local pub where a large group of loud local people is sitting.	0.68	3.35	0.95

Table 10: Factors of Fear of Crime

Variables		FL	M	SD
<b>F2: Social networks</b>				
<b>(59.2% var.; KMO = 0.72; <math>\alpha</math> = 0.77)</b>			2.25	0.60
V 2	People in our neighbourhood can be trusted.	0.68	2.04	0.70
V 3	I have many friends in our neighbourhood.	0.84	2.43	0.87
V 4	There are many reliable people in our neighbourhood.	0.85	2.33	0.75
V 5	When going shopping or for a walk, I meet many acquaintances.	0.69	2.22	0.83
<b>F3: Disorder in the neighbourhood</b>				
<b>(58.8% var.; KMO = 0.77; <math>\alpha</math> = 0.82)</b>			3.20	0.67
V 9	Groups of loitering teenagers	0.77	2.89	1.01
V 10	Drunk people in the street	0.80	3.16	0.92
V 11	Vandalism	0.72	3.08	0.94
V 12	Street begging	0.76	3.8	0.78
V 13	Homeless people	0.79	3.52	0.72
<b>F4: Trust in public institutions</b>				
<b>(50.2% var.; KMO = 0.72; <math>\alpha</math> = 0.80)</b>			2.65	0.84
V 13a	President	0.71	2.17	1.13
V 13b	Government	0.79	2.69	1.22
V 13c	Political parties	0.70	3.26	1.15
V 13d	Army	0.71	2.46	1.26
V 13e	Police	0.71	2.28	1.17
V 13f	Criminal Justice System	0.63	3.06	1.23
<b>F5: Anxiety due to criminal offences</b>				
<b>(65.2% var.; KMO = 0.88; <math>\alpha</math> = 0.89)</b>			2.23	0.93
V 15	Street robbery	0.82	2.31	1.20
V 16	Fraud	0.82	2.55	1.21
V 17	Physical assault / scuffle	0.85	1.79	1.11
V 18	Theft	0.85	2.10	1.09
V 19	Aggressive street behaviour (talk)	0.70	2.97	1.32
V 20	House burglary	0.79	1.68	1.05
<b>F6: probability of victimization in the next 12 months</b>				
<b>(70.4% var.; KMO = 0.90; <math>\alpha</math> = 0.91)</b>			3.16	0.95
V 22	Street robbery	0.90	3.32	1.14
V 23	Fraud	0.87	3.13	1.09
V 24	Physical assault / scuffle	0.89	3.45	1.13
V 25	Theft	0.89	3.02	1.14
V 26	Aggressive street behaviour (talk)	0.65	2.88	1.20
V 27	House burglary	0.82	3.20	1.16
<b>F7: Consequences of crime</b>				
<b>(62.9% var.; KMO = 0.86; <math>\alpha</math> = 0.88)</b>			2.37	0.85
V 28	Street robbery	0.84	2.43	1.09
V 29	Fraud	0.84	2.64	1.08
V 30	Physical assault / scuffle	0.75	1.71	0.93

Variables	FL	M	SD
V 31 Theft	0.87	2.26	1.04
V 32 Aggressive street behaviour (talk)	0.73	3.45	1.34
V 33 House burglary	0.72	1.74	0.96
<b>F8: Ability to self-defence</b>			
<b>(56.4% var.; KMO = 0.58; <math>\alpha</math> = 0.74)</b>		3.25	0.82
V 43 Defend yourself successfully	0.85	3.22	1.10
V 44 Run away	0.78	3.14	1.15
V 45 Pacify the attacker with talking	0.60	3.42	1.05
V 46 Avert the attacker with a self-confident approach	0.75	3.26	1.09
<b>F9: Inter-personal relationships</b>			
<b>(59.8% var.; KMO = 0.81; <math>\alpha</math> = 0.83)</b>		1.50	0.63
V 48 I have no difficulty finding someone who can take care of my home during my absence.	0.64	1.49	0.79
V 49 I have friends willing to take time to listen to me.	0.84	1.44	0.74
V 50 There is a group of people I belong to and socialize with frequently.	0.79	1.68	0.95
V 51 If a fall sick I can always ask my friends to do chores for me (e.g. grocery shopping).	0.79	1.54	0.86
V 53 I know several people, with whom I like to socialize (or do things).	0.79	1.48	0.80
<b>F10: Impact on life in case of victimization</b>			
<b>(67.6% var.; KMO = 0.88; <math>\alpha</math> = 0.90)</b>		2.35	0.88
V 54 Street robbery	0.83	2.44	1.08
V 55 Fraud	0.85	2.62	1.10
V 56 Physical assault / scuffle	0.82	1.79	0.93
V 57 Theft	0.87	2.34	1.05
V 58 Aggressive street behaviour (talk)	0.78	3.09	1.31
V 59 House burglary	0.78	1.84	0.97
<b>F11: Preventive measures</b>			
<b>(55.2 % var.; KMO = 0.81; <math>\alpha</math> = 0.79)</b>		2.94	1.05
V 84 I avoid certain streets, areas and parks.	0.83	2.98	1.38
V 85 I try to avoid strangers at night.	0.83	2.98	1.43
V 86 At nights, I avoid using public means of transport.	0.73	3.67	1.47
V 87 I avoid carrying large amounts of money.	0.66	2.08	1.28
V 88 At night, I only leave my flat if absolutely necessary.	0.66	3.01	1.52

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# Area Crime and Fear of Crime Levels: Has analysis of the British Crime Survey diluted crime concentration and homogenised risk?

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*This paper examines a strangely ignored yet fundamental issue of crime surveys; namely their absolute reliance upon administrative rather than cognitive and sometimes virtual, as opposed to real, areas to respectively sample and analyse crime survey data. The paper proposes that a complementary real neighbourhood BCS booster sample would "representatively" sample and analyse real high crime neighbourhoods. This would allow us to measure the prevalence, incidence and concentration of crimes as well as their correspondence to fear of crime levels within real high crime neighbourhoods.*

## 1. Introduction

For over three decades criminologists have been puzzled by the fact that those most at risk of victimisation do not exert the highest levels of fear of crime (Skogan 1987). This is the so called "fear of crime paradox". Most attempts to explain this agree that fear of crime in self-report surveys stands for an umbrella notion of quality of life (Ditton and Farrall 2007; Jackson 2004) and that more appropriate questionnaire techniques and question wording (Gray et al. 2008; Tseloni and Zarafonitou 2008) diminishes the gap between actual risk and fear of crime. In this work we focus on how "area" and "neighbourhood" are defined in official reports and scholarly work based the British Crime Survey (BCS) and propose that these may also (in part) be responsible for the "fear of crime paradox". This paper argues that official data may fail to reflect the extent of crime problems in notorious high crime neighbourhoods and estates whereas their residents' crime perceptions are evidently based on their direct and indirect experience of crime within their own neighbourhood. Indirect victimisation, i.e., knowing someone who has been victimised, plays an important role in shaping fear of crime levels (Killias and Clerici 2000) and may complement the investigation of neighbourhood definition and boundaries proposed here. Furthermore, knowing that your neighbours are prolific offenders may make your fear of victimisation and consequent protective behaviour both rational and measured. We seek, therefore, to take a healthily sceptical look at our own realist problem-oriented, "administrative criminology" work in this area and examine the possibility, that where BCS measures of high crime neighbourhoods are concerned, we may have been inadvertently practising what Young (2004) fleetingly calls voodoo criminology.

Young's (2004) voodoo criminology concept appears to be based on two main arguments where the BCS is concerned - that BCS data is much less representative of certain crimes and type of places than it is cracked up to be and that those who analyse it tend to conveniently ignore criticisms of its failings, preferring to overstate its strengths. Contrary to Young's (2004) Left Realist "Voodoo Criminology" lament that an increasing number of criminologists are irrationally embracing a positivistic path<sup>1</sup>, is another, arguably, polemical argument

that the last 170 years of research and critical enlightenment has produced a general stasis of rational criminological understanding of official crime statistics. The current position, which remains unchanged following Young's (2011) recent expansion of his critique of what he sees as an unbalanced and irrational growth of positivism, is described by Hope (2005) as a binary one, with non-positivistic *realists* on one side and *constructivists* on the other.<sup>2</sup>

Criminology, whether it is among other labels, realist, constructivist, Left realist, critical, cultural, feminist or "administrative" has a purpose and design in its ambition (Walklate 1998) to work for implementation of change. Working within Hope's (2005) politically neutral *realist* perspective, our purpose is to continue the endeavour to achieve national crime survey data that we know will never be perfect, but will nonetheless hopefully provide reasonably accurate and ever improving measurements to assist the pursuit of knowledge about particular categories of crime in society. Furthermore, it seems ludicrous to suggest that in order to avoid being labelled a positivist, everyone publishing the results of their BCS data analysis should be compelled each time to rehearse all the known caveats about crime survey data. Moreover Young's (2011) compelling call for a criminological movement away from statistically "representative" data towards more ethnography fails to adequately address the fact that the

there are many exceptions including Sutton's (1998) work on stolen goods, which combined fieldwork with thieves, fences and drug dealers with BCS analysis, and the work of prolific pioneers of BSC analysis such as: Ken Pease and Jason Ditton, which inspired the next generations of unaptly labelled "positivist" criminologists, by working extensively in fieldwork with victims and offenders. Furthermore, there are many on-going research projects that seek to unravel the causes of crime, such as the SCoPiC project, University of Cambridge, the Edinburgh Study of Youth Transitions and Crime and earlier work by David Farrington that managed both fieldwork research and Greek letters in scholarly articles. In response to the fear and demonising of mathematical symbols, the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK has recently launched an ambitious programme, GETSTATS, to foster familiarity and understanding of statistics by social scientists (with the exception of economists and psychologists).

2. *Realists* are not actually positivists at all, Hope argues, because they see the crime figures as flawed by the unmeasured "dark figure" and other biases. And yet they endeavour to achieve data that while never perfect will be good enough to provide an accurate reflection of the extent, trends and patterning of crime in society. *Constructivists*, Hope tells us, adopt Cicourel's (1968) view that official crime statistics are mere social constructs that reflect as much, if not more, of the concerns and biases of the organisation that produces them than an objective measure of crime.

1. Young's (2004: 39) voodoo criminology essay charges that "The criminologists themselves are far distant from crime out there, hidden behind a wall of verbiage and computer printout, the barrier graphited with the Greek letters of statistical manipulation." While deliberately disparaging, and perhaps true for some criminologists, this is nevertheless a rhetorical and, therefore, statistically unevidenced generalisation for which



reason for the huge popularity shift towards crime surveys in problem oriented criminology arose in no small part from the ideal of rational policy making as one that at least should try hard to avoid the type of easy confirmation bias and rhetorical fallacies that plainly result from ethnographic studies dependent upon qualitative engagement in personal or political axe-grinding and cleverly camouflaged wishful-thinking to support irrationally irrefutable and infinitely variable pet-explanations for crime and how to tackle it.

Motivated by a desire to reduce the dark figure and increase our respective expertise in BCS administrative criminology research, our aim is to reveal how the BCS sampling strategy might possibly have failed to capture the reality of crime concentration in the many notorious high crime areas of England and Wales.

Our main concern is that while the BCS is nationally representative, for reasons of scale and economy - like all national or regional social surveys - it does not sample data to conduct analysis of real neighbourhoods but only of geographically defined areas according an administrative boundary, which in some instances may be arbitrary. In this paper we hypothesise that this economy of scale may have seriously impacted upon the validity of BCS data in terms of failing to capture the reality of crime risk and fear of those living in high crime neighbourhoods.

Viewed in this light, the existence of the fear of crime paradox - that for certain groups means that fear of crime is greater than the reality of risk in the "area" where they live - may be an artefact of the BCS "area" construction. And, although beyond the scope of this paper, these particular concerns about BCS representation are compounded further by the altogether separate issue of whether the survey is actually measuring fear of crime at all (e.g. Holloway and Jefferson 1997; Ditton and Farrall 2007; Gray et al 2008). Currently used survey measures show raised fear for the crime type mostly covered in the media at the time of fieldwork and they are conceptually non-comparable over time or cross-nationally due to changes in survey questions, media reports and political agendas on crime and crime prevention (Ditton et al. 2003; 2005; Pleysier et al. 2005). As mentioned, these issues form an on-going debate (Jackson 2011) but they are not dealt with herein.

The following section discusses how area classification in BCS official reports (especially the earlier ones) and academic research may be misleading. The third section debates how the BCS sampling frame may distort notions of neighbourhood despite aiming at revealing the importance or not of such effects on social issues, i.e., crime, fear of crime, perceived incivilities etc. It should be noted that the concerns raised in this paper, although they refer explicitly to the BCS, are generalizable across all social, including crime, surveys and their sampling frame in any one country or region. An overview of the literature on the "area" association between crime and fear of crime is given in section four. The paper ends with suggestions for a research plan that will seek to test the validity of internationally common practice in survey design and for the BCS that will further examine the extent and possible limitations of the "fear of crime paradox".

## 2. Area Classification: Is it time for the BCS to "get real!"?

The BCS area sampling strategy has its roots in lessons learned from Environmental Criminology's concern with enduring high crime areas. Early work in the field of "crime place" evolved mainly from the work of Park et al. (1925) and others in the Chicago School of twentieth century classical ecologists. As every undergraduate criminologist learns, the Chicago School moved beyond earlier explanations

of crime and criminality simply in terms of the predisposition or guilt of the individual towards an understanding that could explain observed localised long-term high and low crime patterns in different areas. These localised crime patterns were explained in terms of social change interacting with individuals influenced by their neighbourhood to create cultural and interpersonal conflict - and hence crimes - within geographically bounded communities. Once the problematic issues of naive functionalism, the ecological fallacy and tautology (Downes 1966) were dealt with, knowledge gained from the Chicagoans heavily influenced later environmental criminologists such as Baldwin and Bottoms (1976) and Brantingham and Brantingham (1978; 1981), who sought among other things to explain the difference between areas with regards to crime incidence of particular types of crime. Their work influenced the enduring and evolving rational choice approaches of situational crime prevention (Clarke 1980) and particularly Routine Activities Theory (Felson 1998).

Our knowledge of the importance of understanding and taking account of area as well as individual and household influences on victimisation is behind the general design of the BCS. However *real* neighbourhood analysis does not feature in BCS based reports and scholarly papers that nonetheless refer to "area" and "neighbourhood" effects (e.g. Sutton 1998; Budd 2001). Instead, the BCS *realist analyst* uses a code assigned to respondents, which serves merely as a proxy for the generalised "type" of neighbourhood respondents are said to live in. This is done so that those analyzing the data can distinguish between a BCS respondent's individual characteristics - such as their age, income, education, marital status, gender etc. - and the external attributes of the area where they live - such as housing type and neighbourhood type. In order to do this, the BCS has traditionally assigned a particular ACORN category to every respondent (e.g.: Mayhew et al 1989; Hough 1995).

Marketing companies employ ACORN, which is a geo-demographic segmentation classification system that stands for "a classification of residential areas", for discovering whether individuals within a population can be divided into different socio-demographic groups to create a classification system that works as a typology. The underlying assumption underpinning this practice is that differences within any group category should be less than the differences between those group categories. The ACORN classification system was primarily developed by CACI Limited for the purposes of developing a market research analytical tool. Based on Census variables, the ACORN classification system enables fine-grade consumer analysis of its different consumer groupings. ACORN then is a ready-made convenient human classification system, created for commercial marketing purposes from Census information on people living within convenient administrative boundaries called enumeration districts. An ACORN code is assigned to each Census enumeration district (ED) and this is then copied to all postcodes within the ED (Communities and Local Government 2010). In the 2001 Census, England and Wales had 116,895 EDs containing, on average, some 200 households and 450 people (National Statistics 2007). ACORN has five main categories that have been used by the BCS since the 1980's (Audit Commission 2005). These are described as: "Thriving, Expanding, Rising, Settling, Aspiring and Striving (see Sutton 2004: 9 for a more detailed explanation).

Authors of Home Office BCS publications and some scholarly papers tend to describe their use of the ACORN classification simply as "area type." Some might be even more surprised to learn that BCS ascribed ACORN status is very often simply referred to as "area" (e.g. Budd 2001; Sutton 1998: 25), without making it as perfectly clear as they should that people - from as far apart as Truro and Carlisle, and in cities as different as London and Nottingham - are audaciously being

classified, analysed, and described in published research findings as living in the same "area".

The ACORN generalised housing types used by the BSC, are then, usually described by those who analyse such data as "areas". The problem with this practice is that we do not actually know how accurately BCS high crime pseudo-areas, constructed using ACORN and BCS crime data, reflect life within real world notorious high crime neighbourhoods. Perhaps we *Realists* should be as critical of ourselves as Young's (2004) jibe about our use of Greek letters. Are *Realists* who analyse the BCS and publish results, which refer to these "foreign" pseudo representations of the real thing as "neighbourhoods", inadvertently misleading criminologists and policy makers by obscuring the fact that BCS "areas" and "neighbourhoods" are not real places? Consider, for example the following from Pantazis (2000: 426):

"...poor people are consistently more likely to feel unsafe when alone on the streets after dark regardless of where they live. In most neighbourhoods, they are roughly twice more likely to feel unsafe compared with people in rich households. Secondly poor people living in "striving" neighbourhoods (neighbourhoods characterized by local authority and multi-ethnic, low income households) experience the highest levels of feeling unsafe. Almost 60 per cent of poor people in these types of neighbourhood feel unsafe when alone on the streets, compared with only 43 per cent of rich people. Thirdly, neighbourhoods containing a high proportion of elderly people reveal the starkest variations in rates of feeling unsafe between people in different income households. Thus in "thriving areas" (areas characterized by wealthy retired households), nearly one in two people in poor households feel unsafe compared with only one in five of rich people."

Anyone reading Pantazis words would be forgiven for thinking she is referring to real neighbourhoods and that the *thriving areas* she refers to are real places that are in some way "thriving". They would be wrong on both counts. Because not only are these neighbourhoods sub-virtual but so too are the "areas" Pantazis and other *Realists* (e.g. Sutton 1998: 53) describe from their BSC data analysis. These so called "areas" are simply a BCS socio-demographic classification system of lifestyle data captured from respondents living far and wide. The BCS first used the ACORN classification system to assign a value to BCS interviewees that would serve as a proxy for real area "types" (Audit Commission 2005). The term "sub-virtual area" is used here to distinguish the BCS concept of area from that of the virtual ethnographer (e.g. Williams 2004). In sum, the BSC concept of "area" or "neighbourhood" represents no more of a physical, or even a virtual place, than the British Greek community does!

Even a cursory glance at the literature containing BCS research reveals that authors seldom make it clear that what is meant by BCS "area" or "neighbourhood" is in fact ACORN category. Consequently, only those conscientious readers of scholarly articles and Home Office reports who persist in going through appendices know that bold official assertions made by those writing about controlling for BCS "area effects", "area risk" "high and low crime areas" in regression analysis are not at all what they appear to be. By way of example, Budd (2001) writes "area" and "areas" a total of 41 times in a Home Office briefing note, and yet the closest we get to a remote clue that in BCS research reports "area" does not actually mean a physical area, is where she writes about ACORN in the final paragraph of the fifth and last page:

"ACORN is an area classification which assigns each Enumeration District (approximately 150 households) in the country to one of 54 ACORN types according to the social and housing characteristics in its immediate area (as measured by the 1991 census). ACORN measures the type of area in which a household is located,

rather than the characteristics of a specific household. Not all households in a particular ACORN area will share the dominant characteristics of the area. So for example, not all households in ACORN areas classified as "council estates, greatest hardship" will be council estates or experiencing hardship." (p.5).

To emphasise just how unrealistic the BCS notion of "area" actually is, consider this one following fact: A nationally representative proportion of BCS respondents, sampled from all over England and Wales, will be categorised by the Home Office as living in ACORN "Striving" areas. Those people so classified are described as experiencing hardship and living in a council estate somewhere. In reality, as Budd (2001) revealed, any number of them may be neither hard up nor living on a council estate anywhere. This raises some serious questions. For example: since BCS research purports to match and measure respondents' fear of crime against an ascribed ACORN determined risk, we need to question claims (e.g.: Hough 1995; Kemshall 1997; Pantazis 2000), that across the board, the BCS has proved beyond all reasonable doubt the existence of the fear of crime paradox that for certain groups, fear of crime is greater than the reality of risk in the "area" where they live. This fear of crime paradox has assumed the mantle of knowledge consensus within administrative criminology. The questionable veracity of this consensus concerns us.

Research based on crime survey data analysis has identified this so called fear of crime paradox where those least at risk are most afraid of crimes such as burglary and violence (Skogan 1987). The critical criminologist Young (No Date) does question the validity of the paradox by pointing out that it is not "... unrealistic to worry about burglary when its incidence runs at five times the national average and on some estates four out of five houses have been burgled in the last year." And that: "Crime is focused both geographically in certain areas and socially in certain groups. Crime figures which add together low and high crime areas are useful in assessing large scale service provision, but tend to obscure the pinpointing of crime within the population." (p.9).

So much so then for accurate assessments of risks and reality once the detail behind the broad BCS notion of "area" is examined. To sum up: the difference between ACORN and administrative area, which forms the basis of many surveys including the BCS sampling frame, is that households in the latter are physically (geographically) clustered together. ACORN is a virtual clustering of households from geographically disparate but "similar" areas. The BCS pseudo-neighbourhood administrative area analysis is considered next.

### 3. Neighbourhood boundaries: might BCS sampling methods be misrepresenting the experiences and concerns of those living in the most notorious high crime neighbourhoods?

The BCS collects data on peoples' experiences and worries about crime, to seek to determine levels of risk and reality of risk in different social sectors. To do this it samples people from across England and Wales based on administrative geography, i.e., ED's and postcode sectors, but it does not aim to be representative of any single real neighbourhood, estate or district. In this respect it cannot be analysed in such a way as to tell us what life is like on our most notorious housing estates. Indeed, the data cannot be analysed to reveal what goes on within the actual physical boundaries of any real and known "problem" or desirable neighbourhoods. This has been acknowledged by statisticians involved in the BCS sampling design (Lynn and Elliott 2000).

To avoid the problems outlined in the previous section from using the ACORN as a an area classification Professors Denise Osborn, Ken Pease and colleagues in the 1990's analysed "real" areas via attaching Census information to the sampling areas of the British Crime Survey. This was no easy job. First, drawing on the social disorganisation theory (Shaw and McKay 1942) and empirical research (notably Kennedy and Forde 1990) the researchers selected the appropriate Census fields or variables to extract from the rich decennial data set. These for instance included proportion of over-crowded households, proportion of unemployed males in an area and other relevant theoretical proxies (Osborn et al. 1992). Second, they selected the values of these variables which referred to the sampled postcode areas (1992) or wards (1982-1988) of the BCS fieldwork<sup>3</sup>. Third, the obtained Census information was matched to the BCS data set. Area characteristics were then standardised (i.e., each area characteristics was centred to its national mean and made to vary relatively to its standard deviation, an additional means for securing data confidentiality). To overcome the statistical problem of multicollinearity in regression-based analyses those area variables that were highly correlated were combined to create factors (via principal components analysis) that entailed a set of socio-demographic attributes with a conceptually distinguishing area profile. Finally, the above extracted area information was used together with respondents' individual and household characteristics to statistically "explain" crime risk and incidence (Trickett et al. 1995; Osborn and Tseloni 1996). For a detail discussion see the Appendix by Osborn et al. 1992: 282-3).

Regression-based analysis over individual, household (obtained from the BCS) and area (obtained from the Census with regards to the sampled BCS areas) information offered the opportunity to separate between area and individual effects on victimisation risk and frequency. Thanks to these analyses contrasting effects of the same variable operating at different levels of aggregation - most notably that area affluence reduces but household affluence increases risks and expected number of crimes - were evidenced (Tseloni et al. 2002). A more recent analysis showed that widowed people generally experience the least personal crimes compared to other marital status groups except in densely populated areas where they are heavily targeted (Tseloni 2011). Therefore, the ability to link and employ both Census area and BCS respondent data expanded our understanding and theory of victimisation. To our knowledge however there have been only a few published works on area and individual effects on fear of crime (Brunton-Smith et al. 2010; Brunton-Smith and Sturgis 2011; Brunton-Smith and Jackson in press).

So far, we have seen how ACORN consumer profiling categories are described by realist criminologists as "areas" when they are anything but. More usually, however, those analysing the BCS use the word "neighbourhood" as shorthand for pseudo-neighbourhood. As explained in the previous paragraphs, pseudo neighbourhoods, which are in reality geographical areas along administrative boundaries, are used for BCS respondent sampling purposes. They may not, however, coincide with notional or conceptual neighbourhood geographies (Innes et al. 2004), but they are employed out of necessity as other administrative data are available along these administrative boundaries. Even Sampson's seminal research on collective efficacy and crime which has based *ecometrics*, i.e., the measurement of so-

cial and physical environments (Sampson et al. 1997), and ensuing large research programmes across the world (eg., Popay et al. 2003; Mazerolle et al. 2010) have not escaped this necessity. To overcome the above shortcoming survey methodologists of projects, such as the above, attempt to use local knowledge to select conceptually or notionally meaningful to the residents administrative neighbourhoods, i.e., pseudo-neighbourhoods which proxy real ones.

As the name implies, pseudo-neighbourhoods are not real neighbourhoods at all, although to emphasise the point already made, anyone reading papers based on BCS regression and multi-level modelling analysis might be forgiven for thinking that they are, since the shorthand is frequently used without a prominent and clear explanation except in the data section of the relevant articles (e.g. Tseloni 2006; 2007). The BCS pseudo-neighbourhood may not in reality represent a housing estate with real geographic boundaries, because it has its basis in administrative boundaries that are generated by Census data. For instance, the lower super output area (LSOA) available from the recent Census, which is the lowest publicly available area unit and comprises about 1,500 population, may not cluster together people who consider themselves neighbours but span across and, thus, divide neighbourhoods. Therefore if this is so their crime cues which form fear of crime levels (Christmann and Rogerson 2004) and experiences may differ substantially. As the section after next proposes, however, this question is open to scholarly examination.

#### 4. Crime concentration and fear of crime within and between pseudo-neighbourhoods: what does BCS research to date show?

Having outlined the caveat of confusing sampled area segments to real notional neighbourhoods, this section overviews the evidence on the clustering of crime experiences and fear of crime across such pseudo-neighbourhoods that are real geographic areas and therefore physical clustering does exist unlike ACORN grouping.

Area characteristics play an important role in shaping the residents' risk of household crime. Pseudo-neighbourhood contributes 60% to the explanation of the likelihood of household victimisation (Trickett et al. 1995). By contrast pseudo-neighbourhood effects are weaker than household ones on household crime frequency (Tseloni 2006). In lay words whether a household is at risk of crime is mostly determined by where it resides. Yet how many times it may experience such a crime is rather due to the particular household's attributes. Indeed, crimes against two households with similar characteristics from the same pseudo-neighbourhood are moderately correlated (0.33). By contrast, more narrow crime types such as burglaries and thefts are increasingly correlated (0.54) between two neighbouring households. The level of vulnerability of its neighbours determines even more a household's frequency of victimisation if the household itself is also of high risk (Tseloni and Pease 2003; 2010). The above suggest that between individuals differences are more important for repeat victimisation (Pease and Laycock 1996) and between pseudo-neighbourhood differences are better predictors of victimisation risk (Trickett et al. 1995). In addition, "within area risk" communication increases with neighbours shared vulnerability.

With regards to the question raised in the Introduction on whether we may identify high crime areas using the BCS, descriptive analysis shows that 20% of pseudo-neighbourhoods contribute to one third of household crime and nearly half of personal crime in England and Wales (Kershaw & Tseloni 2005). Two caveats, however, ought to be identified here: The set of areas comprising the most or least vulner-

3. Census fields had to be downloaded via a specialized software (SASPAC) while the researchers involved in matching Census area to BCS household data had to physically work at the Midas Census Centre at the University of Manchester for data confidentiality. The sampled areas identification was included in the BCS data sets and technical reports for the 1982 to 1992 sweeps. The USA Census Bureau has similar rules: uprooting the so "aspiring" researchers to live part time in Washington DC while working on area effects projects (personal communication with Professor Janet Lauritsen).

able differs for personal and property crimes. More importantly, with regards to the basic premise of this paper, such descriptive analysis is subject to errors due to sampling point size variations, namely that the BCS is more likely to record crimes in larger and more densely populated sampling units (Tseloni et al. 2010). This is because, as mentioned, the BCS is nationally but not locally representative (Lynn and Elliot 2000).

Despite the wealth of research on individuals' fear and experiences of crime there is sparse evidence on the association between area crime concentration and residents fear of crime. Household and personal crime incidence rates in the 10% worst (with regards to the respective crime aggregate) pseudo neighbourhoods are respectively about three and six times higher than in the 10% safest areas. Area differentials of levels of fear of crime seem to follow household crime differences: Residents of the 10% pseudo-neighbourhoods with highest levels of fear are almost three times more worried about crime than those in the perceived 10% safest areas (Kershaw and Tseloni 2005).

Fear of crime and household victimisation are moderately correlated (0.35) across BCS areas and in fact this weak correlation gets even lower (0.23) when area characteristics explain both fear and household crime (Tseloni 2007: 175). Most interestingly but not altogether unexpectedly, the area effects on fear and household crime partly differ. Fear of crime and household crime rates rise due to high proportion of young (16-24) people, population density and deprivation levels. But only fear of crime increases in pseudo-neighbourhoods with high proportions of ethnic minority population, whereas the areas ethnic mix does not affect household crime (Tseloni 2007).

Finally, with regards to the interplay between area and individual characteristics:

"...[pseudo-] neighborhood structural characteristics, visual signs of disorder, and recorded crime all have direct and independent effects on individual-level fear of crime. Additionally... individual differences in fear of crime are strongly moderated by neighborhood socioeconomic characteristics; between-group differences in expressed fear of crime are both exacerbated and ameliorated by the characteristics of the areas in which people live." (Brunton-Smith and Sturgis, 2011: 313).

## 5. In light of foreseeable problems, the case for sampling real neighbourhoods

Sampling real notorious high crime neighbourhoods will not be without methodological problems. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to explore these problems in detail, we offer a cursory examination of some of the main issues; beginning with one such neighbourhood in our own current city of residence:

The nationally notorious area of St Ann's in Nottingham may be seen by local residents to have internal low and high crime zones. Sampling such an area by its administrative boundary alone would likely fall foul of the modifiable areal unit problem (MAUP) and associated ecological fallacy (King 1997) in that regardless of what aggregate area identifier data tells us, the administrative boundary that is St Ann's can be sub-divided with local knowledge into the relatively safer "old" St Ann's and less safe "new" St Ann's and no doubt further information provided by residents would describe other notoriously "rough" and "less rough" "real" local segments within St Ann's. While not ideal, perhaps the answer to this problem as the best current way forward lies in selecting from a sample of real named notorious estates, those that have distinct geographic boundaries and

where pilot interviews with residents suggests there are few if any distinctly lower crime areas within.

Research in the USA (Sherman et al. 1989; Weisburd 2008) found respectively that in one year, 3.5 percent of addresses in Minneapolis produced fifty per cent of all crime calls to the police and in Seattle between 1989 and 2002 time period that just 1,500 street segments accounted for fifty per cent of the crime. And yet US research goes on to reveal that sampling notorious high crime neighbourhoods to capture this "reality" may prove no more effective than existing BCS sampling methods, because parts of town with good reputations can have streets with strong crime concentrations, while in notoriously "bad neighbourhoods" there are places with very low levels of crime (Weisburd and Green 1994). A solution to this might be found from Weisburd's et al. (2004) crime hot spot research in Seattle, which found crime incidents at the micro-place (street segment) level remained stable over a 14 year period. If analysis of British police crime data reveals similar stable crime concentrations within real notorious neighbourhoods then such segments could be targeted for sampling and coded accordingly so that ecological fallacy effects could be controlled for in analysis and interpretation.

Hot spot or repeat victimisation analysis might be raised as alternative ways to generate a sampling framework than trying to identify and take a representative sample for a notorious neighbourhood or estate. But combined police recorded hotspot and repeat victimisation analysis, for example, transcend real notional neighbourhoods since it is based on locating the data within the same administrative boundaries that produce the very sampling frames in question. Furthermore, sampling by police recorded crime data will not do anyway, simply because that would defeat the object of the BCS to measure and contrast crimes not reported to the police.

An important aim of the BCS is that it should be able to compare changes over time between earlier and later survey years. To do that it must maintain a core element that is essentially the same for each survey. We do not propose, therefore, that the current system of sampling should be changed. Far from it; what we propose is that the BCS includes a series of "real neighbourhood" surveys. While, to date, there has never been any published research into the question of just how representative BCS "areas" are, there is a possibility that secondary data analysis might enable us to begin to try to answer this question. BCS postcode data should be examined to sample postcodes of respondents within known notorious real neighbourhoods at the city level and also known prestigious low-property crime neighbourhoods at the city level and compare crime experiences and perceptions across administrative (postcode based) and notional (interview based) neighbourhood.

If secondary research finds that existing samples are too small in real neighbourhoods, then there may be a strong case to be made to sample real neighbourhoods in future national crime surveys (Sutton 2007). The following points touch upon the benefits of the proposed approach.

- Expensive to conduct, yet valuable in their own right, city-level surveys of known notorious neighbourhoods and known prestigious neighbourhoods would help to assess the veracity of national and regional generalisations that arise from BCS findings.
- The real concentration of crime would be found in real neighbourhoods - not pseudo neighbourhoods.
- This would allow us to compare real risks with fear of crime in known, named, notorious high crime neighbourhoods and make comparisons over time and between long standing high crime and low crime places.

## 6. The way forward: proposing an up close and personal BCS

At times, although it rarely happens, it is useful for sociologists, social workers, psychologists and criminologists to collaborate to research multiple disciplinary literatures (e.g. Sutton et al 2007). If the distinct political and analytical endeavours of cultural criminologists, quantitative and qualitative researchers – including symbolic interactionists – amongst others, was focused collectively on the problem of notorious high crime communities, and those who police them, would we not at least see a bigger picture and have greater potential to understand more of what we think we know and what we need to learn more about and how to go about it? This proposed loose coalition of quantitative and qualitative criminologists of many flags researching different high crime neighbourhoods, sampled by the BCS, would allow us to better compare and seek to understand the diversity, similarity and constantly shifting social world where high crime levels are perpetrated, perceived, policed and recorded.

We are not proposing a dominant post-modern methodological relativism here, where no one method can ever be better than any other, but we are suggesting that any combination of sound quantitative research with rich qualitative research will provide more insight for the development of the BCS than quantitative analysis alone. To develop knowledge regarding unknown BCS area heterogeneity, such an inclusive developmental approach will almost certainly reveal new and valuable data about the characteristics of non-responders, risk avoidance and fear, and the human detail behind reports of victimisation and self-reported offending.

The BCS needs a degree of constancy to meet its main purpose, which is to show annual crime trends. Major changes to the BCS design would make comparisons with earlier years problematic. Therefore, we do not propose substituting the current pseudo-neighbourhood sampling and analysis with real neighbourhood / estate sampling and analysis. Instead, we wish to recommend a trial (see Sutton 2007) whereby the BCS adopt a real place booster sample of, say, five notorious high crime estates / neighbourhoods and five prestigious "safe" estates / neighbourhoods. At the very least, sampling and analysing data from real BCS sampled communities across England and Wales would allow us to compare the prevalence, incidence and concentration of crimes within real neighbourhoods – as opposed to synthetic ones. This would allow us to determine just how representative synthetic areas are of the reality that they claim to represent. If this sounds like a proposal for future research, that is because it is.

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# Fear of crime: its social construction in the Netherlands<sup>1</sup>

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*Though only some surveys on victimisation and fear of crime have been conducted in Greece, they do follow the conventions and measurement practices that are similar to those in the USA, UK and the Netherlands. That is, besides questions on victimization experienced, items on the so-called fear of crime are included, such as "How safe do you feel walking alone in your area after dark?". The Netherlands have a somewhat longer tradition of victim surveys. From a social construction perspective, this paper discusses the history of 'fear of crime' in the Netherlands and describes how 'fear of crime' has become a social issue in Dutch society. The main purpose of this article is to show that 'fear of crime' is rooted in statistics and surveys by the Dutch government: without statistics, there would be no 'fear of crime' in the Netherlands as we know it today.*

In 2005, Greece was included in the EU International Crime Survey (EU ICS), the European follow up of the International Crime Victim Survey (ICVS) (Van Dijk et al. 2007). Until then, surveys on victimisation were rare and were mainly limited to surveys in greater Athens (Zarafonitou 2008, 2009). These local surveys followed conventions and measurement practices that are similar to those in the USA, UK and the Netherlands. That is, besides questions on victimization experienced, items on the so-called fear of crime are included, such as "How safe do you feel walking alone in your area after dark?". The Netherlands participate in the EU ICS as well and has a somewhat longer tradition of victim surveys.<sup>1</sup>

This paper discusses the history of 'fear of crime' in the Netherlands and describes how 'fear of crime' has become a social issue in Dutch society. The main purpose of this article is to show that 'fear of crime' is rooted in statistics and surveys by the Dutch government: without statistics, there would be no 'fear of crime' in the Netherlands as we know it today. Following American and English practices, 'fear of crime' became a salient issue in Dutch politics and academia. When looking at the historical development of statistics, it is obvious that the new technical and methodological possibilities gave lots of opportunities for governments and institutions to use statistical figures as source as well as tool. Similar to what Lee (2007) finds in his thorough analysis of the birth of fear of crime and its genealogy in the USA and the UK, the Dutch surveys are political instruments. In the Netherlands, 'fear of crime' receives a lot of attention by state actors and many policy agencies are devoting part of their time and money to the 'reduction' of fear. Also, 'fear of crime', its causes and effects are a salient issue in Dutch (news) media.

In this article the method of approach that has been employed is elaborated on firstly: this research is done from a social construction perspective. After that, the historical roots of crime statistics are briefly pointed out, which demonstrate the pervasive instrumental role these statistical developments already played. Politics, i.e. governments and institutions, were extremely interested in statistics and statistical analysis of social phenomena. Criticism regarding the reliability of these (crime) statistics became more apparent, and issues regarding the dark number, together with achievements in polling and sampling, led to the development of the crime victim survey. Several aspects of society were surveyed, among which were all kinds of opinions and attitudes, which is described in the second section. These early (American) crime victim surveys, as well as surveys on living conditions, often contained the familiar 'feeling safe alone after dark'-item, which was copied internationally and used in the surveys

in the Netherlands as well. The most common surveys that were (and still are) administered in the Netherlands are briefly described. Findings from these surveys play a major, and often instrumental, role. Analogue to the USA and UK, it seems that 'fear of crime', no matter to what extent, should be combated in the Netherlands as well.

## 2. Social construction as research perspective

Similar to Green (1997), in Vanderveen (2006) I have discussed the question how the concept fear of crime did become an inevitable part of the universe in the late 20th century, how concepts have been reified "as if they were something other than human products" (Berger & Luckman 1966: 89). Dutch and English material were systematically collected, consisting of survey and interview questions, raw survey and interview data and literature on 'fear of crime' or the experience and interpretation of safety in relation to crime. The concepts, operationalisations and items were analysed by means of a strategy based on a grounded theory approach. That is, the concepts were constantly compared and grouped into higher order categories. The three core categories or concepts that emerged most clearly and that appeared to be central to 'fear of crime' are (criminal) victimisation, risk (perception) and fear. These three concepts are discussed extensively Vanderveen (2006), focusing on the question what certain concepts mean with respect to their social context. When and why did the concept 'fear of crime' become an issue in research, politics and the media? When did 'fear of crime' become a social problem? Why is 'fear of crime' measured the way it is currently? How are different concepts theoretically related to one another? In these chapters a specific method of approach is employed, by which means the meanings of concepts are analysed. This perspective, which implies the relevance of social and political circumstances in order to understand the meaning and relationships of concepts, is explained briefly here. In general, this seems rather similar to Lee's (2001, 2007) contention regarding the contingent nature of both 'fear of crime' research and the 'fear of crime' concept; in other words, 'fear of crime' is not a pre-discursive social fact. He sketches the history of the discourse of 'fear of crime' in the USA and Britain and carries out a genealogical analysis in which the role of the government is of primary interest. Here, the analytical method of approach is based on a so-called 'social construction' perspective. Such an approach assumes that insight in the meaning of a concept, and related issues of validity, can be derived from its history; the social and political context or scene in which the concept has and still is being used.

The work of Hacking (1999a, 2000) explains social construction and uses this perspective as tool of analysis. Elaborating on his work on

1. Parts of this article have been published in my book on the conceptualisation and operationalisation of 'fear of crime' Vanderveen (2006). This article is an adaptation and update of chapters from this book.

the 'sociology of concept formation', he argues that the notion of 'social construction' means that something (X) and its meanings are not inevitable, but rather a product of historical events and social forces. This is not to say that since this something (e.g. child abuse in Hacking 1988) is socially constructed, persons are not suffering from it, nor does indicating that X is a social construction help them. Because of the hereto related "great fear of relativism", Hacking recommends to ask what's the point that something is socially constructed. He proposes two major underlying aims in studies that incorporate the idea of social construction, namely the raising of consciousness and to criticise inevitability, the status quo. These aims can be achieved in three different ways, which Hacking presents in the form of three theses of the social construction of X. The first thesis states that X need not have existed, nor need to be at all as it is. X, its existence or character as it is at present, is not determined by the nature of things, it is not inevitable. X has been brought into existence and is shaped by the social context, namely by social events, forces and history. This social context could well have been different, which would have brought about another type of X. The second thesis claims that X is quite bad as it is and the third maintains that we (i.e. society, people) would be much better off if X were done away with, or when X would be at least radically transformed (Hacking 2000).

All three theses and the very notion of 'social construction' share a general precondition for social construction theses. This precondition holds that in the present state of affairs, X is taken for granted, X is unchanging and X appears to be inevitable. For example, Clark's book on sexual assault within the social context of 18th and 19th century England starts with "It seems to be a fact of life that the fear of rape imposes a curfew on our movements; a fact that if we stay at home we will be safe, but if we venture out alone we face the strange rapist in the dark alley." (Clark 1987: 1). By investigating the social and historical context, she concludes that sexual violence is real, but that rape used as warning is a historical creation. She argues that the protection that is offered by the warning or the myth, in exchange for obedience is illusory, more danger exists in one's home than on dark streets and rapists are male acquaintances, friends as well as strangers. Therefore, her analysis of 'rape as a warning' seems to be an example of the third thesis that Hacking distinguishes, i.e. 'rape as a warning' is quite bad as it is and we, or more specifically: women, would be much better off if 'rape as a warning' were done away with. An example of the first thesis is Green's study (1997), which describes a "history of accidents" and traces the contemporary concept of accident back to history by investigating how it was called, i.e. classified and conceptualised then. The main question concerns the essential characteristics to be labelled as such in a certain period, the conditions that made the current classifications possible and thus when it became possible to speak of accidents.

The background of this article is the proposition that the concept 'fear of crime', and the categorisation, classification and ideas related to this concept (e.g. "men have less fear of crime") are socially constructed, which means that this concept refers to a network of social relations and that it is employed to serve certain ends. The concept 'fear of crime' does not exist in a vacuum, but inhabits a social setting which Hacking (2000) calls the matrix. Within this matrix the idea and concept 'fear of crime' is formed. Thus, the social construction of 'fear of crime' refers to the idea of 'fear of crime' (in its matrix) that is meant by those who employ this concept, how 'fear of crime' is a result of historical events and social processes, how 'fear of crime' became an issue or even a problem. This does not mean that what is named 'fear of crime' cannot be a 'real' social problem, or that people do not worry about crime. To suggest that something is socially constructed, is not to say that it is non-existent, not a problem or that it should not be influenced or measured. Scientific research findings are

socially constructed in the sense that social processes influence the factual results and how they are used to provide support for a theory (Sargent 1997).

In other words, social construction similar to the first thesis or way that is described by Hacking (2000) is applied here. It is posed that 'fear of crime', its meaning(s) and related issues, are a product of historical, cultural and social circumstances or contexts. Other contexts would have brought about another type of 'fear of crime', its meaning (or name) would have been different then. As shown in Vanderveen (2006), the antecedents of the discourses on 'fear of crime' have made the concept appear as an inevitable one; a history of 'fear of crime' starts with its birth. Or maybe even with its (grand) parents. Without statistics, surveys and the (governmental) need for knowledge on attitudes and opinions, the concept 'fear of crime' would not have been born.

### 3. The rise of statistics and surveys

During the research process, it became clear that the discourses on victimisation, risk perception and 'fear of crime' shared similar roots or antecedents, which have led to the current habits of conceptualisation and measurement. These antecedents have made the concept appear as an inevitable one: without statistics, surveys and the (governmental) need for knowledge on attitudes and opinions, the concept 'fear of crime' would not have been born. Lee (2001) too notes statistics and surveys as the primary conditions of 'fear of crime' as we know it.

When looking at the huge amount of surveys performed, it seems that government, institutions and researchers have little doubt about the necessity of survey research in the field of safety, fear, crime and risk. The necessity and existence of acquiring knowledge about opinions and attitudes is unquestioned or even evident. But when did people or more specifically, the government, start to obtain knowledge about misfortunes like accidents or deaths by certain causes. What about attitudes regarding these misfortunes? In general, knowledge about attitudes, ideas, feelings, opinions et cetera is considered societally significant, especially when it is crime-related (see for example Chevigny 2003). Because of the development of statistical knowledge and techniques, the quantitative measurement of these kind of attitudinal knowledge became possible. However, this development has been closely interwoven with governmental choices, institutions and funding.

#### 3.1 Statistical opportunities

Originating from a long development in history, in the early nineteenth century the possibilities of using statistics expanded rapidly (Hacking 1975; Pearson & Pearson 1978).<sup>2</sup> From the 15th and 16th centuries on, the state becomes gradually governmentalised. That is, the government started to govern on the basis of rational calculations, technical analyses, procedures and tactics (Foucault 1991). Categorising and counting social phenomena in the formation of knowledge about society began to form the basis of discussion as well as policy decisions of institutions (Duncan 1984; Porter 1996).<sup>3</sup> Better yet, the statistics were introduced as pure, incontrovertible

<sup>2</sup> Along with the development of statistics, several techniques to analyse the numbers expanded as well, going 'beyond' frequencies and percentages (e.g. Van Bemmelen 1958; Koren 1918), for example by applying Pearson's correlation (e.g. Macdonell 1902).

<sup>3</sup> Also, from the seventeenth century on, new concepts and techniques were developed in the study of the "combination of observations" (Stigler 1986: 11), like probability, induction, statistical inference and likelihood tests,

facts and became eagerly welcomed by the Napoleonic state and Britain (Emsley 1999). When in the 1660s a book on the 'London Bills of Mortality' was published, the statistical study of social problems began (Cullen 1975; David 1998). This is described by Cullen (1975) as a science of society tied to the notion of quantification of social phenomena, and Hacking (1975: 102) denotes 'statistics' as the systematic study of quantitative facts about the State.<sup>4</sup> The use of statistics expanded rapidly, printed numbers became increasingly important, which also eroded determinism and instead increased the awareness of possibilities of social control (Deflem 1997; Hacking 1990). Quantifications were used to justify specific interventions (Hacking 1990; Taylor 1998b). Figure 1 pictures this process schematically.

In the nineteenth century, social scientists began to analyse the aggregated data, starting with Quetelet who published criminal or 'moral' statistics in 1827 (Beirne 1987; Salas & Surette 1984; Stigler 1986; Taylor 1998a). In 1810, the British Home Office began publishing crime statistics, since 1830s on a regular basis. Examples from the British Home Office can be found in the National Archives with numerous documents from the Public Record Office archives, such as hand-written figures from the Home Office that show a comparison of the amounts of various crimes, like murder, burglary and robbery, in 1880 with the annual averages for 1875 to 1879 (HO45/10424 R19175), and an even earlier example that compares the number of criminal offenders in 1826 with 1825 (HO44/17 f.1).<sup>5</sup>




Figure 1. Schema of statistical development regarding 'counting and control' social issues.

According to Cullen, the British national crime statistics were born out of the issue of capital punishment, which during that time was topic of campaign and debate (Cullen 1975: 13). He describes the role of British governmental departments and committees in the use and publication of social statistics in period 1832-1852, as well as the development of private statistical societies, like the Statistical Society of London in 1834, which is now called the Royal Statistical Society (Hacking 1975). Cullen has little doubt about the political nature of statistics and refers to "improvement by numbers" (page 149). With urbanisation, not industrialisation, as a leading motive, the statistical movement was concerned with the moral effects of urbanisation on the working class. As Koren (1918) describes, several other countries, including Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain as well as Ireland and Scotland, Hungary, India, the Netherlands, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the United States all established departments, or bureaus, of statistics

which enabled the "measurement of uncertainty" (Bernstein 1998; David 1998; Hacking 1975).

4. In the seventeenth century, the statistician Conring already argued that the State must have the facts on which decisions can be based and act rationally (Salas & Surette 1984).
5. These examples can be found on <http://learningcurve.pro.gov.uk/candp/crime/g07/g07cs2.htm>.

that started publishing 'moral', 'criminal' or 'judicial' statistics in the nineteenth century. Statistics were used to provide support for public health reforms and education, in particular to fight poverty (Wohl 1983). For example, Florence Nightingale had very much faith in the value of statistics and quantification as a means to reveal higher laws of contagionism in order to fight disease and illness (David 1998; Freedgood 2000). Freedgood (2000), in her account of the Victorian notion of risk, explores the 'count and control' ideas in the Victorian Era. She concludes that the increasing ability of bureaucracy (institutions) to collect large numbers meant that reassuring regularities could be discovered and published. Counting, i.e. the numbers as well as the theory, would "explain and tame the apparent disorder of so much of British society" (Freedgood 2000: 69). The principles and regularities derived from statistics make social problems manageable and knowable (Foucault 1991; see also Lee 2001, 2007).

The political nature of statistics appears from the figures on crime as well. In many countries, the emergence of official crime statistics in the nineteenth century made the construction of national 'pictures of crime' possible, enabling to view this picture or phenomenon as a national problem requiring a national solution (Emsley 1999). For the United States, the picture was related to the State-region (Cummings 1918; Deflem 1997; Gettemy 1918). Since the States of the USA all have sovereign jurisdictions of crime control, without one particular body of criminal law, institution or procedure that relates to the United States as a whole, many difficulties arise in drawing together national statistics on crime and correction. Although from 1850 to 1890 the Bureau of the Census collected statistics on prisoners in connection with each decennial Census of Population, it was not before 1926 that the Bureau of the Census made the first nationwide collection of criminal data (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1997). The second nationwide collection of crime figures began in 1930. This time, the Federal Bureau of Investigation collected summary reports from many police departments on serious offences known to the police, as well as arrests made by the police (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1997).<sup>6</sup>

In the Netherlands, the Central Bureau of Statistics (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek - CBS) began collecting official police figures on crime, in addition to census data on the Dutch population they already collected (Maarseveen, Gircour & Schreijnders 1999; Verrijn Stuart 1918). In 1939, Kempe and Vermaat published a study in which criminal statistics, derived from police figures, of two provinces were presented, together with factors supposed to correlate or cause crime, like church visits, illegitimate children, the use of alcohol, living circumstances, police capacity and also issues concerning surveillance due to impassable roads (Kempe & Vermaat 1939). Van Bemmelen (1958) used official crime statistics from the CBS as well, while briefly describing the 'dark number' issue (Van Bemmelen 1958: 41-43, 250-253).

Thus, since the nineteenth century, in several countries it became common practice to collect statistics on crime, accidents et cetera to check whether (in line with popular belief) crime was increasing or how crime changed (Deflem 1997; Godfrey 2003; Robinson 1933; Wilkins 1980). Besides that, people analysed and interpreted the statistics by not only showing regularities from year to year, but also by explaining these patterns with other variables, like Quetelet and Gatrell had done earlier (Beirne 1987; Emsley 1999; Stigler 1986). For example, Wichman used crime statistics to show that education and the social situation in general were important in explaining increasing crime rates. Also, she noted that crime increased during crisis pe-

6. See for more information the National Archive of Criminal Justice Data [NACJD] as well as the CD-ROM of the U.S. Bureau of the Census; especially Series H952-1170 on crime and correction and Series H971-986 that provide data on homicides and suicides from 1900 till 1970.

riods, like World War I (Van Bochove 1999). The crime figures were used for controlling costs and the general finances as well (Emsley 1999). Consequently, the police and special institutions got the task to provide statistical knowledge, like the number of murders and thefts within a certain region. Obviously, these statistics increasingly became political instruments (Best 2001; Chevigny 2003; Morris 2001; Porter 1996; Taylor 1998a, 1998b). Haggerty's (2001) analysis of the production and publication of official criminal justice statistics by a national statistical agency (i.e. the Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics) provides overwhelming evidence of the instrumental uses of statistics, by showing the 'micropolitical considerations' of the many agencies involved in the production of official statistics about crime and criminal justice. For example, he describes the influences on the decisions regarding the studies that are done, the agencies that control the official data, the counting rules, the way the measures are standardised and how statistical facts are communicated to the public. (Haggerty 2001).

In sum, as pictured in Figure 1 the governments in the USA, UK, the Netherlands and other Western societies took an interest in the counting of social phenomena, and statistics on all kinds of social issues were used to make an argument, to justify specific interventions and to increase the general awareness of possibilities of social control. Statistical analyses have become more and more technically advanced and more common. Institutions, governmental departments and committees were concerned with 'counting and controlling' and with 'explaining and taming'. Statistical regularities were used to develop interventions, make policy and allocate resources, for example concerning crime. In addition to statistics, another datasource became common in many societies: the survey.

### 3.2 Surveying society: criminal victimisation and the police

The survey as a source of information became established in the 1940s and 1950s. Three sectors in society in particular used the survey as a tool, namely the government, the academic community and business (O'Muircheartaigh 1997). These three sectors have developed their own distinct frameworks and terminologies, based on different disciplines like statistics, sociology and experimental psychology. Thus, three lines in the historical development of survey research can be distinguished; firstly the governmental and therefore official statistics, secondly academic or social research and finally the strand of commercial, advertising or market research (O'Muircheartaigh 1997). Likert, in a reprint from a 1951-article, elaborates on the sample survey as a tool of research and policy information (Likert 1968). He proposes various origins, like the polls, which aroused much public interest in their results, consumer market research and methodological origins in mathematical statistics and the field of attitude measurement. According to Likert, the sample interview survey would have a great future, in which he was right; public opinion research creates a totally different perspective of phenomena (Osborne & Rose 1999). Although it took sometime before the increasing criticism regarding the reliability of the official crime statistics was met by making a victim survey (Decker 1977; Inciardi & McBride 1976), see Figure 2. The victim survey consists of a questionnaire that is administered to a sample of the population, asking questions on personal victimisation experiences of several offences like theft and burglary. Although mainly concerned with evading the dark number of official (police) figures and enhancing comparative analysis of official figures and survey rates, it paved the road for the idea that not only the people's victimhood could be measured, but their ideas and feelings regarding crime as well (see Figure 2).

In the 1960s, public opinion surveys administered in the United States began asking about crime and related themes (Harris 1969). For example, the Harris Poll in 1964 asked whether "juvenile delinquency and crime" were a problem or not (Harris 1964), the Harris Poll in 1969 asked respondents whether they "keep a weapon or instrument of protection by your bed when you go to sleep" and the famous items on the stranger who rings the doorbell and how safe they felt when they walked in their neighbourhood during the day. Two more items were added regarding their "worry about wife or husband when they are away from home in the evening" and "worry about children when they are away from home in the evening" (Harris 1969). In 1967, the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) conducted the first nationwide study of victimisation in the United States. Again, the historical roots show the political relevance of 'fear of crime'. This survey was conducted for a governmental commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice (Hindelang 1974). This survey asked people from 10,000 households about criminal victimisation over the twelve months prior to the interview (Hindelang 1974). Moreover, more surveys were administered in the United States, which were (partly) aiming at the measurement of experiences and the fear of criminal victimisation. Around 1970, the focus of the study of crime extended to the impact of crime on the victim, the costs of crime and losses of the victim.




Figure 2. Schematic presentation of development of 'fear of crime'-notion in surveys.

Miller (1973) focused on 'fear of crime' of victims and of those aware of the risk on victimisation. In that year, the National Crime Survey, after some years of preparation, was developed further.<sup>7</sup> Changes in attitudes and habits could be derived from "attitude data" and could be used in planning programs, as Gignilliat (1977: 186) suggests. The 'attitude data' consisted of the responses on questions about the "change in frequency of crime in neighborhood", "change in frequency of crime in U.S.", whether crime had an "effect on activities of people in neighborhood", "effect on activities of people in general", "effect on activities of respondent" and an "effect on travel to areas of city during day" or during the night. Also, questions were asked on the "perceived safety in neighborhood", compared to other neigh-

7. The surveys were part of the National Crime Panel (NCP) Program, which is sponsored by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. Again, the political background of the survey is clear. Gignilliat (1977: 183) notes: "NCP's goal is to help criminal justice agencies improve their effectiveness by providing a new source of detailed information about the victims of crimes, numbers and types of crimes reported and not reported to police, and uniform measures of selected types of crimes".

bourhoods, during the day and during the night (Gignilliat 1977). Not only crime was seen as a social problem, 'fear of crime' itself became a problem for the community as well and became a research subject in itself (see Vanderveen 2006 and Lee 2007). Following this tradition, the linking of personal victimisation incidents with the experience and interpretation of safety, the British Crime Survey (BCS) was for the first time conducted in 1982. The BCS is very similar to the victim surveys as applied in Scotland (SCS), Australia (ACSS), the United States (NCVS), Canada (GSS) (Hough & Mayhew 1983).

In the Netherlands, the sample survey was introduced after the Second World War (Van Bochove 1999). Van Bochove (1999) claims the number of Dutch household surveys increased rapidly not only because of the funds that became available, but also because the government needed more information on social phenomena. Yet, systematic studies of public opinion or of attitudes regarding crime or sanctions were missing and not much literature was available on the victim or on victimology (Kempe 1967). This changed in 1973 when the first criminal victimisation survey was carried out, which was to a certain extent copied from the American victim surveys. Respondents were asked not only about their experiences with crime, but also about safety measures and reactions to crime (Fiselier 1978). Just like Anglosaxon predecessors, this survey mainly aimed for a more reliable estimation of the occurrence of crime, by surpassing the police statistics and thus avoiding the 'dark number' issue (Figure 2). Besides that, Fiselier acknowledged the possibilities of the victim survey for research on for example the costs of victimisation. Moreover, he noted that crime can be viewed as a social problem, which causes that crime does not only pertain to victims of crime, but instead that everybody has to do with crime (Fiselier 1978).

The Dutch Ministry of Justice and its research department, WODC, found the victimisation experiences relevant and conducted a few surveys from 1974 till 1979 (e.g. Buikhuisen 1975; Vanderveen Van Dijk & Steinmetz 1979). In these surveys, no items related to 'fear of crime' were included, unlike the survey that specifically aimed at gauging the opinions and feelings of the population on the issue of crime (Cozijn & Van Dijk 1976: 1). This survey, like the victimisation surveys, had definite political origins. When the Dutch Lower House (Tweede Kamer) discussed the Budget of the Ministry of Justice for the year 1974, a working group for the prevention of crime (Stuurgroep Preventie Criminaliteit) was established. The survey was conducted at the request of this working group.

In the report by Cozijn and Van Dijk (1976), four legitimisations are noted to explain why the study of these opinions and feelings is relevant. First, the authors state that the government should know whether the public thinks problems concerning crime should have priority over other problems. Second, they suggest that the public opinion determines the boundaries of the reform (humanisation) of penal and criminal justice. Next, by studying opinions and feelings, the government can observe trends. Being ignorant of certain feelings in the society might lead vigilantism, i.e. to situations in which people take the law into their own hands, so as to prevent vigilantism. To illustrate their argument, the authors point to some criminal cases in which the public prosecutors ask for long sentences, referring to the unrest in society. A final legitimisation concerns wellbeing, which can be affected by feelings of fear and behavioural constraints (Cozijn & Van Dijk 1976). The contents of the survey, which were conducted with a representative sample, are very similar to the American surveys. Questions referred for example to thoughts about crime, has the likelihood of becoming a victim increased the past two years, feeling safe at home and in the street, avoiding places because of fear of becoming attacked or robbed and preventive measures that were taken. Another survey from that time paid attention to the public's

opinion as well, in relation to police and the tasks of the police. For example, one item stated that "when there wouldn't be police, you wouldn't feel safe" (Junger-Tas & Van der Zee-Nefkens 1978). So in the 70s, some surveys were conducted that were quite similar to the American victim surveys, yet no attention was paid to 'fear of crime' on a regular basis. This changed in 1981, when the ESM (Enquête Slachtoffers Misdrijven), a survey of crime victims, was administered annually till 1985 and bi-annually from 1985 till 1993. Thus, responses on the question "Are you afraid when you're at home alone at night" are available since 1982 from the CBS. The ESM was transformed into the ERV (Enquête Rechtsbescherming en Veiligheid), a survey on legal protection and safety. In 1997, this survey was combined with a survey on health and living conditions and changed into the POLS (Permanent Onderzoek Leefsituatie), labelled as a survey on the Quality of Life.

Next to POLS, a major source of statistical data is the PMB (PolitieMonitor Bevolking). This so called Police Monitor of the Population was introduced in 1990 and has been administered bi-annually since 1993 and is commissioned by the Home Office, the Ministry of Justice and the police divisions (e.g. Huls et al. 2001). Familiar items, on avoiding places because of crime, not opening the door at night and forbidding children to go to a particular place, are included. Similar items, in addition to questions about neighbourhood problems and social cohesion, were included in yet another survey (GSB), a survey conducted in the bigger cities of the Netherlands, connected with policy with respect to these cities. The survey was used to compare the cities on several performance indicators.

In 2005, the Home office, the Ministry of Justice and the CBS signed an agreement that was aimed to streamline the various existing surveys on crime and insecurity (POLS, PMB and the GSB). The different surveys should be integrated into a single Safety Monitor, which would be conducted annually (Pauwels en Pleysier 2008; Oppelaar en Wittebrood 2006). After a transitional period, the Dutch safety monitor (Veiligheidsmonitor) was administered in 2008. This survey consists of fixed and optional components. The national government is responsible for the nationwide administration of the integrated VM; the different police forces and municipalities, when they decide to join, cover local monitors. A new (national) agency was created to co-ordinate and supervise the VM centrally and while this is done by this agency, the cost of fieldwork (data collection, sampling) is charged to the local level. Municipalities can choose from the optional components, in order to meet the own local context and needs (Versteegh and Van den Heuvel 2007). Findings from the VM enables the comparison between police forces and municipalities. Press releases with respect to findings find their way to the Dutch national and local media. In these press releases and media coverages, victimization rates and indicators of fear of crime are always present. It is impossible to think of Dutch media, policy and politics without 'fear of crime'.

Next to national comparisons, international comparisons are possible as well. Since 1989, surveys, the Netherlands participated in the International Crime Victim Survey (ICVS). This was developed in the late eighties and has been used four times now, in 1989, 1992, 1996 and 2000 (Van Kesteren, Mayhew & Nieuwbeerta 2000). Over time, more countries became involved and in 2000 the ICVS has been administered in more than fifty countries all over the world, which makes the amount of data on criminal victimisation and aspects regarding the experience of personal safety overwhelming. The 'feeling safe when walking alone'-item is included, as well as for example an item on the perceived risk of becoming a victim of burglary. Since 2004-2005, the Netherlands, as well as Greece and other (future) European member states, participate in the European Crime and Safety Survey (EU ICS). The EU ICS is organized by, among oth-



ers, Gallup-Europe and Unicri (United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute) and co-financed by the European Commission.

All these surveys and the agencies related to them show how surveys, and the fear of crime, have become an unquestioned social fact. Without the historical developments in statistics and probability theory, the numerous surveys on the local, national and international level (e.g. in the UK, USA, the Netherlands) would not have been conducted. Though the victim surveys were originally developed to counter criticism concerning the reliability of (crime) statistics, i.e. dark number issues, the surveys contained questions on attitudes regarding crime as well. As such, the development of the crime victim survey since the 1960s, and its cross-national expansion, is a result of the developments in public opinion and election polling, technical advancement in sampling techniques and an overall increasing interest in intentions and attitudes of the general public. From this period on, the item 'feeling safe after dark' has been used (Figure 2). This item, and related items on 'worry' and 'stranger ringing the doorbell', soon became known as relating to 'fear of crime'. The item came first, the concept appeared on the stage later. From the 1970s on, not only crime was seen as a social problem, but 'fear of crime' itself became a problem; also, it became a research subject. Besides measures to decrease crime, measures to decrease 'fear of crime' were taken and evaluated, up until now (e.g. Henning & Maxfield 1978; Cordner 2010). Criticism rose together with the increasing development and use of statistics and surveys (e.g. Sanders 1999; Lupton & Tulloch 1999). In response to that criticism, several conceptual and methodological improvements have been made (see for example Gray, Jackson & Farrall 2011). Despite these changes, the overall conclusion is that 'fear of crime' has certainly grown since its birth, but the surrounding discourse, nor its basic indicators, hasn't changed that much: si.

The first Dutch crime victim surveys are based on the earlier American crime victim surveys and the different variants on national and local level have been copied ever since. Also, the internationally famous items, some of which are used in almost every survey, were originally intended and/or used as a sort of public opinion poll-question. Statistics are used instrumentally; Best (2001) notes that people who present statistics have a reason for doing so; they want something, just like the media who repeat the statistics in their publications. Especially in social science statistics "can become weapons in political struggles over social problems and social policy" (Best 2001: 10). Quantitative findings on fear of crime are used in politics and policy, most often in the context of a specific political agenda.

#### 4. Fear of crime in politics and policy

The victim surveys and the figures on fear of crime derived from them, are used in policy making (e.g. see Grogger & Weatherford 1995), financial decisions and international comparisons. Victim surveys have proven to be important instruments in politics and cutting costs (Baer & Chambliss 1997; Body-Gendrot 2001; Kuttschreuter & Wiegman 1998). Several actors, for example politicians and police officers, point to the results concerning 'fear of crime', derived from public opinion polls and surveys. Appeals to public opinion have become central in political discourse, since public opinion provides the ultimate ground of legitimacy for a specific political and legislative agenda (Zaret 2000). Politicians and policy makers often refer to public opinion, and the fear of crime, to legitimise a policy measure. Measures that attempt to reduce fear are proffered as guarantees of security, as "assurance that an established order will prevail", similar to vigilantism and "like any other form of policing" (Johnston 2001: 968–969). A higher 'fear of crime' means that more actions should be taken, whereas a

lower 'fear of crime' means that the policy measures have worked indeed and should be sustained, increased or toughened. In other words, 'fear' is the legitimization of surveillance, punishment and punitive laws (Altheide 2002). Altheide (2003: 53) concludes his article on the discourse of fear in the mass media in relation to terrorism as follows: "Fear is perceived as crime and terrorism, while police and military forces are symbolically joined as protectors."

Thus, British and American studies demonstrate that 'fear of crime' is often used instrumentally and as a political symbol in politics. Obviously, its historical roots, which are similar to other statistics and surveys on social issues, already provide an argument of its instrumental role (see Haggerty 2001; Lee 2007). Statistics and surveys could rapidly increase because of governmental institutions and funding. The pervasive instrumental role that the (crime) statistics and crime surveys played, including the items on 'fear of crime' has described previously; statistics are thought to enable politicians and policy makers to 'count & control', or to 'explain and tame'. The instrumental role is for example reflected by the attention that 'fear of crime' receives from state actors or (semi-)governmental institutions, in for example the USA, UK as well as in the Netherlands. Several policy agencies are investing time and money to the "reduction" of fear, leading to many policy measures and practical implementations that, in some cases, subsequently are evaluated in studies that attempt to check the effectiveness of policy interventions. Such policy measures are mostly connected to a political agenda concerned with 'law & order' and 'zero tolerance'. In 1969, Harris already gives a detailed outline of the growing calls for tougher action in terms of policing, disciplining and punishing criminals, a discourse and political agenda that uses 'fear of crime' to a large extent. For example, crime and 'fear of crime' are said to be a "public malady", for which politicians should "seek its cure" (Harris 1969: 17–18). The fear of crime, more than the fact of it, guaranteed that some kind of action would be taken, for the public demand had to be met.

Findings from surveys on fear of crime do not suggest specific political reactions: in itself, they can trigger either punitive or non-punitive reactions. Yet, several studies indicate fear of crime is used primarily to argue for punitive, repressive measures. Scheingold (1984) for example argues that the initial precondition of a politics of law & order is a public perception that crime threatens the social order, although other threats to society and other personal insecurities are relevant as well. All this paves the road for 'campaigning on crime', on the one hand depicting appealing portrayals of crime, less abstract and more direct, and arousing anxieties, on the other hand providing a rather simple solution to the problem, namely more punitive crime control measures. He states that politicians are served by 'fear of crime' and crime as a symbol; if one takes a get-tough stand, then crime is a good issue when campaigning (Scheingold 1984). Also, 'fear of crime' works out well for law enforcement officials, the result of public concern is frequently that more resources are directed to agencies of criminal process. Besides these two groups, private security organisations profit from 'fear of crime' as well, as do organisations arguing for the necessity of legal firearms ownership (Łoś 2002; McDowall & Loftin 1983). The private security industry, law enforcement institutions, politics and the press all comment on levels of fear of crime, which are generally denoted as being high or too high.

When 'fear of crime' had just started to exist as measurable concept, Harris already commented on the political uses of 'fear of crime'. The choice whether punitive and/or non-punitive solutions are promised in response to the crime problem is a political one. Often, the solutions offered are punitive. For example, the Republican Richard Nixon, who later became president of the USA, issued his first policy position paper titled 'Toward Freedom from Fear' Harris (1969: 73–74) notes:

The proper response to crime, according to Mr. Nixon, lay not in cleaning up the slums, where it was bred, but in locking up more malefactors. "If the conviction rate were doubled in this country", he explained, "it would do more to eliminate crime in the future than a quadrupling of the funds for any governmental war on poverty.

The famous 'broken windows thesis' of Wilson and Kelling (1982) also contributed to the idea that deterrence measures and especially the strict control of minor offences, or incivilities, would reduce fear and crime (see Burke 1998; Harcourt 1998; Herbert 2001). More in general, several authors point out that various contemporary Western societies show an increasing punitiveness and emphasis on crime control (Beckett 1997; Beckett & Sasson 2000; Garland 2000, 2001). Newburn (2002) analyses the USA as a direct source of the law & order policies, and suggest 'zero tolerance' is probably the best known example of imported crime control in the UK (Newburn 2002). He notes that it is not only policies that are transferred across the Atlantic, but more so "elements of terminology, ideas and ideologies" that are often "phrases that have both powerful symbolic value and also act as an incitement to law and order" (Newburn 2002: 174). These phrases are exemplary for symbolic politics, e.g. 'three strikes and you're out', 'war on crime', 'war on drugs' and more recently the 'war on terrorism' as well as the metaphor of 'broken windows' introduced by Wilson & Kelling (1982, Burke 1998). In the Netherlands, these kind of metaphors and war rhetoric are used in political and public debates as well (e.g. Van der Woude 2007: 163).

Thus, analogue to the cross-national expansion of the crime victim survey, including the item on 'feeling safe', similar slogans are used in Dutch politics, policy and media. Garland's (2001) culture of control does not only hold for the UK and the USA, but seems applicable to the Netherlands as well (Downes & Van Swaaningen 2007; Pakes 2006). Pakes (2005) too examines the changes in Dutch criminal justice governance and concludes that tolerance to deviance is no longer a driving force in penal policy. With a hardening view of criminals and more in general a punitive shift, especially towards non-Dutch offenders, the Dutch-style crime complex is clear. Van Swaaningen (2005) distinguishes different themes in the Dutch safety discourse on the local and national level. Fear of crime, and feelings of safety and insecurity became a "major political advisor" (p. 291) and even "the compass of safety policies" (p. 295). The argument of Pakes and Van Swaaningen are advanced and demonstrated in two recent studies. Van der Woude (2010) and Koemans (2010) systematically conducted empirical analyses of the discourse on terrorism and on ASBO's respectively. Van der Woude (2010) examined hundreds of texts from public, political and legislative discourse to compare and explain the legislator's response to domestic and international terrorist threats in the 1970s and the post- 9/11 period. She demonstrates how the social and political sphere has changed and how this change has affected both public and political discourse resulting in extremely punitive demands. Reference to the public's fear of crime were, in contrast to the present, not made. In the post- 9/11 period however, fear of crime is often used to introduce, legitimize and defend far-reaching measures (Van der Woude 2010).

Recent work by Koemans (2010) also stresses the use of the public's feelings of safety in the political debate on social incivilities or so called antisocial behavior. She analysed political discourse and examined policy documents and white papers on measures to tackle antisocial behavior. In addition, she also interviewed several members of parliament and members of the city councils of Amsterdam and Rotterdam. One of the rationales for taking measures she identifies is the assumed link between disorder and crime; reference is often made to a cycle of antisocial behavior, fear and crime:

The often cited idea by the respondents is that ASB should be tackled because left unattended it leads to crime. Many respondents state that if minor incidents of ASB are left untouched, disorder can provoke fear, and fear in itself helps to create the physical and social environment in which real crime can develop. 'When people observe that ASB is not addressed, people will feel afraid and withdraw from public spaces; "they will not intervene when they observe crime", as one MP stated.' (Koemans 2010: 484)

Another rationale she identifies in defense of a tougher approach on anti-social behavior is the idea that anti-social behavior negatively influences the quality of life; anti-social behavior "is a serious problem that makes people miserable and fearful. Regardless of their political background the politicians say that ASB makes people feel unhappy and unsafe" (p.485). In general, this research demonstrates how British rhetoric and more punitive measures were incorporated in Dutch politics and policy. The Dutch government explicitly aimed to get more police on the street, a tougher enforcement of existing and new rules and introduce tougher measures if necessary (Koemans 2010; see also Koemans & Huisman 2008).

This development of increasing punitiveness and emphasis on crime control is strengthened by the events in the USA on September 11, 2001, the series of bombings in trains in Madrid (March 11, 2004) and in the Netherlands by the murder on politician Pim Fortuyn (May 6, 2002) and on filmmaker Theo van Gogh (November 2, 2004) (see also Van Swaaningen 2005). Language and symbols are important in politics and policing, especially when crime, risk and safety are involved. 'Fear of crime' appears to be a powerful phrase, and it is used as a symbol in American, British and Dutch politics. Survey findings on fear of crime are used for a purpose.

## 5. Fear of crime politicised

In this paper, the history concerning 'fear of crime' in the Netherlands has been discussed. Following American and English practices, 'fear of crime' became a social issue in Dutch society. American and English victim surveys and their items, were copied in Dutch surveys. Analogue to the USA and UK, findings from these surveys play specific instrumental role: whether 'fear of crime' is increasing or decreasing, the findings are used to legitimize law & order policies. In Greece, the victim survey has been introduced more recently. Greece has participated in the EU ICS, a victim survey that shares several similarities with the victim surveys from the early beginning. Findings from these surveys may indicate different things. Jackson (2004: 963) points out that fear of crime can be an expression of broader attitudes and values as well as an experiential phenomenon, pointing out someone's own sense of vulnerability and worry in a specific situation. He concludes that crime is "a lightning rod – a metaphor for social problems in the local community and to wider society". Survey data on fear of crime can give us a better understanding of fear as an expression and as a reflection of one's own ideological position (see Farrall, Jackson & Gray 2009). In addition, empirical studies on how survey findings, on victimization rates and fear of crime, are actually used in political and social discourse, provide more insight in ideology and politics of a society. As Lee (2001 e.d.) demonstrates 'fear of crime' has been used as argument in favour of a politics of law & order and 'zero tolerance' (Lee 2001). The literature on Dutch discourse suggests the same thing: reference is made to 'fear of crime', whether it is increasing or decreasing or unchanged, to legitimize law & order policies. Van Swaaningen (2005) problematizes this use of fear as compass in (community) safety policies. In the Netherlands, it has led to a change in police priorities: not only crime, but non-criminal acts (urban nuisance-

es) are fought against. On the local level, like in the city of Rotterdam, this has developed into "banishment modern style", a "temporary or permanent exclusion of offenders or potential offenders from certain places or functions". Needless to say, these 'banishment policies' and measures are not directed randomly to all people in Dutch society. Van Swaaningen (2005: 303) concludes:

Banishment is the new metaphor of this politics of public safety and the fears of the law-abiding citizen are the driving force behind it. The popularity of politicians increasingly depends on 'tough' statements on crime and insecurity. In this sense we attempt to govern through crime. If the process of politicians shouting each other down on 'who is the toughest?' continues, it is to be feared that crime control is becoming a fight without a social face, of which the most disadvantaged and powerless groups in society become the victims.

As noted before, the Netherlands are not alone in this developmental trajectory with respect to the discourse of law & order and the fear of crime. Neither are the Netherlands unique in its use of survey measures on crime, punitiveness and fear of crime. In general, it seems that "Policy measures are constructed in ways that appear to value political advantage and public opinion over the views of experts and the evidence of research" (Garland 2001: 13). Greece might be no exception to this observation. Cheliotis and Xenakis (2010) focus on punitiveness and incarceration rates in Greece, which appear to be risen, like they did in other Western countries. However, they argue that "broad-brush cross-country comparisons" may not do justice to explain, though similar at first glance, developments in "states of the semi-periphery, given their very different social and economic trajectories". It is hard to disagree with that, especially with many European countries in transition and an international and national political agenda that is filled with issues like the financial crisis and immigration. This necessitates a critical analysis of the political uses of public opinion and survey data even more.

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# Fear of crime in contemporary Greece: Research evidence

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*Fear of crime is considered as a complex social phenomenon with important consequences at both personal and societal level. Its semantic boundaries remain unclear and the pursuit of its definition results in a skepticism concerning its conceptualisation. The research evidence in Greece reflects the association of citizens' insecurity with the perception of the quality of their everyday life as degraded as well as their dissatisfaction with the state services, and in particular with the police effectiveness, in this field. In this context, the interpretation of the examined phenomenon will be based on the fundamental assumption that a feeling of general social insecurity is expressed through fear of crime.*

## I. The reasoning of empirical research on fear of crime

Fear of crime is considered as a complex social phenomenon with important consequences at both personal and societal level. Its semantic boundaries, however, remain unclear and the pursuit of its definition results in a skepticism concerning its appropriate conceptualisation and the criteria which lead to this (Vanderveen, 2006:29), contributing consequently to a disputation even of its status as a social phenomenon (Gray *et al.*, 2008:378).

Literally, '*fear of crime*' is defined as "a rational or irrational state of alarm or anxiety engendered by the belief that one is in danger of criminal victimisation" (McLaughlin, 2006:164). On this basis, the feeling of unsafety is provoked by the perception of crime as "a real and serious enough threat in order to be taken into account in the arrangement of everyday life" (Killias, 2001:399). This feeling is defined as the opposite of '*personal safety*' which consists of "the daily, often taken for granted, routines, that human beings engage in as a way of feeling safer at home, on the street and in the workplace" (Walkrate, 2006:292). Fear of crime and unsafety are often related to '*personal insecurity*' stemming from "the threat, imminent or remote, direct or indirect, imaginary or real, posed for individuals by other people, identifiable groups, larger and impersonal entities like the system, the market, the establishment or even society in the abstract" (Berki, 1986).

The aforementioned concepts are often used interchangeably in an attempt to refer to the same feeling or situation<sup>1</sup>. In fact, fear of crime is not only associated with the probability of victimisation but also with the perception of social reality as well as with the capacities of reaction and protection (Mucchielli, 2002:22). Furthermore, research has confirmed the existence of differentiations between the indicators of crime and those of fear of crime (Crawford, 2007:899). In order to explain this ambiguity, a classic distinction is made between *direct fear of victimisation* concerning the subject and his/her family, and the perception of crime as a *serious social problem* causing anxiety even when it does not concern the subject directly (Furstenberg, 1971; Lagrange, 1993; Robert & Pottier, 2004). In the first case, the fear is approached, as already noted, as a personal situation, whereas in the second case, the insecurity is general and focuses on criminality as a social problem. This distinction partially allows for the association of fear of crime with indicators of an area's criminality and victimisation levels without ignoring the fact that the subjective perception of threats is based on '*vulnerability*' (Killias, 2001; Killias & Clerici, 2000; Box, *et al.*, 1988; Taylor & Hale, 1986) which people attribute to themselves or to those close to them. The above distinction may also ex-

plain the large number of citizens claiming on surveys and polls that they fear crime, thus expressing their general *social concerns* within a "symbolically dense concept of crime" (Jackson, 2004:962). This distinction has also been founded on the perception of fear of crime either as *expressed* or as *experienced* depending on its association with the "expression of related concerns, funneled through this concept of crime", or with the "summed expressions of threat and vulnerability" (Jackson, 2004:962).

The tendency to exaggerate estimations of criminality and criminal threats often originates from an improper correlation of personal and/or social insecurities with fear of crime. A further explanation may arise from the origin of fear of crime which does not rest solely on personal experiences but expands to those of others since the knowledge about crime stems from different sources of information (Lupton & Tulloch, 1999:521). The expression of similar feelings is connected to a series of different factors such as those concerning the quality of life of an area's residents, their trust in the penal system as well as their socio-ideological views.

Fear of crime and insecurity are considered, above all, as basic factors in shaping citizens' attitudes toward punishment (Killias, 2001:399; Zarafonitou, 2011). Most research studies agree that citizens' views towards the severity of criminals' treatment and generally towards the severity of criminal policies are affected by these anxieties<sup>2</sup>. The fact that a large number of citizens demand stricter policies of 'law and order' is often associated with their general insecurity related to the dimensions of the criminal problem as well as their lack of confidence in the criminal justice system which they consider ineffective in protecting them from crime. This aspect of insecurity is additionally linked to other social anxieties such as unemployment, immigration, health care or education (Zarafonitou, 2008a).

The residents of modern cities are concerned mainly about street crime and "signs of incivility"<sup>3</sup>. Despite the fact that in urban centers the problems related to organised criminality are perhaps more serious<sup>4</sup>, it is

1. In the Greek language only one word is used for insecurity/unsafety=*anasfaleia*.

2. For an overview on the subject, see contributions included in the collective work of Kury & Ferdinand (Eds), 2008.

3. The consideration of factors related to what is defined as "environmental disorder" or "signs of incivility", such as broken windows, graffiti, litter in the street, dilapidated buildings, poor public lighting etc., have been included in American and British surveys from early on (Skogan & Maxfield, 1981, Lewis & Salem, 1986, Reiss, 1986).

4. According to Garland, citizens are persuaded that they face constantly new threats based "almost exclusively on street crime and forget the serious harms caused by criminal corporations, white-collar criminals or even drunk drivers" (Garland, 2001:136).

everyday criminality and "incivilities"<sup>5</sup> which appear to be associated with the perception of life as degraded as well as with the feeling that state does not care and abandons citizens. Due to the fact that the state very often neglects issues of citizens' quality of life mainly in areas of low socio-economic status, the aforementioned problems are gathered there. This leads to a vicious circle where the residents who can afford it, move from these areas while the most powerless remain, without having the power to act as pressure groups towards the state. This trend prescribes a process of further degradation, since these areas are not desirable to install socially accepted activities (housing, commercial activities, cultural activities, etc.), thereby reducing further their value (square metre prices) and attractiveness, and thus being 'selected' either for deviant and/or criminal activities (drug trafficking, prostitution, illegal trade etc.) or as a last resort by vulnerable population groups (Shaw & McKay, 1969). In this context, it is observed that worry about crime is also 'shaped' by a series of subjective parameters, such as the psychological perception of vulnerability, the wider social views and attitudes and the perception of everyday risk<sup>6</sup>. These approaches reveal the significant role of information about crime which, especially in urban areas, is monopolized by the mass media.

The examination of fear of crime in contemporary Greek society is based among others on the aforementioned reasoning, while the interpretation of the related research data rests on the fundamental assumption that through fear of crime a "feeling of general social insecurity" is expressed, stemming to a large extent from the above-mentioned perception of social and environmental disorder as indicative of the absence of state interest, which surpasses it and intervenes in the shaping of the perception of personal and social views (Mucchielli, 2002:23).

## II. The Greek research data

### i. Research methodology

Research on fear of crime has not a long tradition in Greece. Furthermore, Greece had not participated in international victimisation surveys until 2005, when it was included, for the first time, in the last European Victimization Survey (Van Dijk *et al.*, 2007a). On the national level, only one victimisation survey was conducted, in 2001 (Karydis, 2004), although this subject has been examined in the framework of surveys on fear of crime carried out in Athens during the last decade (Zarafonitou, 2002; 2004a; 2004b; Zarafonitou & Courakis, 2006, Zarafonitou 2010)<sup>7</sup>. According to data derived from the European Victimization Survey, Greeks are among the most affected by a vague sense of insecurity (Van Dijk *et al.*, 2007a; Van Dijk *et al.*, 2007b).

The first Greek survey<sup>8</sup> on fear of crime was conducted in 1998 and its focus was on the study of *fear of crime as well as of the social percep-*

*tions of the criminal phenomenon in five areas of the Greek capital* (Zarafonitou, 2002). Subsequent studies in 2004 (Zarafonitou, 2004a; 2004b; 2006a; 2006b; 2008a) and 2006 (Zarafonitou & Courakis, 2006; Zarafonitou, 2008a) were carried out in three areas of Athens in which the city center was always included<sup>9</sup>. Recently, the survey "*New forms of policing and the feelings of (un)safety among the shopkeepers in Athens and Piraeus*" (Zarafonitou, 2010) has also been, carried out in one area close to the center of Athens, one central area of Piraeus and one outlying area of the capital.

The choice of the research areas was always based on socio-economic criteria and environmental characteristics<sup>10</sup>. The sample in each case was comprised of approximately 500 persons, inhabitants of these areas, who responded to the questionnaires. The sampling, aiming at the representation of each area, included the following stages: a first stratification on the basis of the administrative subdivisions as shown on the maps of each municipality, and then their broader subdivisions (ten in each area) where an equal number of questionnaires was distributed and completed by "door to door" personal interviews. Immigrants were not included in these samples in order to ensure homogeneity. On the contrary, a separate research was conducted in 2004 which addressed the insecurities of immigrants only and their attitudes to the criminal phenomenon as well as their opinions about safety measures (Zarafonitou 2004b; 2006b).

Concerning the survey of 2001, the sample was representative of the national population and it was comprised of 6.095 persons aged 15 and over (Karydis, 2004:78). Finally, the sample of the EU ICS was divided into a larger national one (1.216 residents, aged 16+) and a smaller one focused on the capital (804 persons), (Van Dijk *et al.*, 2007a: 14). In these cases, telephone interviews and the CATI mode of data collection were used (Van Dijk *et al.*, 2007b)<sup>11</sup>.

9. The survey includes interviews with police representatives and questionnaires addressed to shopkeepers or employees of shops located in the aforementioned areas.

10. The research areas included in the study of 1998 were two municipalities of east Athens (A1, A2) and two of west Athens (D1, D2) respectively as well as an area of the center (C) of the Greek capital. Area A1 is one of the most expensive districts of Greater Athens with an almost exclusive residential character. It is a pre-eminently upper-class district, with upgraded residences, green public spaces, many private schools and foreign embassies. Area A2 constitutes a quite crowded middle-class district with a variety of land use (residence, commerce, entertainment, sports), gathering a considerable number of young people. Area D1 constitutes a central section of one of the most crowded municipalities of the capital with intense urban development during the last years. In the area there are also an industrial zone, labour housing projects and lower-class neighborhoods. Area D2 is a section of an Athenian municipality where green spaces, industrial zones and technical educational facilities exist. A community character, however, is evident in this case too as in the area D1. Finally, the area in the center of Athens (C) is a deprived district of the city center characterised by intense commercial activity, administrative and other economic activities, intense population concentration and heterogeneity. The residential facilities are downgraded and many immigrants have settled in the broader district (Zarafonitou, 2002:88). The 2004 research was carried out in two municipalities of west Athens and the aforementioned city-center district. Area D2 is at a distance of 10 km from the center of Athens and its population has a low socio-economic status. The population of Area D3 is middle-class and the land use, except for the residential section, is of commercial character. In both areas the community character remains (Zarafonitou, 2004). Finally, the 2006 study was carried out in the same city-center district and the aforementioned upper-class Area A1 and the Area D2 of the 2004 study (Zarafonitou and Courakis, 2006).

11. About the methodology of this kind of surveys, see especially: Farrall *et al.*, 1997:657-678; Ditton *et al.*, 2000:142-156; Mayhew, 2000:91-119; Lynch, 2002:431-457; Vanderveen, 2008:33-52; Kury & Oberfell-Fuchs, 2008:53-84; Gray *et al.*, 2008:3-24 and Gray *et al.*, 2008b:363-380.

5. This is a vague concept which, in the framework of some approaches such as that of "broken windows" (Wilson & Keeling, 1982), is considered as an indication of other important problems such as lack of social solidarity or criminality (Crawford, 2001).

6. It has been observed, for example, that persons with more "authoritarian" views as regards "law and order" perceive more often the environment as characterised by "incivility" and associate this perception with problems of consensus and social cohesion as well as degradation of social ties and informal social control (Jackson, 2004: 960).

7. See also: Panoussis *y.*, Karydis *V.* (1999). "Fear of victimisation, insecurity and police inefficiency". In V-PRC, *The public opinion in Greece*, Athens: Nea Synora, (in Greek) as well as: Spinellis *C.D.*, Chaidou *A.*, Serassis *T.*, (1991), "Victim theory and research in Greece", in Kaiser *G.*, Kury *H.*, Albrecht *H.J.*, *Victims and criminal justice*, Freiburg: 123-159.

8. A pilot study had preceded in 1996 which was conducted in one borough of the Greek capital (Zarafonitou, 2000: 511-519).



Table 1: Research on fear of crime in Greece

YEAR	AREAS	SAMPLE
Athens, 1998	Five (5) research areas	493 residents aged 15+
1st national survey, 2001	Greece	6.095 residents aged 15+
Athens, 2004a	Three (3) research areas	450 residents aged 15+
Athens, 2004b	Three (3) research areas	208 immigrants
EU ICS, 2005	Greece and Athens	1216 and 804 residents respectively (2020 in total), aged 16+

Athens, 2006	Three (3) research areas	444 aged 15+
Athens, 2010	Three (3) research areas	229 shopkeepers or employees

## ii. Asking about fear of crime

The examination of the meaning of fear of crime as well as the methods used in its investigation or its *conceptualisation and operationalisation* (Vanderveen, 2006:23) precedes and originates simultaneously from the research experience.

Table 2: Asking about fear of crime

RESEARCH	QUESTIONS ON FEAR OF CRIME
Athens, 1998	"Are there any areas in your area (municipality) where you are afraid to walk alone after dark?" (Yes-No)
1st national survey, 2001	"Speaking generally, how safe do you feel walking alone in your neighbourhood after dark? Do you feel very safe, fairly safe, bit safe, not at all safe?" "Please try to remember the last time that you came out for any reason in your area after dark. Have you avoided some places or people for safety reasons?" (Yes, No, I never go out after dark, I don't know/I don't answer). "What would you say are the chances that over the next 12 months someone will try to break into your home? Do you think this is very likely, likely or not likely?"
Athens, 2004a	"How safe do you feel walking alone in the areas of your municipality after dark?" (Very safe, fairly safe, bit unsafe, very unsafe) "Do you feel safe when you are at home alone after dark?" (Yes-No) "How likely do you think it is to be a victim of crime in the near future?" (Very likely, fairly likely, bit likely, not likely)
Athens, 2004b	"How safe do you feel walking alone in the area of the municipality where you live, after dark?" (Very safe, fairly safe, bit unsafe, very unsafe) "How safe do you feel when you are at home alone after dark?" (very safe, fairly safe, bit unsafe, very unsafe)
EU ICS	"How safe do you feel walking alone in your area after dark? Do you feel very safe, fairly safe, a bit unsafe or very unsafe?" "How likely do you think it is that your house will be burgled in the coming year" (Very likely, fairly likely, bit likely, not likely)
Athens, 2006	"How safe do you feel walking alone in the area of the municipality where you live, after dark?" (Very safe, fairly safe, bit unsafe, very unsafe)
Athens, 2010	"How do you characterize the neighbourhood where your shop is located?" (very safe, fairly safe, bit unsafe, very unsafe) "How likely do you think it is that you or your shop will fall victim of crime in the coming months" (Very likely, fairly likely, bit likely, not likely)

As it is obvious in table 2, the items used in Greece to investigate fear of crime levels are quite similar to those of the International Crime Victimization Survey (Van Dijk *et al.*, 2007b). Thus, the question "*how safe do you feel walking alone in your area after dark?*" is used in all surveys with the exception of the survey of 1998 in which the respondents were asked directly "*if he/she were afraid*" and the one of 2010 in which the question refers to the perception of area's safety. In addition, fear of crime is examined through "risk perception" according to the model of the ICVS, whereas in most local surveys, unsafety was examined in relation to being at home as well as on the street.

This latter variable indicated an even greater fear on the part of the respondent.

## II. Research evidence on fear of crime

### i. The rates of unsafety

In general, the Greek research data has ascertained high levels of fear of crime as shown aggregated in table 3.

Table 3: Rates of unsafety

RESEARCH	QUESTIONS	RATES OF FEAR OF CRIME/UNSAFETY
Athens, 1998	"Are there any areas in your municipality where you are afraid of walking alone after dark?" (Yes-No)	58.7% (Yes)
1st national survey, 2001	"Speaking generally, how safe do you feel walking alone in your neighbourhood after dark? Do you feel very safe, fairly safe, bit safe, not at all safe?"	34.6% (Bit safe or not all safe)
	"Please try to remember the last time that you came out for any reason in your area after dark. Have you avoided some places or people for safety reasons?" (Yes, No, I never go out after dark, I don't know/I don't answer.)	24.9% (Yes)
	"What would you say are the chances that over the next 12 months someone will try to break into your home? Do you think this is very likely, likely or not likely? Do you think this is very likely, fairly likely, likely or not likely?"	66% (Very likely, fairly likely, likely)
Athens, 2004a	"How safe do you feel walking alone in the areas of your municipality after dark?" (very safe, fairly safe, bit unsafe, very unsafe)	52.7% (Bit unsafe, very unsafe)
	"Do you feel safe when you are at home alone after dark?" (Yes-No)	30.1% (No)
	"How likely do you think it is to be a victim of crime in the near future?" (Very likely, fairly likely, bit likely, not likely.)	50.6% (Very likely, fairly likely)
Athens, 2004b, (immigrants)	"How safe do you feel walking alone in the area of the municipality where you live, after dark?" (Very safe, fairly safe, bit unsafe, very unsafe)	27.0% (Bit unsafe, very unsafe)
	"How safe do you feel when you are at home alone after dark?" (Very safe, fairly safe, bit unsafe, very unsafe)	17.9% (Bit unsafe, very unsafe)
EU ICS	"How safe do you feel walking alone in your area after dark? Do you feel very safe, fairly safe, a bit unsafe or very unsafe?"	42% (Greece) 55% (Athens) (Bit unsafe, very unsafe)
	"How likely do you think it is that your house will be burgled in the coming year" (Very likely, fairly likely, bit likely, not likely)	49% (Greece) 73% (Athens) (Very likely, fairly likely)
Athens, 2006	"How safe do you feel walking alone in the area of the municipality where you live, after dark?" (Very safe, fairly safe, bit unsafe, very unsafe)	56.5% (Bit unsafe, very unsafe)
Athens, 2010	"How do you characterize the neighbourhood where your shop is located?" (very safe, fairly safe, bit unsafe, very unsafe)	58.90% (Bit unsafe, very unsafe)
	"How likely do you think it is that you or your shop will fall victim of crime in the coming months" (Very likely, fairly likely, bit likely, not likely)	87.10% (Very likely, fairly likely)

These rates prove to be smaller at the national level compared to those of the city level; however, they remain high in relation to the average of ICVS which was 23% in 2000 (vs. 34.6% in Greece in 2001) concerning unsafety in the streets<sup>12</sup> and 29% (vs. 66% in Greece in 2001) concerning perceived risk of burglary in the coming year (Van Kesteren *et al.*, 2000). Moreover, the EU ICS average in 2005 was 28% (vs. 42% in Greece) concerning unsafety in the streets and 30% (vs. 49% in Greece) concerning the perceived risk of burglary (Van Dijk *et al.*, 2007a, Zarafonitou 2009b).

The rates of unsafety of the residents of Athens are even higher throughout the above period of time and only in 2004, the year of the

Olympic Games, a small decrease is observed<sup>13</sup>. In comparison to the European average (32%), Athenians display the largest percentage of unsafety in the streets (55%) thus holding the first place of all the other Europeans in 2005. Likewise, the European average concerning the perceived risk of burglary in the coming year was 35% in contrast to 73% in Athens (Van Dijk *et al.*, 2007a: 64). A similar picture is derived also from the findings of the local surveys in Athens since fear of crime rates were 58.7% in 1998, 52.7% in 2004 and 56.5% in 2006 (Zarafonitou, 2002, 2004a; Zarafonitou & Courakis, 2006). As regards the recent survey addressed to shopkeepers (2010), the level of expressed unsafety is even higher (58.9%). It could be argued that this finding reflects Garland's approach (2001: 152) concerning the exten-

12. The rate of unsafety was higher in the survey on "Fear of victimisation, insecurity and police efficiency" carried out in Greece, in 1998 (Panoussis, Karydis, 1999:250). According to the answers of 800 citizens, 64.5% felt unsafe or not very safe and 76.9% answered that they were afraid.

13. This small decrease in the rates of unsafety is probably due to the general climate of "security" resulting from the measures taken in this framework and their extensive media presentation. It is of particular interest that during the period preceding the Olympic Games, the publication of subjects related to insecurity was restricted (Chainas, 2007).

sion of anxieties of the middle classes, especially in times of significant social changes and economic recession.

### iii. Who fears what and when

The feelings of fear of crime and insecurity are not equally distributed in the population and are differentiated on the basis of respondents' personal characteristics. Women express a much higher percentage of fear in all the above surveys without exception<sup>14</sup>. Regression and multilevel analysis of the 1998 research data on the *estimated individual effects* have shown that "females have more than 5 times greater odds<sup>15</sup> to be afraid than males of otherwise identical characteristics" (Tseloni, 2002:184). In this analysis, married people have 73% greater odds of fear, and employees, students and those with low educational levels have almost double odds of fear whereas a positive effect on fear of crime results from long term residence in the area (Tseloni, 2002:186). A similar picture results from the 2004 research data analysis since "men report 83 percent lower odds than women of feeling unsafe walking alone after dark and roughly 60 percent lower odds of feeling unsafe at home alone after dark or perceiving a high crime risk" (Tseloni & Zarafonitou, 2008:399). The probability of fear is higher also among salaried workers, long term residents of an area, and the poorly educated (Tseloni & Zarafonitou, 2008:399). In general, the area where a respondent lives proved to be the most important individual factor. For example, the center of Athens and an upper class residential area produced results at the two opposite ends of the scale regarding unsafety felt by their residents. This finding reflects the important role of personal and/or social vulnerability in shaping feelings of insecurity (Pantazis, 2000; Killias & Clerici, 2000)<sup>16</sup>.

The surveys carried out in greater Athens have included also a question investigating the reasons considered by the respondents themselves as provoking their fear of crime (Zarafonitou, 2002; 2004a; Zarafonitou & Courakis, 2006).

Table 4: The object of fear

Athens	1998	2004	2006
Thefts & robberies	17.1% & 16.3%	19.9% & 17%*	27.2%
Drugs	15.3%	21.2%	14.2%
Assaults	15.3%	8.5%	20%
Sexual offenses	13.3%	10.2%	12.4%**

\* Robberies and burglaries.

\*\* Only rapes

The correlation of fear/unsafety with property crimes reflects to some degree a rational perception of risk by the residents of the Greek capital, considering the officially recorded proportions of these offenses. Additionally, drug-related problems appear to be a considerable concern for the Greek society as will become obvious below. In contrast, the fear caused by sexual and physical assaults appears to be much


higher compared to the percentages of these types of crime as recorded in crime statistics (table 8)<sup>17</sup>.

Finally, the intensity of fear appears to be differentiated on the basis of time. This factor was examined only in two surveys in Athens (1998, 2004) through an additional question addressed only to those having expressed fear or unsafety. In the first one (Zarafonitou, 2002:102), the question was "when are you afraid of walking alone: during the day, night, or both" and as it was expected, a large majority (79.4%) responded that it was at night that they feared the most. It could be said that the wording of the question accounted for this high percentage. For this reason, the question which was posed to the residents of the capital who participated in the next survey (Zarafonitou, 2004a) was "open" asking them "after what time do you feel unsafe". The answers were almost similar to the ones of the previous study since 75.7% made it clear that they were afraid from 10:00 pm onwards, 21.7% claimed that they were afraid from 8:00 - 10:00pm, and 2.6% before 8:00 pm.

### III. The trends of apparent criminality<sup>18</sup>

Though fear of crime is not causally associated with crime levels, it is still of particular interest to be studied in relation to the dimensions and the trends of criminality as derived from Eurostat crime statistics and from the data of the International Crime Victimization survey, as well as from those provided by the Hellenic Police.

Table 5: Total offences in Greece (Change 1995-2008: +26,8%).



Source: C.Tavares & G.Thomas, Statistics in focus, *Population and social conditions*, Eurostat 19/2008, 36/2009, 58/2010

According to Eurostat data, the criminality in Greece increased by 26.8% during the period 1995-2008, recording however several fluctuations.

14. The emphasis on 'fearful' women has been criticised as 'stereotyping' (Gilchrist *et al.*, 1998:284). Pain claims, also, that, "elderly women's fear about violent crime and harassment presents a reasonable reflection of risk" (Pain, 1995:596).

15. Odds=ratio of the probability of occurrence over the complement probability (of non-occurrence).

16. According also to the recent research data (Zarafonitou 2010), the shopkeepers of the area close to the center of Athens report the highest levels of unsafety compared to the rest of the sample.

17. The 2010 data derived from the survey in shopkeepers indicate financial crisis as the prior threat (30, 6%), while thefts and burglaries are ranked second with 25.5%.

18. As the statistics presented in this section come from different sources, an effort was made in order to include the most updated published evidence from its source.

tuations all these years, as shown in *table 5* (Tavares & Thomas, 2008, 2009, 2010). This rise is mainly due to:

a) An increase of 236.2% of drug trafficking which were 2.930 in 1995 and reached 9.852 in 2008 and

b) An increase of 93.6% of robberies which were 1.600 in 1995 and reached 3.097 in 2008.


During the same period, prison population increased by 86.3% (it was 5.831 in 1995 and became 10.864 in 2007<sup>19</sup>), (Tavares & Thomas, 2008, 2010).

The number of police staff increased during 2001-2006 by 6.1% (Tavares & Thomas, 2008). In comparison with the European average, the number of police officers per 100 000 residents is quite high in Greece since in 2006 this rate was 435 while the European mean was 371 and the European median was 332 (Aebi *et al.*, 2010:113).

In spite of the aforementioned increase in crime, Greece ranks below the European average. According to the above data, the number of total offences per 100.000 population in 2007 was 3 927 while the European mean was 4 675 (the median was smaller, i.e. 4 108), (Aebi *et al.*, 2010:37).

The lower level of criminality is also indicated on data derived from the last EU ICS since the overall one-year victimisation prevalence rate in Greece is 12.3% which is lower than the average (14.9%).


**Figure 1: Prevalence victimisation rates for 10 common crimes in 2004-2005.**



Source: Van Dijk *et al.*, 2007a: 19

A similar picture is evident in the comparison of the victimisation rate in Athens (13.5%) to the average of other main cities (21.5%). Thus, Athens is ranked fourth from the end among capital cities.


**Figure 2: Crime prevalence in capital cities. Respondents affected by at least one type of crime within 2003/04**



Source: Van Dijk *et al.*, 2007b : 241

The finding of low victimisation<sup>20</sup> is, nevertheless, reversed when the data concern *non-conventional crimes*<sup>21</sup> (Van Dijk *et al.*, 2007a: 55), like corruption or drug-related problems, where Greece is ranked first.

**Table 6: Non-conventional crimes (%), EUICS 2005**



Source: Van Dijk *et al.*, 2007a: 55s.

In order this general assessment of criminality to be completed, it is interesting to refer to related data concerning among others the participation of aliens in criminality in general as well as in particular types of crime and the recorded crime level in greater Athens.


19. In this case, the statistics of 2007 are presented for they are the most updated available regarding prison population in the aforementioned source.

20. These data cover 10 *conventional* crimes: vehicle related crimes (theft of a car, theft from a car, theft of a motorcycle or moped, theft of a bicycle), burglary, attempted burglary, theft of personal property crimes (robbery, sexual offences, assault and threat).

21. Street-level corruption, consumer fraud, drug-related problems and hate crimes.

According to the Greek crime statistics, the percentage of aliens among offenders in 2006 was overall 16.4% (19.3%, when excluding the violations of car legislation). This percentage reached 27% (30.8% when excluding the violations of car legislation) in 2009 through a continuing increase, as shown in table 7. This rate is disproportionate to their participation in the general population (8% in accordance to the census of 2001) (Pavlou, 2004) and, in particular categories of offences it is even bigger during the aforementioned period of time. Specifically, in 2006 their percentage in intentional homicide was 26% (27.2% in 2009), in rape 43.5% (43% in 2009), in robbery 39.8% (42.7% in 2009) and in theft and burglary 23.6% (42.8% in 2009), concerning both completed and attempted offences in all the aforementioned cases.

**Table 7: Percentage of aliens among offenders, 2006-2009.**



Source: Minister of Citizen Protection, Crime Statistics, Greece, 2006-2009

Finally, it's worth mentioning that the larger percentage of criminality occurs in the area of the Greek capital, especially concerning certain categories of crime, as reflected in table 8.

**Table 8: Offenses committed in the Greek capital (2006, 2009).**

Country	Great Athens	
100%		
	<b>Total of offences</b>	
2006	463 750	160 004
2009	386 893	162 410
	<b>Intentional homicide</b>	
2006	222	84
2009	252	95
	<b>Assaults</b>	
2006	7 399	3 122
2009	7 869	3 274
	<b>Rape</b>	
2006	267	103
2009	250	92
	<b>Theft (total)</b>	
2006	66 498	42 916
2009	91 296	54 495
	<b>Robbery</b>	
2006	2 598	2 061
2009	3 099	2 268

Source: Minister of Citizen Protection, Crime statistics, Greece, 2006, 2009

According to the aforementioned, criminality in Greece has been on the rise in recent years, and in particular during the period when the surveys on fear of crime were conducted. This tendency is observed to be mainly due to property crimes and drug offenses. More than one-third (34.5% or 66.4% excluding the violations of car legislation) of criminality was registered in greater Athens in 2006 and almost two fifths in 2009 (42% or 46.9% excluding the violations of car legislation). As regards particular types of crime, almost half of murders and assaults (37.8% and 42.2% in 2006, 37.7% and 41.6% in 2009), 64.5% in 2006 and 59.7% in 2009 of thefts and 79.3% in 2006 and 73.2% in 2009 of robberies are committed in greater Athens. The percentage of aliens among offenders was 16.4% (19.3%, when excluding the violations of car legislation) in 2006 and 27% (30.8% when excluding the violations of car legislation) in 2009 in the area of the capital. The residents of greater Athens experience more intensely the most significant social and environmental problems, such as unemployment, housing, and pollution, resulting from intense urbanisation (Zarafonitou, 1994).

## VI. Explanatory factors for fear of crime

According to what was mentioned above, victimisation rates of conventional crimes are quite low and consequently they could not be considered by themselves as adequate explanatory factors of the Greek citizens' feelings of unsafety, which appear to be exaggerated. However, in order a convincing interpretation of these findings to be revealed, the following factors need to be taken into consideration:

- The perception of the quality of everyday life in the area of domicile (i.e. exposure to drug-related problems, corruption, street-crime)
- The high level of victims' unsafety
- The general attitudes towards police effectiveness.

### i. Perception of the quality of everyday life in the area of domicile

According to the surveys on fear of crime carried out in Athens, the dissemination of fear of crime is not equally distributed in each area. A noteworthy differentiation is observed on the basis of each one's socio-economic profile. Thus, the highest percentage of fear is always recorded at the deprived part of the city center followed by the areas of western Athens, whereas the lowest percentage is recorded in the upper socio-economic residential area. The rate of fear of crime in the district of the city-center<sup>22</sup> was 76% in 1998, 65.3% in 2004 and 75.7% in 2006. On the contrary, this rate was only 40.4% (1998) and 23.3% (2006) in the upper class residential area of the Greek capital (Zarafonitou, 2002, 2006). It is of particular interest that the regression and multilevel analysis of the 1998 research data in Athens revealed that the area of residence was the main predictor of fear. Regarding in particular the area of the city center, it was found that it accumulated the "highest odds ratio of fear" (683% greater than in the upper class residential area) (Tseloni, 2002:190). Likewise, the analysis of the 2004 research data revealed that living in the area of the city-center increased the odds of perceiving likelihood of victimisation as high by 56% (Tseloni & Zarafonitou, 2008:399).

The predominance of the center of Athens was also confirmed in the national survey where the highest percentages of unsafety (55.7%) were recorded in relation to the remaining areas of the Greek capi-

22. This area was chosen on the basis of the local competence of the police precinct. About the characteristics of the research areas see *supra*.


tal. However, this finding perhaps holds true only for Athens since in Thessaloniki, which is the second largest Greek urban center, the higher percentages of unsafety were recorded in its periphery (Karydis, 2004:16).

The association of socio-economic parameters with feelings of unsafety is also confirmed through the EU ICS data (Hideg & Manchin, 2005). According to these, a strong correlation emerges between unsafety and some neighbourhood characteristics which describe a "deprived area" or, in other words, the "adverse neighbourhood": *youth on the streets, homeless persons, beggars, littering, graffiti, vandalism, and public intoxication*. The profile of the neighbourhood is also examined in EU ICS, on the basis of the perceived prevalence of two categories of crime in the area. These crimes are:

- Property crimes (car theft and theft from cars along with burglary and other petty thefts), and
- Violent criminality (relatively widespread fighting and personal assaults, extended with racial / ethnic violent crimes and domestic violence).

The image of an "unsafe environment" is mainly correlated with: *unsupervised youth* (35%), *littering* (31%) and *graffiti* (29%). The poorest assessment of local area is higher among the inhabitants of Athens and Brussels (and to a smaller extent of Budapest and London) who are consistently dissatisfied about the frequency with which they confront criminality and deprived area characteristics (Hideg & Manchin, 2005). Personal safety of citizens in European capitals depends primarily on neighbourhood characteristics.

Figure 3: Assessment of local areas



Source: Gergely Hideg and Robert Manchin, *Environment and Safety in European Capital*, based on the data of the European International Crime Survey (EU ICS), Gallup Europe, E U I C S Working Papers.

The assessment of local areas in European capitals (frequent occurrence of any of the aforementioned attributes) is summarised in the following features (Hideg & Manchin, 2005):

Adverse neighbourhood characteristics: Athens & Budapest 86%, Brussels 84%

Property crimes in the area: Athens 52%, Brussels 46%, London: 41%

Violent crimes in the area: Brussels 26%, Athens 24%, London 23%.

In this context, the role of previous victimisation experience proved important, since falling victim to violent or property crimes is more frequent among those who have a rather unfavourable view of neighbourhood characteristics. The most important determinant is how safe people feel and how much they believe that property crimes are prevalent in their area. Only about half of those who report a high level of property crimes say that they are rarely or never afraid of walking in their neighbourhood after dark. This is opposed to 74% who feel safe and don't perceive a similarly high level of property crimes in their local area.

Respectively, if a respondent reports a high level of violent criminality in the local area, he/she is 121% more likely to have fallen victim to a violent crime than those who give a better rating (39% vs. 18%). Similarly, if one lives in an area with a reported high level of property crimes, this person is 46% more likely to have a recent victimisation experience concerning property crime than those whose assessment is more favourable in this respect (63% vs. 43%).<sup>23</sup>

The aforementioned parameters refer also to the perception of "quality of life" that emerged from the research on fear of crime among inhabitants of Athens in 2004, measured by satisfaction from health services, education, public transportation, and the environment. According to these findings, the quality of life appeared to be an important factor concerning unsafety since 76.8% of those who expressed feelings of unsafety were also dissatisfied by the quality of life in their municipality. This rate was 58% among the respondents who felt safe (Zarafonitou, 2004a).

Table 9	Satisfaction from the quality of life in the area of domicile			
	Safe		Unsafe	
Satisfied	89	41.99%	55	23.20%
Not satisfied	123	58.01%	182	76.80%
Total	212	100.00%	237	100%


$\chi^2$ : ,000

Source: Ch.Zarafonitou, *Insecurity, fear of crime and attitudes of the inhabitants of Athens toward the criminal phenomenon*, Panteion University, 2004 (in Zarafonitou, 2008).

Furthermore a strong correlation is observed between the exposure to drug-related problems and fear of crime. The impact of this exposure on fear of crime is derived from the perception of drug addicts as dangerous. The last EU ICS included a related question, which proved to be of particular interest for Greece since 25% of the respondents answered that *over the last 12 months very often or from time to time they were personally in contact with drug-related problems in the area where they live. For example they saw people in drugs, taking or using drugs in public places or they found syringes left by drug addicts*.

23. Other perceived adverse neighbourhood characteristics have a similar effect: increasing the chance of violent victimisation by 66% and the chance of property victimisation by 30% (Hideg & Manchin, 2005).

**Figure 4. Correlation of the exposure to drug-related problems and fear of crime**



Source: J. van Dijk, J. van Kesteren & P. Smit, *Criminal Victimization in International Perspective. Key findings from the 2004-2005 ICVS and EUICS*

According to these data, the inhabitants of Greece, Portugal and Luxembourg are ranked in the first three places. Though the answers to this question give little information about actual trends in drug-related problems<sup>24</sup>, it should be mentioned that this phenomenon has concerned Greek society especially after 1980.

In the survey of 2004, the inhabitants of Athens indicated drugs to be the most important social problem in their local area (25.5%), more so than immigrants (21.2%) and unemployment (19.9%). Crime as a general social problem was ranked fourth (Zarafonitou, 2004a). Drugs also occupied the first rank in the hierarchy of the *criminological issues which were discussed within the family during the last 2 weeks* according to the sample of the national survey in 2001 (Karydis, 2004:163). The surveys of 1998 and 2006 examined this relation through the reasons causing their fear/unsafety; drug-offenses were included in the four main answers with 15.3% and 14.2% respectively<sup>25</sup>.

## ii. The high level of victims' unsafety

Although the research findings are not homogeneous concerning the relationship between past victimisation experience and the feeling of fear, this connection clearly and steadily comes out of Greek research (Tseloni & Zarafonitou, 2008). According to the data above, in 1998, the examination of the level of victimisation among people having expressed feelings of fear of crime has shown that there were more victims among them. Nevertheless, the distribution of victimisation rates does not coincide with the one of fear of crime since the biggest percentage of victimisation was not reported in the area of the centre where the highest percentages of fear of crime are recorded (Zarafonitou, 2002:120). In any case, the correlation between vic-

timisation and fear of crime was also found in the multivariate analysis of these data, according to which victimisation during the year preceding the study nearly doubled (87%) the odds of fear (Tseloni, 2002:188).

This correlation was confirmed also in the survey of 2004 carried out in Athens as well as in the national survey of 2001 (Karydis, 2004:162). According to these findings, in 2001, victims expressed more feelings of unsafety compared to non-victims (42.8% vs. 28.4%). Likewise, in 2004, the inhabitants of Athens felt more unsafe if they had one or more victimisation experiences in the last year (Zarafonitou, 2008b:163)<sup>26</sup>. This assumption could explain convincingly the much larger representation of victims among those who feel unsafe in comparison to that of non-victims (72.8% vs. 47.5%) and vice-versa.

Table 10	Victimisation and feelings of (un)safety			
	Safe		Unsafe	
Victims	25	27.20%	67	72.80%
No Victims	187	52.50%	169	47.50%
Total	212	47.30%	236	52.70%

$\chi^2: .000$

Source: Ch. Zarafonitou, *Insecurity, fear of crime and attitudes of the inhabitants of Athens toward the criminal phenomenon*, Panteion University, 2004 (in Zarafonitou, 2008).

This finding is verified also by the multivariate multilevel modelling of the aforementioned data according to which previous victimisation increases the odds of feeling unsafe while walking alone after dark by 166%, at home by 69% and the perceived risk of future victimisation by 193% (Tseloni & Zarafonitou, 2008: 397). The feelings of unsafety are also influenced by indirect victimisation (see also, table 11) since knowing a victim increases the odds of unsafety in the streets by 79% and the perceived risk by 128% (Tseloni & Zarafonitou, 2008: 397).

Table 11	Indirect victimisation and feelings of (un)safety			
	Safe		Unsafe	
Athens, 2004	Safe		Unsafe	
Indirect victims	86	38.90%	135	61.10%
No victims	123	56.40%	95	43.60%
Total	209	47.60%	230	52.40%

$\chi^2: .000$

Source: Ch. Zarafonitou, *Insecurity, fear of crime and attitudes of the inhabitants of Athens toward the criminal phenomenon*, Panteion University, 2004 (in Zarafonitou, 2008).

Finally, this picture is not altered in the study of 2006 since approximately three-fourths (73.3%) of those who declared to have had previous experience of victimisation<sup>27</sup> answered that they felt unsafe on the street at night in contrast to 26.7% who did not feel unsafe. Likewise, there are many more victims among those who feel unsafe in comparison to non-victims (40.7% vs. 19.4%).

24. As it is pointed out by Van Dijk, *et al.* (2007b:97): 1) Contact of the general public with drug-related problems cannot be seen as an indicator of the actual level of drugs consumption. 2) No strong relationships were found between the extent of the public's exposure to drugs and national rates of cannabis consumption and estimated rates of drug addicts. 3) No relationships were found between exposure to drugs-related problems and levels of property crime.


25. The impact of the exposure to drug-related problems on fear of street crime is strongly ascertained from EU ICS data (Van Dijk *et al.*, 2007b: 133).

26. The picture is similar according to the findings of the research on immigrants conducted in Athens (Zarafonitou, 2006:277).

27. Within the framework of this survey, the question was posed, basically, in order to examine the effect of a similar experience in shaping punitiveness of the subjects and not to measure victimisation. For this reason, the question was "in the last five years, have you become a victim of one or more crimes?"



Figure 5: Victimization and unsafety



Source: Zarafonitou Ch. (2008a). *Punitiveness. Contemporary trends, dimensions and inquiries*. Athens: Nomiki Vivliothiki Publisher.


The fact that taking precautionary measures at personal level is not very common in Greece could give some partial explanation for the high levels of victims' unsafety (Killias, 2001:402). From the recorded answers to the question "what changed in your everyday life after your victimisation or the victimisation of your acquaintances" it was ascertained that more than half took absolutely no measures and answered either that they "feel generally unsafe" (31.4%), or "nothing has changed" (19.1%), while 23.3% made reference to security measures taken at home (locks, alarms, etc.) and 14.3% answered that they avoid certain areas (Zarafonitou, 2008b:164).

Table 12 Athens, 2004	Changes in your life after the direct or indirect victimisation	
Measures of safety in their houses (locks, alarm etc)	83	23.30%
Moving to another area	6	1.70%
Avoidance of some places	51	14.30%
Carrying weapons (knife, gun, spray)	16	4.50%
General unsafety	112	31.40%
Improvement of relations with neighbours	21	5.60%
No change	68	19.10%
Total	357	100.00%

Source: Ch.Zarafonitou, *Insecurity, fear of crime and attitudes of the inhabitants of Athens toward the criminal phenomenon*, Panteion University, 2004

These findings are also verified by EU ICS data.

Figure 6: Perception of the likelihood of victimisation, unsafety after dark in local area, households with burglar alarm or with special door locks



Source: Van Dijk et al., 2007a.

In the above-mentioned explanatory factors, the absence of victims' support from specialised agencies could be added. Indeed, this kind of support is not common at all, as indicated by the ranking of Greece (2%) below the related ICVS average in 2004/5 (9%). On the contrary, the need for support expressed from victims is very high (64%) (Van Dijk et al., 2007b:121,123). In any case, the explanation of the high levels of victims' unsafety could not be considered separately from the overall phenomenon.

### iii. General attitudes towards police effectiveness

Among the reasons associated with unsafety is also the lack of confidence in the police. The first surveys on fear of crime observed the decisive role that the presence of police can play in this context, especially if it is willing, effective, and appreciated by the community (Box et al., 1988, 353). This role becomes even more important in modern urban environments. Within this framework, the police is perceived by citizens as "an organization in the service of the local population" and, as such, satisfaction from police services "constitutes a 'logical' criterion for its assessment" (Killias, 2001, 429). In this way, the findings indicate that those who feel more intense fear are those who are also most dissatisfied by the work of the police and who seek greater policing (Zvekcic, 1997, 8).

In Greece, the citizen's attitudes are, in general, mostly negative concerning police performance and effectiveness. This is a finding verified from all the national and local surveys. The respondents in Athens found the police work in their area insufficient or mediocre in 1998 (61.8% and 36.3% respectively) (Zarafonitou, 2002:130) and ineffective in 2004 and 2006 (71.8% and 68.6% respectively) (Zarafonitou, 2008b:168, Zarafonitou & Courakis, 2006)<sup>28</sup>. In 2010, 58.4% of the shopkeepers of Athens and Piraeus evaluated as a little or no effective the police in tackling crime in local area (Zarafonitou, 2010). This assessment becomes even more negative in the case of victims or respondents who expressed feelings of unsafety.

According to the national survey of 2001, the assessment of police effectiveness was somewhat better in the domain of policing and criminal policy (5.56 on a scale from one to ten), (Karydis, 2004:139). This survey examined public attitudes toward police through numerous questions and the whole assessment measured 5.80 (on a scale from one to ten as above), (Karydis, 2004:139). This relatively positive assessment was due, partly, to the phrasing of the question which referred to the police and not to the police station in the area of residence as was the case in the local research studies. In addition, residents of large urban areas tend to have a more negative attitude toward the police (Hauge, 1979), which explain the poorest assessment in Athens.

In comparison with other European citizens, Greeks expressed one of the poorest assessments of the police (57% vs. 67% EU average), in the context of the European Victimization Survey of 2005. Regarding inhabitants of Athens, 52% were satisfied with the police force's control of crime in local areas and this assessment ranked in the last place among European capitals (Van Dijk et al., 2007a: slide 17). These indicators were even lower in Greece when they referred to the victims' satisfaction regarding the denunciation of five conventional crimes (28% vs. 55% EU average), (Van Dijk et al., 2007a: 115).

28. The only positive assessment emerged from the answers of the immigrant-inhabitants of Athens in 2004 who evaluated the police work as effective or quite effective in their majority (74.3%) (Zarafonitou, 2006b:104).

This negative attitude, however, does not affect citizens' tendency to report crimes to the police. Thus, 64.5% of the victims in the surveys on fear of crime in Athens did report their victimisation to the police (Zarafonitou, 2004). This rate was 70.4% in 2006 (Zarafonitou, Courakis, 2009:154) and 73.6% in 2010 (shopkeepers only, Zarafonitou, 2010). According to the last ICVS findings, on a national level, this percentage was 49%, being larger than the European average (47%) (Van Dijk *et al.*, 2007b:110). These findings reveal that the police as an institution, is not challenged, yet its effectiveness concerning crime control is.

The above attitudes are indicative of dissatisfaction with police services in relation to protecting citizens from crime and, specifically street crime. The same result is derived from the justification of fear of crime since the respondents mention the insufficient policing among the most important reasons for their unsafety. This factor was deemed critical along with "many immigrants" (19.8%) immediately after "the isolated and badly-lit areas" (20.1%) by the residents of Athens in 1998 (Zarafonitou, 2002:128). A similar rating was observed in the study of 2004 (22.9%) in which Athenians ranked "many immigrants" as the most significant factor (23.66%) in this context, (Zarafonitou, 2004a). Finally, in the study of 2006, the "insufficient policing" was considered as the most significant explanation for their unsafety (27.2%) and was followed by "many immigrants" (17.5%) and "badly lit streets" (16.3%) (Zarafonitou, Courakis, 2006).

Residents of large urban centers dissatisfaction with the police is strengthened by the increase of criminality as well as the weakening of informal social control. The above data confirm this hypothesis since the lack of social contacts and social solidarity increases feelings of insecurity. Thus, "the indifference of the passers-by in case of a criminal attack" is listed as the fourth significant factor for fear of crime (9.7%) by Athenians in 1998 (Zarafonitou, 2002:128) and in 2004 (10.4%), and is followed by the "indifference of neighbours" (9.6%), (Zarafonitou, 2004), whereas the "absence of contact with neighbours" was ranked fifth (7.5%) in 2006 (Zarafonitou & Courakis, 2006).

## V. Mass media

In attempting to interpret the high levels of unsafety, the mass media must not be omitted from the factors which play a serious role in this process (Karydis, 2010). Greek research examined their role as a source of information, evaluating at the same time the perception of their credibility.

**Table 13: Mass media as source of information about crime and their reliability<sup>29</sup>**

Research	TV/Radio	Reliability of mass media - General sample	Reliability of mass media- Unsafe
Athens, 1998	74.1%	67%*	60.9%
Greece, 2001	65.8%**	49.4%***	—
Athens, 2004	63.9%	63.2%****	54.7%
Athens, 2006	52.9%	74.1%*****	—

\* The provided answers were: less serious than in fact is, as it is in fact and more serious than in fact is. In the table the only answer included is "more serious than in fact is".

\*\* The question included also newspapers (Karydis, 2004:167).

\*\*\* The question was about the way criminality is presented and if it is corresponding to the reality and the answers included in the table are "no, rather no", while 43.5% answered "yes, rather yes" (Karydis, 2004:167).

\*\*\*\* In the 2004 survey the question was about the objectivity of presentation of the criminal phenomenon from the media and the answers of this table are "a bit or at all objective".

\*\*\*\*\* In this table is included only the answer "more serious than in fact is".

As the above table depict, the mass media are the main source of information concerning crime-related issues. However, their reliability is considerably questioned because of the way they publicise issues of criminality. The majority of citizens believe that the mass media exaggerate in their presentations of the actual severity of the criminal problem. Those respondents who feel unsafe also agree on this point but to a lesser degree, which shows the association of mass media crime representations with fear of crime. In any case, it is a significant factor in the formation of social attitudes on crime which would have been even more significant if their reliability was not questioned to such a degree.

## VI. The impact of fear of crime

The consequences of fear of crime are obvious on the daily lives of citizens as well as on criminal policy. These results were accumulated from the attitudes of citizens as indicated by their suggestions for the design and implementation of more effective policies. The main focus of respondents in this case concern punitiveness and its connection with the feeling of unsafety.

This subject was examined within surveys conducted in the Greek capital as in the most recent European victimisation survey in which Greece also participated. The local surveys of 1998 and 2004 requested respondents to state their proposals about the measures that need to be taken in order criminality to be dealt with appropriately. On the other hand, the study of 2006 which examined the "unsafety, punitiveness and criminal policy" focused on this relationship through the standard question of the ICVS and other questions which investigated punitiveness. Likewise, EU ICS asked respondents to choose the most appropriate sentence for "a man of 21 years old who is found guilty of burglary/housebreaking for the second time, -this time he has taken a colour TV", (Van Dijk *et al.*, 2007b).

The survey questions of 1998 and 2004 were open-ended and the responses were classified in thematic units (Zarafonitou, 2002:144 & Zarafonitou, 2004)<sup>30</sup>.

**Table 14: Unsafety and punitiveness**

Research	More repression	Prison
Athens, 1998	57.6%	
Athens, 2004	59.1% + 16.1%*	
EUICS, 2005		30%**
Athens, 2006		31%

\* During the classification of the answers, an additional unit is had been derived which was focused exclusively on the stricter treatment of immigrants. This unit is added in the general repressive measures proposed in this context.

\*\* The EUICS average in 2004/05 was 24% (Van Dijk *et al.*, 2007a:117).

The impression which is obtained from Greek research is that there is a tendency to adopt stricter criminal policies associated with citizens'

29. Data of this table come from: Zarafonitou, 2002 & 2004, Zarafonitou & Courakis, 2006, Karydis, 2004.

30. The thematic units of the 1998 study were: more repression, circumstantial prevention, social prevention, treatment-rehabilitation, and policy-mass media.

unsafety, previous experience of victimisation, the negative evaluation of the police, and the mass arrival of immigrants. Thus, punitive attitudes are expressed strongly by:

- those who are afraid of walking in the street at night (62.1%) and the victims (62.9%), (Zarafonitou, 2002),
- those who feel unsafe in their own homes at night (65.1% + 10.6%) and those who consider the police to be ineffective (65.6% + 14.2%), (Zarafonitou, 2004a),
- those who feel that it is unsafe to walk alone in their area after dark (35.7% vs. 25% of those feeling safe), those who claimed to have been victimised in the past 5 years (36.9% vs. 28.5% of the non-victims), those who considered crime as the most important social problem (43.2% vs. 25.5%) and those who suggested that the most important social problem is the continuous entry of immigrants in the country (49.0% vs. 25.5% of the rest), (Zarafonitou, 2008a:135).

According to the aforementioned, the citizens who feel unsafe express negative attitudes towards the effectiveness of the police and they are also the ones who request stricter criminal policies. Indeed, the attitudes toward the police constitute a factor of citizens' unsafety and one of its significant consequences as well. This is depicted by the more negative evaluations made by those who express feelings of fear and unsafety and also by the victims<sup>31</sup>.

The above research findings are indicative of the consequences of fear of crime in the formation of social attitudes towards crime and criminal policies. The punitiveness which is displayed through the choice for more policing and the expansion of imprisonment is basically connected, on the one hand, to the unsafety resulted from property and street crimes and, on the other, to the negative evaluation of police effectiveness. However, punitiveness does not originate exclusively from everyday unsafety but also from a variety of factors such as the socio-economic status, the level of education and the ideological-political views of the citizens. Punitiveness which is connected to these factors appears to be relatively independent from fear of crime but very dependent on the perception of the dangerousness of specific population groups on the basis of their social or national origin, gender, age etc. In this case, punitiveness is manifested as a "philosophy" towards retributive punishment in which other purposes of penal sanctions are reduced (Zarafonitou, 2008a:132).

## VII. Epilogue

During the last two decades, significant social changes have occurred in Greece, the most important of which were the mass entry of immigrants as well as the recent economic crisis. In this period the dimensions and the characteristics of criminality reveal a general trend of aggravation. Though the levels of criminality are lower compared to most European countries, they appear to be higher compared to its past levels in Greece. The rise of everyday criminality, especially of robberies and burglaries, has a direct impact on personal unsafety. Likewise, the contact of inhabitants of urban centers and, in particular of Athenians, with different aspects of drug-related problems in their everyday life, contributes to the perception of local life as degraded. These problems are more intense in the central area of Athens, where especially in the last years, the environmental degradation is obviously combined with a considerable concentration of immigrants and

in particular of illegal ones, the surge of prostitution and drug-related problems as well as the growth of illegal trade and the serious consequences of the financial crisis (e.g. shops closure).

On the other hand, the state is not properly adapted to these changes and, consequently, the official social control exerted through police agencies and criminal justice system as a whole does not inspire trust in a large part of the population. In addition, participative policies are not widely used in Greece (Panoussis, 1993; Spinellis, 1997:291; Zarafonitou, 2003, 2004; Papatheodorou, 2005; Courakis, 2007), and thus, informal social control remains also weak.

The feeling of insecurity influences citizens' quality of life on a daily basis, through self-restraints of social activity, leading also to a heavy financial burden which aims to enhance the measures of their self-protection. The social insecurities associated with crime, stemming from a complex interaction of personal, socio-political and communicative factors, affect additionally the shaping of punitive attitudes, expressed as a need for the implementation of strict and retributive penal policies (Zarafonitou, 2011). In this context, the often extreme forms of criminality which characterise contemporary societies, contributing to the intensification of citizens' fear and insecurity, instead of being tackled, are exacerbated by policies of a selective and 'expressive' alleged suppression. This process is part of a vicious circle of aphoristic choices at personal and social level, exclusions, insecurities and conflicts, often expressed through the terms of criminality. The confrontation of this impasse does not seem to be either simple or easy, since it is not confined solely to crime but involves broader issues of social *disorganization*.

In this light, the role of state's services appears to be fundamental, especially in the context of Greece as well as in societies with similar features, where there is a tradition of a 'strong state' (Robert, 2005:95). Given that the citizen-state relationship is quite problematic and that the sense of citizenship is not appropriately developed, Greeks' wider social insecurities and concerns are reflected in fear of crime. In this framework the widely expressed appeal for more intensive policing and stricter sentences reflects both a general lack of satisfaction as well as the wavering trust of a large number of citizens towards the penal system. Under these conditions, fear of crime is shaped not only as a personal situation but also as a social phenomenon. This complexity constitutes a challenge for criminological research.

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31. According to the aforementioned research findings of 1998, the police is considered inadequate by the 61.8% of the total sample. This percentage is 73.4% among those who are afraid and 74% among the victims (Zarafonitou, 2002:130). Likewise, in the research of 2004, 72% believed that the police were ineffective. This percentage was 77.6% in the case of those who felt unsafe on the streets (Zarafonitou, 2004a).

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# Punitiveness and Fear of Crime in European Countries

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*Fear of crime and punitiveness are two themes which have been discussed widely in the field of criminology over the last decades. Against the backdrop of empirical data based on victim surveys, fear of crime has been playing an increasingly important political and legislative role especially in the US, but also increasingly in Western Europe. Newer methodological approaches illustrate the complexity of the concepts. Outcomes identified as 'fear of crime' in the past, now appear to be a mixture of different anxieties only partially related to the fear of becoming the victim of a crime. Similarly, punitiveness encompasses many facets, including popular attitudes towards criminal sanctions, intensification of legislative and sentencing policies in a country, as well as practices by law enforcement and other social control agencies. This article provides an overview of this international discussion.*

## 1. Introduction

During the last three decades, fear of crime and punitiveness has been widely discussed in Western societies, including in Germany. During the last 20 to 30 years, these societies have undergone considerable changes which can be described with keywords such as globalization, mobility, changes in family structures, in social support systems, and in labor conditions (Sessar 2010; Kury & Obergfell-Fuchs 2011). The discussion on fear of crime and punitiveness often focused on the USA, where, in the first half of the 1970s, imprisonment figures increased dramatically, a trend which continues until today. As a result, the USA has highest number of prisoners in the world in proportion to their population. On state as well as on federal levels criminal laws have been exacerbated and phrases like "war on drugs", "three strikes", "tough in sentencing", "zero tolerance", or "mandatory sentencing" went around the world (Zimring & Johnson 2006; Garland 2001a, p. 142). A related increased punitive turn in Germany facilitated a discussion on crime policy (Sack 2006; 2010). In that country, one even talked about a lust for sanctioning (Hassemer 2001, p. 416).

In other western European countries, but also many states beyond those, punitiveness increased over the last two to three decades, in particular through revisions of penal laws. As Kury and Shea (2011) have shown, this trend can be seen in many countries over the world (see also Dünkler et al. 2010). Indermaur and Roberts (2011, p. 181) report about similar developments in Australia: "Australia has seen a dramatic rise in its imprisonment rate and the passage of a range of punitive laws since 1990. This has occurred despite the fact that the Australian population has not become more punitive. Indeed the overall level of punitiveness has dropped slightly. The passage of these laws, therefore, does not reflect any change in underlying punitiveness. It follows that the changes reflect the operation of various political 'initiatives'". This development shows the complexity of the concept "punitiveness" and its measurement.

Zarafonitou, in contrast, (2011) presents results of a survey about fear of crime in Athens/Greece for 2006. This rate is described as relatively high as compared to other surveys. Fearful citizens are more punitive, so fear of crime creates harsher attitudes towards offenders. Punitiveness is influenced by several variables for example a lack of leisure time or unemployment. This shows again the complexity of the background dimension of punitiveness (see Sessar 2010; Hirtenlehner 2011). Conservative citizens are more likely to vote for harsher punishment for criminals. Globalization creates increased levels of fear and feelings of insecurity which may be unrelated to

crime, but influence various fears and so also punitive attitudes as Zarafonitou has shown clearly (Baker & Roberts 2005). Meanwhile Greece is faced with dramatic financial problems which are likely to increase not only general fears but also the "fear of crime".

Kuhlmann (2011, p. 61ff.; see also Kutateladze 2011; Ferdinand 2006) has shown related changes for the US' criminal justice system and pointed out that the management of correctional institutions in that country increasingly abandoned goals of rehabilitation and, instead, focused on managing the new 'warehouse' population. Overcrowded prisons and inhumane conditions do not prepare prisoners for leading a responsible life on the outside. Prisons are populated mainly by the poor, members of minority groups and increasingly by women (see e.g. Wacquant, 2009). Because of structural changes in society feelings of insecurity have increased among the population. Under these circumstances a punitive ideology was promoted that held the individual person responsible for his/her poverty or criminal behavior while ignoring the structural contexts (Kury a. Shea 2011a, p. 12f.).

According to Lee (2001a, p. 467) this phenomenon in the USA is connected to a discussion on fear of crime which started at the end of the 1960s. "Since the late 1960s the 'fear of crime' has progressively become a profoundly engaging field of study for criminologists and other social researcher" (cf. Hale 1996). Especially remarkable about the early research on fear of crime has been "the way 'fear of crime' has been discussed without clear definitions of the central concepts, as if it were a pre-discursive object of inquiry ... The impetus to get on and do research is of course increased by the recent interest of governments and funding bodies in the 'fear of crime' problematic, not to mention the role of pressure groups and the insurance and security industries who have a vested interest in such research". This has caused repercussions on "the governance of populations and the formation of individual human subjects as objects of self and governmental regulation" (p. 468; Lee 1999; 2001b; cf. Garland 1994). Meanwhile empirical research shows that the measurement of punitiveness is exceedingly difficult and the published results of surveys about attitudes towards punishment using standardized questionnaires often overestimate the level of punitive attitudes towards offenders (see Kury u. Obergfell-Fuchs 2008).

The increasing numbers of surveys on fear of crime among the public brought this topic to the center of attention. It was also discovered by politicians and became, in connection with increasing media coverage, a predominant theme (cf. Beckett & Sasson 2004). But the media mostly reported on low level street crime or spectacular criminal cases and thereby created a distorted image of crime among the public, which, in turn, can be called a "politics of fear" (for Japan



cf. Miyazawa 2008, for Great Britain cf. Jewkes 2008, for the US cf. Kappeler and Potter 2005 or Moore 2003).

The factual crime development has almost no influence on the crime model presented to the public by politicians or the respective media reports which can be, at least in the short-term, rewarding for politics (cf. Beckett 1997). Even in situations of overall decreases in crime rates the media often report a partial increase or at least an increasing problem, since only such a heightened threat would be a profitable message.

Therefore criminal policy can easily become an undifferentiated policy. Worldwide surveys show the public's wish for effective crime control comprising harsher laws, harsher sanctions, and more police controls (see Dünkel et al. 2010; Kury & Shea 2011). Such results can especially be found by using standardized questionnaires without providing the subjects with balanced information about actually occurring crimes. Waiton (2008) and Wacquant (2009; 2010) warn that such practices increase the risk for popular demands to solve a rising spectrum of social problems through legislative means. This risk can be enhanced through conflicts of interest among pressure groups with outcomes which may be particularly detrimental for lower income groups. An example would include certain aspects of the US prison system: On one hand the public, the media, and parts of the political system challenge the "tough on crime" stance while on the other hand business ventures gain considerable earnings with the increasing number of inmates who function as cheap labor (Diedrich 2010; see also Kuhlmann 2011).

Studies on punitiveness are still rare. In 1989 the first wave of the International Crime Survey has been completed which used the same questionnaire in 16 countries (van Dijk et al. 1990, p. 82). Inter alia, the subjects' sanction proposal for a 21 year old man who had committed a second burglary and stole a color TV, was asked. On average 12.7% of the European countries (Germany 8.8%) voted for a fine, 22.2% (Germany 13.0%) for a prison sentence, and 42.5% (Germany 60.0%) for community service, but in the USA only 8.2% suggested a fine, 29.6% community service, while 52.7% asked for a prison sentence. The USA results showed the second highest vote for a prison sentence, it was only exceeded by the city of Surabaya/Indonesia (66.5%). "... calls for tougher action in terms of policing, disciplining and punishing criminals began to grow" (Lee 2001a, p. 476). Especially fearful people will easily be influenced by populist drifts (see Zafaronitou 2011).

Important for a punitive shift or "the New Punitiveness" is a general change in society, culture, and criminal policy (Pratt et al. 2005). Pratt (2007, p. 3) emphasizes that "penal populism" "...is the product of deep social and cultural changes which began in the 1970s and which now extend across much of modern society" (cf. Garland 1996; 2001a; 2001b). Part of this trend is a "reprivatisation" of social control. During the last 20 years the responsibility for crime control was increasingly turned back to communities and citizen. This can be seen in concepts like 'Community Crime Prevention' which became increasingly important in Germany since the early 1990s (Garland 1996; Obergfell-Fuchs 2001) and 'neighborhood watch' or 'community policing' in the US (Community Policing Consortium or U.S. Department of Justice 1996).

For the development in Great Britain, Stenson (1996, p. 103) emphasized: "If we examine the new discourses of crime and communal security emerging in Britain during the last fifteen years, certain discursive shifts are apparent. It is striking that references to the social and to the state have given way increasingly to the emphasis on community, the individual and partnership between statutory agencies, commercial enterprises and voluntary groups (...) in the fight against crime". According to Hope (1995) the

increasing efforts to reduce crime against the background of rising disorganization in large metropolitan areas is the central topic of the 1980s (in summary Obergfell-Fuchs 2001, p. 3ff.; Hope & Karstedt 2003).

## 2. Fear of Crime

Against the background of considerable societal changes the feelings of insecurity have grown among the public (cf. e.g. Moser 1978). During the last decades, such changes have occurred along with German reunification and, in Europe, with the opening of the borders towards the East, followed by increased immigration. Other factors are, on the one hand, growing globalization, on the other hand, an increased individualization which implies the risk of social isolation. Increasingly citizens are seen as responsible for their own economical and social development while - at the same time - the state withdraws from its responsibilities for its citizens. The population has the growing impression that the state is less able to regulate emerging problems and politicians are not able to solve complex global challenges. The belief in politicians decreases in western countries which can be seen in a decreasing rate of people who vote.

Furthermore, considerable changes in labor conditions lead to disruptions and gaps in employment biographies, as well as changes in traditional family structures. According to Becker and Reddig (2004, p. 173) the success of punitive populism is based on the anomic consequences of individualization, neo-liberalism, and globalization. Sack (2004, p. 47) also mentioned the neo-liberal turn in economy and politics, which made a considerable contribution to the "culture of control" and to the increasing mass imprisonment, especially in regard to lower socio-economic groups (cf. Garland 2001a; 2001b; Wacquant 2009). Such analyses mostly refer to the USA or Great Britain. Whether these trends also apply to Germany or other continental European states continues to be controversial (see Klimke et al. 2011; Sack 2004; 2006; 2010; Kury et al. 2004d; Kury & Obergfell-Fuchs 2011; Reuband 2011).

Needs for punishment and feelings of insecurity are often interwoven. In many surveys of the 1990s, criminologists found an increased fear of crime. But the critical discussions about this concept, some years later, showed that the standardized questionnaires measured a mixture of different anxieties. Among these, the fear of becoming a victim was only one aspect which became less important when compared to other fears such as unemployment, becoming poor, losing track of the latest technological developments, or becoming the victim of a traffic accident (Sessar 2010). So Bannister & Fyfe (2001), for example, pointed out "that fear of crime is now recognized as a more widespread problem than crime itself" (Farrall et al. 2009; Matthews 2005).

Furthermore, Lempp (2009) showed the changed societal situation of juveniles. In the past, the future seemed secured for young people and it was possible to develop longitudinal life perspectives. Life was felt to be under control and family cohesion appeared in place. Nowadays, however, the search for a place in society requires extensive personal energy and causes uncertainties and fears (p. 40). Lempp states that showing this fear publicly, admitting it to others or even oneself equates the unbearable admission of being a loser. In reaction to this, the juvenile will begin to be truant and associate with others in the same situation. These youth will not attribute the cause of this development to themselves but to all others - the whole society which marginalizes them (p. 44).

In contrast to the USA or other European countries, there are no periodic crime and victimization studies in Germany, so there are



few data concerning time developments of fear of crime (Reuband 2011). The only survey on "fears of the Germans", carried out with the same methodology since 1991, is done by an insurance company (see ([http://www.ruv.de/de/presse/r\\_v\\_infocenter/studien/aengster-deutschen.jsp](http://www.ruv.de/de/presse/r_v_infocenter/studien/aengster-deutschen.jsp))).

Every year about 2,000 to 3,000 citizens, representative for the German population, are surveyed with a standardized questionnaire. A comparison of the results of 1991, the first wave, and 2009 shows primarily that in the first survey fewer respondents mentioned any fears. Secondly, fear of crime became less important in comparison with other worries. In 1991 the highest score fell upon "moving in of foreigners" (49%), on second position "fear of crime" was stated (34%), followed by "increased cost of living" (34%), "personal unemployment" (30%), and "losing independence in old age" (30%). In 2009, the last survey, the highest score for fears fell upon "worsening of the economical situation" (66%), followed by "increasing unemployment in Germany" (65%), "increased cost of living" (63%), "natural disasters" (56%), "losing independence in old age" (54%), and "overwork of politicians" (53%). About 63% worried about the "cutback of social benefits" as a consequence of the increasing national debt. "Fear of crime" appeared on the next to last position (24%; last position: "disruption of partnership": 16%) and therefore played - in comparison with other worries - not an important role. Since 1991, that portion decreased from 34% to 24% among an increased general level of fear. But the decrease in fear of crime seems to be only weakly correlated with the demand for harsher punishment.

The reasons might be methodological. Experimental studies were able to show that the "classical" items aimed at measuring fear of crime were at best partially able to grasp the concept, so the operationalization is pretty poor (cf. Kreuter 2002; Farrell et al. 1997; 2000; Kury et al. 2004a; 2004b; 2004c; 2005; Sessar 2006; 2010). Some studies critically raised the question of the validity of such items in more or less standardized questionnaires. They found that these items (e.g. attitudes towards the death penalty) overestimate punitiveness among the public (Kury & Obergfell-Fuchs 2008). When in a country like Germany, where the death penalty has been abolished since 1949, the public is asked about a reintroduction of this sanction, it is doubtful whether those people who agree with such a concept theoretically do believe in an actual reintroduction (Dünkel & Morgenstern 2010, p. 5).

During the last decades, on the background of the discussion regarding high rates of fear of crime, punitiveness has become an increasingly prominent topic internationally in the field of criminology. Some authors discuss a "new punitiveness" (Pratt et al. 2005). Many other countries beside the US have passed harsher laws with increased sanctions for offenders (cf. Kury 2008; Kury & Ferdinand 2008; Kuhlmann 2011). However, the US remains the precursor of the punitive development. Walmsley (2010) reported for the USA (end 2007) an imprisonment rate (number of inmates per 100,000 population, including pre-trial detention) of 756 (number of inmates: 2,293,157), for Canada a rate of only 116, for England and Wales of 153 (end 2008) and for Germany of 89 (August 2008). Hinds (2005, p. 54ff.) examined the development of crime control practices in the US-American states, in Europe, and in Australia from 1970 to 2000, based on the number of inmates per 100,000 population and the number of police officers per 100,000 population. She found a much higher imprisonment rate for the USA overall than for Europe or Australia, but, for the period of the last 30 years, she also discovered distinct differences between individual states of that country. While the Southern states had the highest increase, and the meanwhile highest imprisonment rates, the West and the Mid-West states ranged in middle. The North-Eastern

states had the lowest rates. In contrast, the increases in Australia and the European Union countries under consideration were notably small. Considering the police density as a second parameter, the picture changed. In the USA as well as in Australia and in Europe the police density increased from 1970 to 2000. Australia showed the lowest rate of increase. The author argues (p. 60): "This study shows that analyzing both custody and police rates reveals distinctly different crime control patterns over time in the United States, Australia, and Europe that provide a more accurate and complex picture than that available from custody rates alone" (cf. Frost 2008; Aebi & Kuhn 2000). This refers to the complexity of the operationalization of crime control and, finally, of the assumed governmental punitiveness. Depending on the choice of the parameter of the study, the results may vary considerably.

Similarly, Matthews emphasizes (2005, p. 178): "Although the term 'punitiveness' is widely used in the literature, there is little attempt to define or deconstruct it. The consequence is that punitiveness remains a 'thin' and undertheorized concept. Its largely undifferentiated nature and the general vagueness surrounding it, however, have not been an impediment to its adoption" (cf. Kury et al. 2004d, pp. 64-65; Simonson 2009). According to Lautmann and Klimke (2004, p. 10) punitiveness refers to the tendency of preferring retributive sanctions by neglecting reconciliatory sanctions. Punitiveness is a specific mode of using harsh and sharp penal sanctions. The archaic motive of vengeance succeeds over rational restitution, (cf. Simon 2001). According to Oelkers and Ziegler (2009, p. 38) punitiveness is understood as an affinity of imposing retributive sentences in the case of an offense. In Germany, a controversial discussion against the background of the different definitions debates whether or not this punitiveness has increased during the last decades (Sack 2004; 2006; Klimke et al. 2011).

The following describes the different dimensions of punitiveness by focusing on public attitudes towards sentencing, legislation, sentencing by courts, as well as police and social work. Special attention is given to the measurement of punitiveness. A summarizing discussion on the problem of increasing punitiveness in combination with a tentative exploration of the impact of sanctions finishes this paper.

### 3. Different Dimensions of Punitiveness

Depending on which part of the broad and less contoured concept of punitiveness is being considered, the results may vary considerably, as Hinds (2005) has shown in her comparison described above. The discussion on punitiveness has often focused on different aspects, so the results are hardly comparable - if there are any empirical results at all.

Often the incarceration rate in a given country is taken as a measure of punitiveness, but even this rate is dependent on several other variables. This limits a cross-national comparison (Aebi & Kuhn 2000). Frost (2008, p. 289) criticizes the prevailing use of incarceration rates as a measure of punitiveness. Based on calculations for different US states he concludes: "... the size of prison population (and, therefore, of imprisonment rates) depends upon the number of people going into prison and how long they stay there. The key finding is that the states' 'punitiveness' rankings vary quite dramatically depending upon the measure of punitiveness employed. Some of the states that are consistently referred to as relatively less punitive are actually exceptionally punitive when punitiveness is measured by reference to one of the dual determinants (e.g. as the risk of imprisonment or the duration of imprisonment). Likewise some of the most punitive states appear far more average when the cumulative outcome of punitiveness (imprisonment rate) is deconstructed into the dual determinants. Perhaps as important, some of the frequently discussed

regional variations in punitiveness are far less pronounced when punitiveness is measured through one of the dual determinants". The simplicity of the data access and the construction of variables have sometimes led to only superficial comparisons. "Research using imprisonment rates as the outcome measure likely confound imprisonment propensity and penal intensity" (p. 291; cf. Lynch 2002; Farrington et al. 2004).

In a recent presentation Obergfell-Fuchs (2010a) compared the developments of prison populations and crime rates for different crimes. He examined whether changes in inmate population came along with changes in crime rates or whether differences might be explained by shifts in imprisonment itself and therefore by a specific punitiveness. He found that for some particular crimes the assumption of such a specific punitiveness dependent on the type crime can be affirmed. Especially changes over time in regard to sex crimes showed a clear discrepancy between the inmate population and the particular crime rates. Most obvious were the contradictory trends concerning child sexual abuse. This crime rate has decreased since the early 1990s. In fact, considering the 35 year period under analysis between 1976 and 2009 this rate has been, with some exceptions, stable or even slightly decreasing. Interestingly, since this crime rate dropped, the ration of inmates, adults as well as juveniles and especially preventive detainees, has increased. This result can be interpreted as an indicator of selective punitiveness concerning this type of offences. Although less offences occurred, more of these offenders were incarcerated (Kury & Obergfell-Fuchs 2011).

### 3.1. Attitudes of the Public

One important aspect of punitiveness refers to public attitudes towards criminal sanctions. Schneider (2009, p. 267) argues that these public attitudes are generally based in opinion polls. But in most cases the public is not informed about the actual crime situation, and if so, then usually through mass media. Studies showed that up to 96% of the public obtains this information through the mass media (Roberts & Stalans 1997). But the media report almost exclusively about rare, severe, and brutal crimes and not about mass crimes (Kerner & Feltes 1980; Baumann 2000, S. 171). Quite often such reports on heinous singular crimes are combined with the request for harsh punishment. If there are reports on criminal sanctions, imprisonment takes center stage. Because of this distorted image of crime it is not surprising that imprisonment is the most popular form of criminal sanction (Shinkai & Zvekić 1999, p. 89). For example, the results of the 2003 youth survey of the German Youth Institute (Gille et al. 2006), shows that even among the 16 to 29 years olds the fight against violence and crime is regarded as a more important political duty than the support for socially disadvantaged. This is surely connected with the fact that this age group not only shows the highest offender rates but also the highest victimization rates. Alternatives to imprisonment, besides probation and fines, are relatively unknown among the public.

The measurement of attitudes to sanctions among the public is, because of the complex background, a notably large problem. (cf. Maruna & King 2008). Studies have shown that the more information about the criminal case were known to the subjects, the less they reacted in a punitive way (Doob & Roberts 1983; Roberts 1992; Roberts & Hough 2002). Simultaneously, the public supported, besides punitive reactions like imprisonment, alternative sanctions, especially for juveniles (Doble 2002). Cullen et al. (2002, p. 140) found in an empirical research in the US that at least 55% of those surveyed voted for resocialization as the main goal of a prison sentence. Other surveys showed that the public's tendency towards harsh sanctions is not more punitive than the reactions of courts, when they are informed about the background of the criminal cases (Bondeson 2007, p. 186;

2003, pp. 69, 76). Based on the data of the British Crime Survey Hough and Roberts (1998) found that the public underestimates systematically the risk of sanctioning, especially the severity of sanctions actually imposed. As Schneider (2009, p. 268) mentioned, the judges impose unnecessary harsh sanctions because they misleadingly assume that this will be the public's will. Also politicians have exaggerated assumptions about the public's punitiveness.

As methods surveys showed, the results of opinion polls are heavily dependent on their methodological approach, this includes the design of the questionnaire, the wording of the items, sample selection, and interviewer selection - just to mention a few relevant aspects. Furthermore, they are influenced by the knowledge of the subjects about crime and media crime reports. Attitudes towards the death penalty are often taken as a measure for the public's punitiveness. But this question is influenced by the fact whether the death penalty is exercised in a country or not and the historical circumstances of this abolishment or retention. In German history a distrust of state power in regard to sanction, is part of the legacy of the 3rd Reich. In contrast, the history of lynching and Frontier violence shape the retention of the death penalty in the US - or rather in the states which continue to practice capital punishment (Kuhlmann 2011). In Germany, the death penalty has been abolished in 1949. Shortly before the voting of the parliamentary council an opinion poll showed that two thirds of Germans favored the continuation of this most severe sanction. In 1950 55% voted for this sanction. This percentage further decreased to 55% in 1967 and even 30% in 1973. After a temporarily increase during the years of RAF-terrorism (1977 = 44%), it decreased again to 25% during the mid-1990s (Institut für Demoskopie 1996). Gelb (2006, p. Vf.) summarizes the essential results of the research on attitudes towards sanctions.

Overall, the results show the limited validity of such surveys on attitudes towards sanctioning among the public. The more information the people have about alternative to prison sentences or about the backgrounds of crime, the less punitive are their suggested sanctions (Doob & Roberts 1983; Roberts 1992; Roberts & Stalans 1997; Roberts & Hough 2002). Otherwise it can be assumed that public attitudes towards sanctioning can easily be changed in a short period of time by the amount of given information or media reports about severe crimes. The public's knowledge about crime and criminal sanctions, is often combined with emotional perceptions (e.g. child sexual murder) a rather dysfunctional foundation of a rational crime policy. In fact, the field of criminology can provide a plenitude of knowledge which would provide a solid base for political decision-making.

### 3.2. Harsher Penal Laws

Other criteria for the measurement of punitiveness are changes in the legislation of particular countries, especially if these changes led to harsher penal laws (see the reports of different countries all over the world in Kury and Shea 2011; Dünkel et al. 2010). Western industrialized countries report mostly consistent results in this regard. From almost every country such developments are reported (cf. the contributions in Kury & Shea 2011; Kury 2008; Kury & Ferdinand 2008).

Concerning the German development of the last decades, Hassemer (2009, p. 285f.) concludes that criminal law, like other parts of daily life, is moving away from the freedom pole towards the security pole. In this movement, the criminal law becomes harsher but not better. Due to increasingly complex prohibitions, higher threats of punishment and harsher sanctions, a sharpening of the instruments of investigation, a cutback of protection warranties which can

delay a court proceeding, the criminal law is expanding (cf. Kury & Obergfell-Fuchs 2006; Kury et al. 2009). Since the beginning of the 1990s the criminal law has become harsher in more than 40 instances of crime, although the crime rates have decreased (Oelkers & Ziegler 2009, p. 39). Kunz (2010) depicts a development towards a "criminal law of risk": A discussion about recent tendencies of legislation and sanctioning shows that the criminal law of risk and its society protecting functions interfuses the sanctioning system (measures, especially detention) and the criminal legislation (symbolic criminal law). The criminal law of the future will not be based on a concise and purposeful theory of criminal law, but on a more vague concept in which prevention by control and a pragmatic crisis management will take center stage (cf. von Trotha 2010).

A harshening of criminal laws during the last decades has been reported internationally, with the United States as a prime example.. The focus is mostly directed towards security and prevention, especially towards particular groups of offenders, primarily sex offenders and violent offenders. Such discussions are fostered by the mass media, which take up singular severe crimes and suggest that prevention by harsh and long punishment will be possible. Pratt (2007, p. 5f.) emphasizes: "Populist responses to crime are stronger and would seem most likely to influence policy when they are presaged around a common enemy, a group of criminals who seem utterly different from the rest of the population". Especially sex offenders, and above all pedophiliacs and juvenile violent offenders, are seen as an "enemy". The actual number of registered sex offenders in Germany has decreased during the last decades, although it has to be assumed that, due to an increased sensitivity towards this topic, the reporting behaviour probably has increased (cf. Obergfell-Fuchs 2010b).

The international strengthening of the field of victimology and a broader discussion of the protection of victims - per se a very important development - has a stake in punitiveness. The demand that victims, especially women and children and more recently, also elderly people, should be better protected from crime, often leads to a harsher punishment, in the belief that this would help achieve the goal of an augmented security.

### 3.3. Sentencing severity

A harshening of laws does not necessarily lead to harsher sentences. Especially experienced judges will have the tendency to keep their hitherto existing sanctioning behavior. However, it can be assumed that in the long run political and public pressures towards a harsher sanctioning will have an impact (Kuhn 2002). Such a development can be seen in countries like Great Britain and the USA where the crime policy of the last years has been characterized by increasing harshness (Mauer 2001). But of course there is no linear correlation between the law-and-order discussion in the media and the sanctioning by courts. Numerous factors have influencing effects. Zimring (2001) describes, with regard to the USA, three relevant aspects in the interaction between the penal law, the public, and the sanctioning practice.

With regard to Germany the data concerning sanctioning during the last decades do not clearly reflect an increase in punitiveness. On the one hand, sentences below the margin of two years have become harsher, but they are more often suspended for probation. On the other hand, the sanctioning of sex offences shows a clearly different development: Here a tendency towards longer prison sentences is observable. But the onset of this development is located long before the hysterical debate about sex offences in the mid 1990s. This might be due to an increased relevance of this type of offences within the justice system itself as well as in the adoption of an increased public sensitivity concerning sexual and physical violence against women.

One part of this development is the enactment of the violence protection law in 2002. Whether a harsher sanctioning of the justice system triggers the public's discussion or whether the public's view about crimes influences the justice system, can hardly be answered. A repercussion of the prison inmate population on the sentencing might also be possible. When prisons are overcrowded and judges are informed about this situation, this might have an effect on imposing harsher or more lenient sentences.

### 3.4. Police - Social Work - Public Administration

A major aspect of punitiveness is the procedures used by governmental control agencies, e.g. the police and social work. Here, only few research results are available and there is special lack concerning longitudinal data. Recasens (2011) emphasizes that research concerning punitiveness by law enforcement is quite difficult to assess because of the unclear concept of punitiveness which is difficult to apply to the complex police functions. Furthermore, the police is divided in special forces with clearly distinct functions. Normally the citizen's contact with the police is limited to particular units, e.g. the uniformed police, who they meet in the public arena or in order to make a complaint.

In den USA, for example, in order to fight incivilities or minor street crimes, the police has been using a harsher approach towards deviant persons in connection with policies such as "quality of life policing" and "zero tolerance". Often the "New York Model" of the former New York police chief Bratton and Mayor Giuliani has been seen as dominant (Bratton & Dennis 1998). Even German politicians, police officers, and governmental officers travelled to the United States in search of suggestions, although earlier studies have shown that the actual crime preventive effect of such models is doubtful (cf. Dreher & Feltes 1997; Jasch 2003). Meanwhile the insight that such methods are neither feasible nor applicable in the German context has become widespread.

In "High-Crime Societies" such as the United States, as Garland (2001a) describes, crime has become more or less normal and there is no possibility for crime or social policy to abolish it, in spite of the claims to the opposite by the yellow press especially in regard to severe crimes. Generally this claim is accompanied by a call for harsher sanctions. According to Oelkers and Ziegler (2009, p. 41f.), the consequences of this individualization and personalized attribution of the causes of crime are "neo-correctional" treatment measures and a superficial treatment of deviance, especially behavioral treatment programs which emphasize personal responsibility and not societal responsibility (p. 42; cf. Cavadino & Dignan 2006; Krasmann 2000; earlier Lamott 1984). Meanwhile, remedial strategies which focus on the individual offender's responsibility have become widespread in social work, e.g. Anti-Aggressiveness-Training, Anti-Violence-Training, or treatment programs for sex offenders (Weidner 2001; Stelly & Thomas 2002, p. 11).

But one has to keep in mind that a uni-directional focus on societal factors as reasons for crime and the depiction of a punitive turn as self-fulfilling prophecy ignore the results of the criminological research of the last 20 years. This research has shown that the interaction of personal and societal factors has much more explanative power than a single-sided view which is less useful even for practitioners. Although emphasizing individual solutions of socially deviant behavior might be an indicator for punitiveness and an attribution of individual responsibility, it does not help the offender to tell him that his or her problem is based in criminogenic societal conditions, whose elimination are unlikely to occur anytime soon. She/He needs help here and

now for social reintegration and a life without further delinquency. Here, specific training programs will be helpful such as those successfully implemented with other problem groups like alcohol addicts, gambling addicts or persons with phobia.

#### 4. Discussion

Punitiveness, but also fear of crime are, as expected, complex constructs, which are still insufficiently described and defined. Punitiveness itself does not exist, there are only different facets and specifications of this phenomenon. In discussions punitiveness is referred to as the public's attitudes towards sanctions and sentencing. Certainly the public's attitudes are important because they can influence political decisions on harshening punishment and political action.

As research shows punitiveness is also influenced by fear of crime. Fearful citizens are more punitive (see Zarafonitou 2011). Over the previous decades fear of crime has increasingly become more and more a political factor (Beckett & Sasson 2004). Politicians "use" fear of crime to govern people. To suggest that it is possible to diminish the "crime problem" by establishing sharper laws and punishment is a promise which cannot be fulfilled. Yet on the background of the rational of most people it is the best way to reduce the problem. Insofar crime policy can be very simplified by telling people to reduce the crime problem by increasing the severity of punishment. Empirical research, however, shows that increasing the penalties has only a small crime preventive effect if at all (Dölling et. al. 2006; 2009; 2011).

Most political players can be sure that, as long as they do not exaggerate, they will be applauded by the public for demanding harsher punishment and harsher police and court proceedings in connection with severe crimes (cf. Brumlik 2008; Funke 2008). Punitiveness is useful for threatening and for demonstrating readiness to act (Becker & Reddig 2004, p. 173). According to Garland (2001a), punitiveness is caused by a change in the conditions of life and a different role of the state. The state has given up its monopoly of control and as a result, law enforcement approaches have shifted increasingly into the role of management of security and risk. A crime policy of harshness focuses on those who increasingly refuse to participate in area where only those with enough political and economical power are granted access (Oelkers & Ziegler 2009, p. 42; cf. Hofer & Tham 1975). Responses to criminal deviance increasingly result in attribution of responsibility without enabling the persons concerned to take over this responsibility (Oelkers & Ziegler 2009, p. 42; Heidbrink 2006, p. 29; Maaser 2006, p. 79). Often these persons do not have the power to appeal these decisions.

Critics from the social sciences usually only reach the internal circles of the already converted, i.e., participants who already agree on the ineffectiveness of harsh sanctions. Normally the public does not take note of such discussions, instead, their thinking is limited to categories of security and deterrence. A punitive policy which does not account for the societal causes of crime and which is oriented towards singularly threatening scenarios is populist because it does not offer a solution to the problem, although it presents it as such. However, it is again and again possible for single political stakeholders to enhance their acceptance among the public as well as their election chances by calling for a harsh strategy against the common "enemy". Again and again, politicians try to succeed in election campaigns with the "classic" crime topic (Reuband 1996, p. 500; 2011). Often harsher laws only have a symbolic value because the actual jurisdictions usually do not or only partially apply such new laws. Such a "governing through crime" is not useful for the solution of societal problems, in the

contrary, it often worsens them. According to Sack (2004) this mind set only serves the interest of political power - crime policy ensures the continuity of the state and the government (Simon 2007).

For decades, criminologists, especially in the USA, have pointed to an increasing "penal populism" and "government through crime" (Pratt 2007). This development is supported by the mass media. The orientation of political and societal stakeholders in the USA towards opinion polls and not towards recommendations of experts might be the result of their particular variation of democracy. Many decision makers, not only politicians but also influential police officers and judges, are directly elected by the citizens and are dependent on their benevolence. In a public punitive climate it would be political suicide not to fulfill the desire for harsher sanctions. However, this might have repercussions on the credibility of the stakeholders in the long run when the public notices that political decisions are not based on solid expertise and that the players are more interested in getting votes than in the solution of the problems. The most recent poll of R+V-Infocenter (2010) measured the "fear of the Germans" and showed that the fear that politicians might be overstrained ranks on place 6 of 16 possible alternatives.

While some scholars are of the opinion that there is a clear punitive trend in Germany (cf. Sack 2004; 2006; 2010; Klimke et al. 2011), others advance a view that this is not the case, except for a doubtlessly increasing harshness in penal policy making (cf. Reuband 2011; Kury et al. 2004d). According to Klimke (2008, p. 21) the advance of punitive populism in Germany is still decelerated, but there are already gateways for an increased punitiveness, such as a rationalization in dealing with deviance and developments towards an increased informalization of security. In contrast to the USA, where judges and prosecutors are elected and moods among the public have therefore a stronger and faster influence on sanctioning, the German administration is less dependent on political influences (Klimke 2008, p. 21).

According to Schulte (2006, p. 1) in Germany an increasing number of employees work in so-called "non-norm employments", this means marginal employment, part-time employment, temporary contracts, or state-aided employment, i.e. jobs which are inherently insecure and leave these employees with a constant sense of anxiety. In 2004, more than 40% of the workforce worked in such employment forms - a percentage that has doubled since the 1970s. Consequently, the number of those working in "norm-employments", this means permanent employment with full social security, has decreased from more than 80% to 60%. Assuming an ongoing trend, in about 10 years the number of those in non-norm and norm-employments will be equal. The increase in mini jobs and part-time employments has been extraordinary. Those in non-norm employments most often earn smaller wages, their social security qualification is smaller, and they have a higher risk of becoming unemployed. A majority of these workers are young and female (p. 2).

However, considering the societal changes it has to be critically discussed whether it is still adequate and reasonable to assume an employment norm of the post-war years or of the time of the economic miracle. Behavioral roles, way of life, and societal factors have changed considerably. Today, nations are not insular entities anymore; globalization and new unexpected possibilities of communication have led to new opportunities as well as to new risks and uncertainties. Among those affected this might lead to a new call for a strong state and the assumption that if the state will be able to provide financial security, it should at least provide security from criminals.

An example for such uncertainties is the recent discussion of the increasing divergence between the poor and the rich. According to

calculations of the Institute for Economy and Society (Institut für Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft – IWG) (Miegel et al. 2008) the portion of the rich (an income of more than 150% above the median of all incomes) has increased in Germany between 1986 and 2006 from 16.2% to 20.5%. During the same period of time, the portion of the poor (an income of less than 60% below the median of all incomes) grew from 20.6% to 25.5%. This means the middle class decreased from 63.2% to 54.1%. These developments are important reasons for increasing existential fears of slipping into social marginalization. Further examples are the media reports in September 2010 on the savings measures of the German Federal Government. These savings measures include a reduction of social benefits and should relieve the federal household until 2014. Those concerned about these savings measures are especially people who are dependent on social benefits, most often the permanently unemployed and their families. Criminal behavior of juveniles can be explained in the context to such reduced life chances. This has to be the starting-point for crime prevention, not the harsher sanctioning of those already in danger of becoming a fringe group of society. For them, harsher sanctions would represent an additional burden (cf. Hofer & Tham 1975).

Von Hirsch et al. (1999, p. 45) emphasize that the threat of sanctions will only be effective if the public and potential offenders assess the probability of being sanctioned as relatively high, a finding which has already been stated by Beccaria (1983, Orig. 1775). But the public is neither informed about the certainty nor about the severity of sanctions (cf. Kury & Quintas 2010a; 2010b). In their analysis of the literature the authors found “that when potential offenders are made aware of substantial risks of being punished, many of them are induced to desist” (cf. Nagin 1998). But it is important to differentiate between the certainty of a sanction and its severity. “Information about changes in certainty of punishment seems easier for potential offenders to obtain than information about changes in severity. ... The severity of criminal sentences which courts actually impose is a less visible phenomenon for many potential offenders” (cf. Kury & Quintas 2010a; 2010b). While the certainty of a sanction has a deterring effect, this is much less the case for its severity. “The evidence concerning severity effects is less impressive”. Von Hirsch et al. (1999, p. 48) summarize: “The research we have reviewed provides no definitive answers to whether and to what extent substantial increases in the use and duration of custody could enhance marginal deterrence. However, recent studies’ findings – particularly, of the absence of strong and consistent negative statistical correlations between severity and crime rates – do diminish the plausibility of expecting large deterrent benefits ... Against any possible benefits, there also should be weighed the possible counterproductive effects relating to reduced differential disincentives against the most serious crimes of violence ... Also to be considered, is the destigmatisation of punishment that may occur, if severe sanctions are very widely employed”.

The public has to be more informed and more rationally informed about crime and sanctions in order to understand the reasons why crime is a part of every society. The public has to understand the relationship between crime and societal factors - such as the living conditions of juveniles, the procurement of norms and values, the political implementation of fair living and labor conditions for all citizens - rather than the impact of sanctions (cf. Wacquant 2009). But such a rational elucidation will probably not create interest among the public because simplistic, one-sided, and dramatized reports of selected, severe crimes often evoke a pleasant shiver and form a picture generalized to all/ a large number of offenders. Traffic accidents are also a part of living in contemporary society are generally accepted, although the number of traffic deaths is much higher than the number of those murdered. This although preventive measures like speed limits or controls for drunk driving

are easily practiced. In fact, such preventive measures are less often implemented, possibly because they would affect the general public and not only some underprivileged groups without the power of complaint. Another reason might be that such sanctions would affect economical interests, for example those of the car and alcohol industries (cf. Kury & Brandenstein 2005; 2006).

Despite the excitement of the discussion on punitiveness it is important to remember that the results found so far, especially for Germany, are quite meager. Depending on the particular ideology, opinions are stated with vehemence which is not a useful way for rational discussion. Sometimes stepping back and reviewing scientific theory might be useful. The null hypothesis has to be held until empirical results prove the contrary - often this basic assumption of science is neglected in this discussion. The empirical results are often too sparse to reject the null hypothesis. Especially the important question of the genesis of punitive attitudes among the public and their repercussion for criminal policy is not yet sufficiently researched.. Finally, the research agenda should follow this discussion so as to not abandon this important theme to arbitrariness.

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# Are judges too lenient according to public opinion?

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*A sample of Swiss criminal court judges as well as a representative sample of the Swiss population were asked to give their opinion on four fictional criminal cases, which were presented to them in the form of simulated judgments. The study shows that the population pronounced average sentences that were significantly harsher than those of the judges. While this finding, confirming the relevant literature, may seem logical, it is nonetheless surprising because it is due exclusively to the disproportionate weight of the most punitive individuals within the examined population sample. A more refined analysis shows that a majority of the population would actually be satisfied with less severe sentences than those pronounced by the judges.*

## I. Introduction

One often hears and reads in the media that the criminal justice system is too lenient and that offenders are not treated as harshly as they deserve. On the other hand, judges retort that the public is ill-informed about the law and the details of individual criminal cases and hence unable to form a sound opinion. In an attempt to reconcile these two positions, we will try to determine if the claim that judges are too lenient in the public's view truly reflects public opinion.

## II. The 2000 Swiss study

The goal of this earlier study was to determine the extent to which the severity of the sanctions imposed by judges is consistent with the desires of the public. However, before being able to analyze the relationship between public and judicial attitudes to punishment, a method of measuring the two must be defined. Several researchers have tried to measure either judicial attitudes to punishment (de Keijser, 2000; Kuhn, 2000; Walmsley, 2002) or public opinion towards sentencing issues (French Ministry of Justice, 1998). The systematic study of the relationship between the two seems to be a relatively recent topic though (Beckett, 1997a, 1997b; Glick & Pruet, 1985; Killias, 2001; Kury, 2000; Mande & English, 1999; Roberts, 1992)<sup>1</sup>.

Graebner (1974) analysed nation-wide data from the United States to determine whether the severity of sentencing varied from one region to another and, if so, whether this variation reflected public opinion. He observed that regional variations did indeed exist and that public opinion was directly related to sentencing practices.

Roberts & Doob (1989) compared the incarceration rates favoured by the public with actual incarceration rates for a number of common criminal offences. They found a high degree of overall concordance between the two.

Van Dijk et al. (1990) measured judicial attitudes to punishment by the prisoner rate (Kuhn, 2000; Walmsley, 2002, 2007) across fourteen countries and compared them to public attitudes to punishment measured by the proportion of the respondents of the first international crime victimization survey who favoured a prison

sentence for a 21-year-old recidivist burglar who stole a TV set<sup>2</sup>. They observed a strong correlation ( $r = .61$ ) between both attitudes. In other words, in those countries where judges imposed harsher sentences, public opinion was also the most punitive. However, the question whether public opinion influences judges or whether the severity of the sanctions influences public opinion remains unanswered.

Ouimet (1990) presented five fictional cases to 235 court practitioners and 299 members of the general public in Montreal. Each respondent was asked to impose a sentence on each of the five offenders. The study revealed that the length of the sentences handed down by the general public exceeded those of the court practitioners by a ratio of about 1.5 to 1. In addition, the study also found that the socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents (e.g. gender, age, household income) did not affect attitudes to criminal punishment.

Tremblay et al. (1994) employed the same study design, yet included additional variables in their analyses. They observed that the two sets of respondents differed in the degree of responsibility that they attributed to the five offenders and that the depth of their knowledge of the criminal justice system appeared to account for a sizable part of the observed differences in attitudes towards punishment.

Indermaur (1994) compared offenders' views on sentencing with those of judges and of the general public in Australia by interviewing 410 Perth residents, 17 judges, and 53 offenders. He observed that the three samples held very different views on the objectives of sentencing. While the public favoured incapacitation, the judges seemed to prefer its deterrent effect, and the offenders favoured rehabilitation.

Rossi et al. (1997) asked a sample of 1'500 Americans about the sentences they would like to see imposed for different offences in order to assess whether public opinion corresponded with federal sentencing guidelines (Gottfredson et al., 1978; Wilkins, 1987). Although the degree of concordance at the individual level was modest, the median sentences favoured by the public corresponded quite closely to the guidelines for almost all types of offences. The

1. Beckett (1997a and 1997b) shows that even if public attitude to punishment is consistent with judicial practice, this does not always imply that the former influences the latter, because there may also be an effect of judicial attitudes on public opinion. The title of her 1997a paper ('Political Preoccupation with Crime Leads, Not Follows, Public Opinion') says a lot on that matter. But Mande & English (1989) as well as Roberts (1992, 162) believe that public opinion may have an indirect influence on judges.

2. The question used in the international victimisation surveys is formulated as follows: 'People have different ideas about the sentences which should be given to offenders. Take for instance the case of a 21-year-old man who is found guilty of a burglary for the second time. This time he has stolen a colour TV. Which of the following sentences do you consider the most appropriate for such a case: fine, prison, community service, suspended sentence or any other sentence?'; if the respondent chooses a prison sentence, he or she is asked to specify its length; see for example van Dijk et al. (1990, 168, questions 30a and 30b).

only significant exception was drug trafficking, for which the median sentence favoured by the public was much lower than the penalty prescribed by the guidelines.

Hough & Roberts (1998) presented a summary of a burglary case to a representative sample of the British population and observed that the public would sentence the offender to almost the same - or even milder - terms as the judges. Interestingly, about 80% of these respondents thought that the sentences delivered by the judges were too lenient and that the latter did not do a good job. A similar observation has been made in Poland where the public also generally asked for longer prison terms, yet when confronted with real cases actually imposed more lenient sentences (Kury & Krajewski, 2000; Szymanowska & Szymanowski, 1996).

Beyens (2000) compared the views of magistrates on punishment with those of the general public in Belgium. To this end, she used a question from the International Crime Victimization Survey asking respondents which sentence they would impose in the case of a young recidivist burglar who had stolen a TV set (van Dijk et al., 1990). The main result of the study was that the public seemed more willing to impose alternative punishments to imprisonment (especially community service order) than the interviewed judges. 63% of the latter delivered a prison sentence, compared to only one in five respondents from the general public.

As this review of the literature has shown, several methods have been used to measure the differences between public and judicial attitudes to punishment. Some researchers simply asked respondents if they thought the sanctions imposed by judges were too harsh, adequate, or too lenient. All the studies using this type of question format have consistently concluded that the public considered judges to be too lenient (Kury & Ferdinand, 1999 ; Roberts, 1992)<sup>3</sup>.

Another method is to present respondents with real cases (which have been heard by a court) and to ask about the sanctions they would have imposed on the offenders. A third method is to present the same (fictional) scenarios to a sample of the public and a sample of judges. This methodology is especially suited for the issue at hand because it controls for all the relevant variables (such as an offender's criminal record).

Drawing upon actual court cases, we thus created four scenarios containing all the information needed to impose a sentence (i.e. a detailed description of the offence as well as the characteristics of both the offender and the victim). The four cases are those of a recidivist reckless driver caught speeding at 232 km/h on a highway with a speed limit of 120 km/h - i.e. about 144 instead of 75 miles per hour - (case A), a recidivist burglar who committed a robbery (case B), a first-time rapist (case C), and a bank clerk who embezzled one million Swiss francs (about 640'000 €, 780'000 \$, 435'000 £) from his bank (case D).

In May 2000, these four cases were submitted - by means of a written questionnaire - to a representative sample of 654 Swiss judges, so constructed that it reflected the linguistic and the cantonal (state) set up of the country. The response rate amounted to 44 % (i.e. 290 valid questionnaires were received). Of those 290 respondents, 219 came from the German-speaking part of Switzerland (76%), 64 from the French-speaking part (22%), and seven from the Italian-speaking part (2%). Approximately one quarter of the judges were female. The age of the respondents ranged from 31 to 70 years, with an average of 50 years.

3. As Roberts (1992) notes : 'The question has never failed to generate the result that the majority of the public ... expressed their desire for harsher penalties. In fact, this question concerning sentencing severity generates a higher consensus than any other issue in criminal justice'.

Also in 2000, we presented the same four cases to a representative sample of the Swiss population (606 people). The public survey was conducted using computer assisted telephone interview (CATI) methodology. In addition to all the survey items contained in the judges' questionnaire, additional socio-demographic variables on the respondents were recorded as well as one item on their opinion of the criminal justice system. The participation rate of the telephone survey was 72%.

In a next step, we compared the sentences desired by public opinion to those meted out by the judges. Since all respondents were polled on the very same cases, any differences in the severity of their sentences must reflect differences between the populations (Opp & Peukert, 1971; Ouimet, 1990).

The following hypotheses were tested:

Do public and judicial attitudes to punishment vary according to the gender of the respondents?

Do public and judicial attitudes to punishment vary according to the age of the respondents?

Do public and judicial attitudes to punishment vary from one part of the country to another?

Are public attitudes to punishment more punitive than actual judicial sentences?

Despite important differences between the sentences individual judges delivered for a given case, a certain uniformity exists between the average length of the prison terms delivered by female and male judges, by older and younger judges, as well as between judges in the German part and elsewhere in the country.

With regard to gender, not even the scenario of the rapist generated any differences between male and female judges. This result is probably strongly influenced by jurisprudence. Among the public, the results are quite different. With the exception of the case of the rapist, women were systematically (but not significantly) more punitive than men.

Like gender, age did not significantly influence the sentences delivered by the judges. This is true in all four cases. With regard to the public, the results are slightly different from those concerning the judges. If age does not influence the punitive attitudes in cases B (burglar) and D (bank clerk), speeding is sentenced more severely by older respondents ( $r = .15, p \leq .01$ ), whereas the rapist is punished more severely by younger interviewees ( $r = -.14, p \leq .01$ ).

Across linguistic areas, once again, the responses of the judges reveal a high degree of homogeneity. Except for the burglar (case B) - on whom the German-speaking judges imposed a more punitive sanction than their French and Italian speaking counterparts - no significant differences emerged among the judges according to their region of origin. The differences across the results from the public survey were more pronounced, however: the French-speaking inhabitants of the country are largely and significantly more punitive than the residents of the German-speaking part. This difference will come as no surprise to Swiss criminologists, as it replicates a consistent finding of national studies (Killias, 1989).

In general, the size of the town or suburb where one lives, marital status, and professional activity did not significantly affect attitudes to punishment. Foreign residents, on the other hand, were more punitive than Swiss citizens, and respondents living in poorer households were more punitive than those who were better off. Finally, the respondents with the lowest level of education were more punitive than the better educated.

Furthermore, as can be seen by comparing the columns for the year 2000 in Tables 1 and 2, the public was more punitive on average than the judges in three of the four cases<sup>4</sup>, although they were more lenient towards the bank clerk who embezzled one million Swiss francs (case D). This latest finding may suggest that the public does not consider white-collar crime as a very serious form of offending.

To sum up, in three out of four cases, the public were more punitive than the judges. However, since the average length of the imposed prison terms may be affected by a few extreme answers, we also examined what share of the public would deliver less or more punitive sanctions, respectively, in comparison to the average sentence imposed by the judges.

The results of this analysis are presented in Table 3, which shows that a majority of the public would be satisfied with the average sentences imposed by the judges. Indeed, as they imposed more lenient sanctions than the judges, most people would be satisfied even if judges imposed still shorter prison terms. This unexpected result was arguably the most interesting finding of this study, because it showed

4. This tendency is highly significant ( $p \leq .01$ ) in the cases A and C, but not significant in case B. Case D is the exception to the rule, with a public that is less punitive than the judges ( $p \leq .05$ ).

that the high average of the public was due to a small number of respondents who favoured imposing very long prison terms.

### III. Critics of the 2000 Swiss study

The very fact that the public sample indicated a less punitive attitude than the judges not only took the researchers by surprise; it was actually so counter-intuitive that both the media and politicians found it hard to believe. Furthermore, a Dutch study did not show the same results (de Keijser et al., 2007). Therefore, it may have been suspected that the results had been forged or that the researchers had made a mistake, and the results of the study were forgotten.

### IV. The 2007 remake

In 2007 we had the opportunity to remake the same study, using the four identical criminal cases. The goal of the 2007 study was not only to replicate the results from the earlier study, but also to test for any potential differences between 2000 and 2007. The results are presented in Table 1.

**Table 1.** Average Length (in Months) of Prison Sentences Delivered by a Sample of Swiss Judges in the Four Cases (Written Questionnaire)<sup>5</sup>

	Average length(in months)		By gender				By Region			
			2000		2007		2000		2007	
	2000	2007	Men	Women	Men	Women	German	Latin	German	Latin
Case A (driver)	6.1	5.9	6.1	6.5	6.5	4.2	6.2	5.5	6.4	4.6
Case B (burglar)	11.4°	9.8°	12.0	10.2	10.3	8.0	12.0*°	9.7*	10.1°	9.1
Case C (rapist)	45.2	41.9	44.9	46.4	43.1	37.7	45.1	45.6	42.5	40.0
Case D (bank clerk)	26.8	24.9	27.2	25.6	26.0	20.9	26.2	28.7	24.0	28.2

\* The internal difference between the results for the same year is significant ( $p \leq .05$ )

° The external difference between the 2000 and the 2007 results is significant ( $p \leq .05$ )

Table 1 shows no big differences between the 2000 and 2007 samples of judges. Once again, the consistency of the judicial rulings attests to the very stable and strong jurisprudence of the Swiss justice system.

**Table 2.** Average Length (in Months) of Prison Sentences Delivered by a Sample of Swiss Citizens in the Four Cases (CATI)<sup>6</sup>

	Average length (in months)		By gender				By Region			
			2000		2007		2000		2007	
	2000	2007	Men	Women	Men	Women	German	Latin	German	Latin
Case A (driver)	11.9	9.6	10.2	13.4	8.8	10.5	10.6*	18.2*	8.8	12.5
Case B (burglar)	13.6°	24.1°	13.0°	14.2°	22.0°	26.0°	12.4*°	19.4*	23.4°	26.7
Case C (rapist)	59.3	64.4	60.2	58.5	61.0	67.3	56.4*	72.8*	64.5	63.9
Case D (bank clerk)	20.5°	13.4°	18.2°	22.6°	12.3°	14.5°	18.8*°	28.4*°	12.1*°	18.1*°

\* The internal difference between the results for the same year is significant ( $p \leq .05$ )

° The external difference between the 2000 and the 2007 results is significant ( $p \leq .05$ )

#### 5. 2000:

Case A: mean = 6.1, median = 4.0, standard deviation = 5.7;  
Case B: mean = 11.4, median = 10.0, standard deviation = 7.3;  
Case C: mean = 45.2, median = 42.0, standard deviation = 21.0;  
Case D: mean = 26.8, median = 25.0, standard deviation = 11.7.

#### 6. 2000:

Case A: mean = 11.9, median = 2.0, standard deviation = 26.1;  
Case B: mean = 13.6, median = 6.0, standard deviation = 21.8;  
Case C: mean = 59.3, median = 36.9, standard deviation = 60.1;  
Case D: mean = 20.5, median = 6.0, standard deviation = 42.2.

#### 2007 :

Case A: mean = 5.9, median = 5, standard deviation = 6.2;  
Case B: mean = 9.8, median = 8, standard deviation = 8.2;  
Case C: mean = 41.9, median = 36.5, standard deviation = 27.9;  
Case D: mean = 24.9, median = 24.3, standard deviation = 13.

#### 2007:

Case A: mean = 9.6, median = 0.0, standard deviation = 31.1;  
Case B: mean = 24.1, median = 6.0, standard deviation = 50.3;  
Case C: mean = 64.4, median = 48.0, standard deviation = 75.5;  
Case D: mean = 13.4, median = 0.0, standard deviation = 32.7.



Table 2 shows some differences between the 2000 and 2007 surveys of the public: the average sentence for the bank clerk dropped significantly whereas the average sentence for the burglar increased.

The key finding of the 2000 study has thus been confirmed. As a matter of fact, Table 3 shows that in three of the four cases (because the tendency changed for the rapist) a majority of the public would be satisfied with the average sentences imposed by the judges. Most people would even be satisfied if judges imposed shorter prison terms.

**Table 3.** Proportion of the Public who Would Impose Sentences Which Are Less or More Punitive, Respectively, Than the Average Prison Sentence Imposed by the Judges

	Proportion of the public who are less punitive than the judges		Proportion of the public who are more punitive than the judges	
	2000	2007	2000	2007
Case A (driver)	66.8%	66.6%	33.2%	33.4%
Case B (burglar)	59.4%	51.2%	40.6%	48.8%
Case C (rapist)	50.6%	41.2%	49.4%	58.8%
Case D (bank clerk)	78.8%	85.2%	21.2%	14.8%

We decided to subject the minority of particularly punitive people, whose answers raised the average length of the sentences disproportionately, to a correspondence analysis and found three discriminating variables. We used the HOMALS procedure (i.e. homogeneity analysis). The considered sample included all the respondents whose punitiveness was higher than the most punitive judge, i.e. 7.8% of the whole sample for case A, 18.1% for case B, 17.0% for case C, and 3.5% for case D.

It turns out that the most punitive respondents tend to live in economically disadvantaged households, have no clear political affiliations, and have achieved only low levels of education. Those discriminating variables indicate that the most punitive individuals only have a limited understanding of the criminal justice system.

## V. Critics of the 2007 remake

In the face of such surprising results, one obvious point of criticism relates to the different polling methodology being employed by the two studies (CATI for the public survey and written questionnaires for

the judges), and it seems only natural to question their comparability. Consequently, we repeated the study and submitted a written questionnaire to a sample of the public.

## VI. The 2008 written questionnaire to a sample of the public

The reader will notice that, in contrast to sentences meted out for cases A, B and C, punitiveness regarding case D has not undergone a similar reduction between 2007 and 2008 but actually remained stable. This might be explained by the fact that in case D the public always displayed a lower average punitiveness compared to the judges. This may suggest that extreme punitiveness was less manifest in case D in comparison to the sentences pronounced in the other three cases. Thus, the fact that the most punitive segments of the population did not respond to our written questionnaire may not have had the same effect in case D as it did in cases A, B and C, for which sentences decreased drastically.

**Table 4.** Average Length (in Months) of Prison Sentences Delivered by a Sample of Swiss Citizens in the Four Cases (Written Questionnaire as Opposed to CATI)<sup>7</sup>

	Average length(in months)		By gender				By Region			
			CATI 2007		WRITTEN 2008		CATI 2007		WRITTEN 2008	
	CATI 2007	WRITTEN 2008	Men	Women	Men	Women	German	Latin	German	Latin
Case A (driver)	9.6°	3.1°	8.8°	10.5°	3.4°	2.5°	8.8°	12.5°	2.8°	3.8°
Case B (burglar)	24.1°	8.0°	22.0°	26.0°	9.0*°	5.7*°	23.4°	26.7°	8.2°	7.5°
Case C (rapist)	64.4°	46.1°	61.0°	67.3°	44.2°	50.6°	64.5°	63.9°	46.0°	46.5°
Case D (bank clerk)	13.4	13.4	12.3	14.5	12.8	15.0	12.1*	18.1*	12.4	15.9

\* The internal difference between the results for the same methodology is significant ( $p \leq .05$ )

° The external difference across the two different methodologies is significant ( $p \leq .05$ )

### 7. 2007:

Case A: mean = 9.6, median = 0.0, standard deviation = 31.1;  
Case B: mean = 24.1, median = 6.0, standard deviation = 50.3;  
Case C: mean = 64.4, median = 48.0, standard deviation = 75.5;  
Case D: mean = 13.4, median = 0.0, standard deviation = 32.7.

### 2008:

Case A: mean = 3.1, median = 0.0, standard deviation = 7.5;  
Case B: mean = 8.0, median = 0.0, standard deviation = 16.6;  
Case C: mean = 46.1, median = 36.0, standard deviation = 50.1;  
Case D: mean = 13.4, median = 0.0, standard deviation = 31.6.

**Table 5.** Proportion of the Public who Would Impose Sentences Which are Less and More Punitive, Respectively, Than the Average Prison Sentence Imposed by the Judges (Written Questionnaires as Opposed to CATI)

	Proportion of the public who are less punitive than the judges			Proportion of the public who are more punitive than the judges		
	CATI 2000	CATI 2007	WRITTEN 2008	CATI 2000	CATI 2007	WRITTEN 2008
Case A (driver)	66.8%	66.6%	81.4%	33.2%	33.4%	18.6%
Case B (burglar)	59.4%	51.2%	74.6%	40.6%	48.8%	25.4%
Case C (rapist)	50.6%	41.2%	56.1%	49.4%	58.8%	43.9%
Case D (bank clerk)	78.8%	85.2%	86.1%	21.2%	14.8%	13.9%

The results are presented in Tables 4 and 5: submitting written questionnaires to a sample of the population yielded even more dramatic differences between the public and our sample of judges. One possible explanation is that the CATI survey methodology allowed us to reach a more diverse sample of the population encompassing the more punitive individuals. As we saw earlier, these tend to be the least educated and thus probably the least inclined to take an interest and participate in a written survey. If one considers – as we did for the HOMALS procedure – that the particularly punitive people are those whose punitiveness is higher than the most punitive judge, one observes that for the CATI procedure the particularly punitive people are 7.8% of the whole sample for case A, 18.1% for case B, 17.0% for case C, and 3.5% for case D, whereas they were only 0.3% (case A), 3.5% (case B), 0.8% (case C), and 3.5% (case D) for the written procedure. We conclude from this experience that CATI is a more appropriate polling method for conducting research among the public, which produces results that are more representative of the population as a whole.

## VII. Conclusion

As the various studies presented here have shown, and even if our study clearly shows that a majority of the population would be satisfied with less severe sentences than those pronounced by the judges, public opinion on sentencing is systematically reported as being more punitive than is actually the case. Both the media and politicians seem to relay the attitudes of a minority whose attitudes differ from how the average citizen feels about judicial decisions in criminal matters.

As a matter of fact, as the high average sanctions awarded by the public are due to a small group of very punitive people, engaging the public as a whole is not necessary for the situation to improve; a change in public attitudes to punishment could be obtained by altering the opinions of this small group of highly punitive individuals. The target audience of such an intervention seems to live in large cities, to be financially and educationally disadvantaged and to be less interested in politics than the average population. As this description appears to fit people who read low-brow newspapers and watch television, one strategy for tackling their misperceptions of the criminal justice system would be to address them through their preferred media. In order to avoid a growing misunderstanding of their work, criminologists and judges will, in the future, have to better target their message to its audience and write articles for low-brow newspapers, participate in televised debates, or both.

From a methodological viewpoint, critics, who argued that data collected using different methods would yield incomparable results, were proven right. In fact, by using a written questionnaire both for the judges and for the public, the differences that had previously been observed became even more acute. As a consequence, the 2008 remake (written questionnaires sent to the public) probably

misrepresents the population as a whole as a selection effect may have occurred.

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# Fragmentation and Interconnection in Public Safety Governance in Belgium, England and Wales and the Netherlands: Empirical Explorations and Imagined Futures

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*This paper deals with the seemingly contradictory trends of almost simultaneous fragmentation and interconnection in the policy domain of (local) public safety governance, which are present, albeit unevenly, across the several European states under consideration here. Public safety governance is understood here as all the actions of relevant actors on the local level that are meant to establish public safety and, of particular relevance to this Special Issue, reduce the fear of crime, insecurity and disorder on the municipality level. The paper is organized as follows. We begin by analysing the recent history and "career" of public safety policies in each of the three national cases of the Netherlands, Belgium and England and Wales, highlighting throughout the complex inter-play of the processes of fragmentation and inter-connection throughout these narratives. We then attempt to decipher the comparative "master patterns" emergent across these cases and what the broader lessons that may be drawn for policy agendas and ways of "imagining" public safety futures for these and similar societies.*

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## 1. Introduction

Providing public safety has been a traditional, legitimizing, core task for the modern "sovereign" state. Maintaining public order, safety and fighting crime (if not explicitly *the fear of crime*) became specialized tasks of professional keepers of the peace within the state apparatus in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century across much of Western Europe. For much of the twentieth century, security was seen as a core function of the state, both normatively and empirically (Garland, 1996; Shearing and Wood, 2003). However, during the last decades of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, highly formalized state control failed to answer adequately the challenges, *inter alia*, of public order problems, rapidly rising crime rates and concomitant heightened cultures of fear of crime and disorder, and an even greater broadening of the already capacious notion of public safety. New actors and organizations from both public and private spheres tried to fill the gap by helping (local) government authorities to satisfy the need for both greater public safety and reduced fear of crime and disorder (thus the concept of "fragmentation" in the title of this paper). Across many contemporary liberal democracies the nation- or central state monopoly on formal control and enforcement partially broke down and the object of governance was expanded far beyond traditional crime and public order problems. However, both traditional as well as new providers of public safety soon became aware of the need to co-operate with one-another and with the public at large (thus the concept of "interconnection" in the title of this paper). Co-operation on an operational level was increasingly necessary primarily due to the functional complexity of the problems and the institutional difficulty of dealing with these according to the former strict division of labour between actors. On a more administrative and political level, there would appear logically to be the need for greater convergence in actors, goals and accountability.

This paper deals with the seemingly contradictory trends of almost simultaneous fragmentation and interconnection<sup>1</sup> in the policy

domain of (local) public safety governance, which are present, albeit unevenly, across the several European states under consideration here. Public safety governance is understood here as all the actions of relevant actors on the local level that are meant to establish public safety and, of particular relevance to this Special Issue, reduce the fear of crime, insecurity and disorder on the municipality level (Edwards and Hughes, 2005, 2011).

The paper is organized as follows. We begin by analysing the recent history and "career" of public safety policies in each of the three national cases of the Netherlands, Belgium, and England and Wales, highlighting throughout the complex inter-play of the processes of fragmentation and inter-connection throughout these narratives. We then seek to decipher the comparative "master patterns" emergent across these cases and explore what the broader lessons that may be drawn for policy agendas and ways of "imagining" public safety futures for these and similar societies.

## 2. Public safety governance in the Netherlands

Half a century ago, community safety governance in the Netherlands was a simple and almost invisibly enacted task<sup>2</sup>. Policy or politics had no apparent significance whatsoever for the governance of community safety. The number of actors involved was small and political or societal debate about local safety almost nonexistent. How different is today's picture. Safety and security occupy prominent places on the local and national political as well as broader societal agendas. Community safety has become a highly politicized issue. On the local level a large number of different actors is involved in keeping the peace and controlling disorder or crime. Complexity reigns all

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*governance and the search for connective capacity" which is initiated by A. van Buuren en M. Fenger at the Erasmus University Rotterdam (The Netherlands).*

1. The theme of "fragmentation and interconnection" is borrowed from the book project *"Between fragmentation and connectedness. Public*
2. Still in line with Thorbecke, the great 19<sup>th</sup> century Dutch liberal statesman's dictum about the police: "we want a police that comes to our attention as little as possible".

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1. The theme of "fragmentation and interconnection" is borrowed from the book project *"Between fragmentation and connectedness. Public*

over. In this section we sketch summarily what happened during the last decades and how it is today.

#### *Change and stability*

Traditionally crime and disorder were not issues of importance in the political culture of Dutch society. "The authorities" - in the Dutch system, the local level mayor, public prosecutor and the police - could easily cope with the total amount of crime and disorder. Full enforcement was the rule. Safety governance was neither an issue in politics nor in policy. The police and the system of criminal justice did what they had to do and nobody worried about it.

Rather unexpectedly and suddenly Dutch society started to change during the second half of the 1960s. Crime and disorder began to rise rather fast. The until then taken for granted societal order - the heavily "pillarized" Dutch society (Lijphart, 1966; Goudsblom, 1967) - became contested. Traditional keepers of peace, law and order were not able to meet these new challenges adequately. During the next years order problems kept growing but fast rising crime rates soon became a more urgent problem during the 1970s and 1980s.

The rising crime tide (and the growing fears of crime and disorder) effectively put an end to the fiction of full enforcement. From now on authorities had to choose what to enforce and sanction and what not. It led to a "revolution". First in the juridical sphere, the introduction of the "positive opportunity principle" ('t Hart, 1994): enforce and prosecute only if a public interest is involved and there is a reasonable chance of success. Later on, much later, the choices that needed to be made became part of more or less considered policies (Commissie Peper, 1981), thus bringing political responsible authorities, like the mayor, back in.

#### *System under pressure*

Rather early on in this period of "revolution" Dutch authorities became aware that government on its own never would be able to cope effectively with the growing problems. Since the mid-eighties the governance of local safety was no longer a monopoly of the mayor, public prosecutor and the police. Many other actors - housing corporations, schools, neighbourhood organizations, storekeepers, welfare professions, community building and many other organizations or citizens - are involved now. The dominant perspective no longer is the hierarchy between the two local "bosses" of the police - mayor and public prosecutor - and the police force. Nowadays horizontal relations between many actors dominate the local safety scene (Hoogenboom, 2009). But one should remember however that even in the Netherlands the shift from top-down "command and control" towards more horizontal kinds of steering and cooperation sometimes met with considerable resistance.

We describe the developments along three lines. First there is the drastic fragmentation of the field. Many new actors enter the scene. Then there is an increased need for explicit and politically accountable steering of all these actors. Policy and politics enter the field. And at last, but not least, new arrangements are introduced to (re)connect all the actors that are involved in today's local governance of safety.

#### *Solutions causing problems.*

The broad deployment of responsibilities for local safety among many actors is meant to solve a problem: especially the problem of overload of the police.

This is a problem that has manifested itself in the Netherlands ever more urgently since the early 1980s. Other organizations than police and criminal justice should share the burden. Sharing the burden for the governance of local safety changed the scene from a closed, insulated and rather orderly chain into an open and often highly variable and difficult to assess network. Traditionally mayor and

public prosecutor maintained local peace and order with the help of the police and criminal justice. As part of the local administration the fire brigade also played a role and so did building inspectorates and some other specialized offices within the administration. The system mostly had a "chain-like" character: the mayor giving instructions to the police, the police bringing offenders to the public prosecutor and through the latter's office into the courts. The system was not open to newcomers. Non-governmental actors did play a minor role.

Since the mid-1980s the governance of community or public safety gradually expanded to encompass many governmental, quasi-governmental and non-governmental actors. Shopkeepers were obligated to protect their premises, football stadiums had to procure their own safety (police being present only as backup, if need be), private citizens were invited to make their homes burglar-proof. Organizations entered into stable cooperative relations with the police, to ensure safety in business parks, to bring youthful offenders back on the right path, to prevent the deterioration of neighborhoods or to solve conflicts between neighbors.

The resulting landscape is one of horizontally linked more or less autonomous organizations. Networks encompassing many different types of organizations, where hierarchy or hierarchical steering (and accountability) is almost lacking (Terpstra en Kouwenhoven, 2004). Local government and the police, however, still occupy special positions within these kinds of network, not in the least based on the police's legal possibilities to use coercive power (Hoogenboom, 2009). But local government cannot depend any longer on traditional command and control steering. Most of the organizations involved are autonomous towards local government. For good and bad, traditional kinds of steering must give way to more governance-oriented ones.

#### *Ordering complexity: increased steering.*

The fast rising demand for order maintenance and crime control made public safety governance a much more visceral political activity (cf. Reiner, 1985). Choices had to be made about what to do and what not to do. Political administrators now had to be accountable for the choices that were made. The burden of choice could not be left to operational executive police officers. Much that was left implicit in the past now had to become explicit. In the Netherlands (and elsewhere, for example, Belgium) the need for explicit and accountable choices led to the rise of an elaborate system of police and safety planning or policy formation.

The notion of police and safety planning and policy was introduced during the second half of the 1980s (Commissie Peper, 1981). Both police and safety planning gradually became more important. Police planning was stimulated by the 1994 Police Reform that introduced larger and more rationally steered police forces. From the early 1990s on national government also helped local governments to develop local safety policies of their own (IVR 1993 a.o.; Nota Veiligheidsbeleid, 1995, VER<sup>3</sup>). Gradually - large cities earlier than smaller cities and villages - many local communities introduced local safety policy plans, also known as integrated safety policy plans (e.g. SGB0, 2000). At the same time however national government began to introduce programs to strengthen its own steering of the police and (local) safety (mostly through plans like BNP and IVP). So the overall amount of planning and steering of police and safety in general increased drastically. Tensions between national and local steering and control also increased. We can observe these trends also

3. VER is short for Veiligheid Effect Rapportage (Safety Effect Report), a scan like instrument that is used to assess ex ante the safety and security risks of intended developments in urban planning, housing, infrastructure etc.

in other Western European countries (Cachet, Van Sluis, a.o.: 2009; Cachet en Prins, 2010; Hughes, 2007, Edwards and Hughes 2009).

For a very long time police and police planning dominated the safety field. Only rather recently (decade of 2000s) did the public prosecutor's office and local government really become genuine partners of the police in the planning of community safety. Nowadays all parties are convinced that the accountable authorities – mayor and public prosecutor – should be in the lead where local policy development and implementation is at stake. Despite these developments it seems that police leadership in the governance of local safety remains dominant. The police force still exclusively is the owner of a lot of information needed in policy development processes. The police are also the first of all public authorities feel the urgency of safety problems (and fears over crime and safety) and the need to intervene. Furthermore policy development by police, public prosecutor and local government still does not seem to be co-ordinated well. Drastic shifts in the timing of these policy cycles are needed to guarantee adequate co-ordination between the separate policy cycles (De Pee, 2010). Improved and more co-ordinated kinds of policy planning seem to be a necessary but not a sufficient instrument to bring together the many organizations - governmental as well as non-governmental - that are involved in the governance of local safety today.

This explains why we are not really surprised to see other mechanisms for bringing together all these different actors in a joint effort to improve community safety. The most important complementary mechanism is the development of new institutional arrangements between actors.

#### *Ordering complexity: new arrangements*

For a long time the system of public administration in the Netherlands has been characterized by three layers of government: national government, the provinces and local governments (in 2010 appr. 430). As far as police and public safety is concerned provincial governments never played a role of any importance. National and local government both became more important during the last decades. Nevertheless there can be serious doubts about the integrative powers of these two levels of government versus the tremendous fragmentation of the police and safety field which we sketched above.

Traditional arrangements do not seem to be able to bridge effectively the gaps between the many different actors that are nowadays involved in the development and execution of community safety governance. Since the mid-1990s many new institutional arrangements have been introduced to steer and control the governance of safety. Most of the formal legal arrangements are located on a supra-local or regional level (Police region and Safety region). But there are also many new arrangements on the local level that lack a strictly legal basis but are important nevertheless. "Police regions", for example, were introduced in the Police Law 1993. "Safety regions" - meant to cope with crises and large accidents - were introduced very recently. Although both are based on specific laws and not on the WGR – the Dutch law on inter-urban cooperation - they nevertheless share many characteristics with WGR arrangements. Most important of these is their weak, indirect, democratic legitimacy. Police and Safety regions are administered by mayors only<sup>4</sup>. The 1993 Police Law leaves the police regions ample room for the internal ordering of their region. Most regions are subdivided in a number of districts: each a part of a large city, an entire middle-sized city or a number of adjoining smaller towns. In

a kind of district council the mayor(s), the district public prosecutor and the relevant police chief coordinate their actions and policies. This is probably the most important co-ordination device, although it is lacking a firm legal base. Decisions taken on the district level may have a lot of consequences for the local governance of safety.

Insofar as the governance of local safety is dealt with, the police have long been in the lead, as we mentioned before. More recently we see the Police Act 1993 being used to broaden the responsibilities for the governance of public safety. Police regions do such by introducing mostly temporary but always informal arrangements within which police, public prosecutor and local government take an equal share in policy development and implementation on the local level.

In many police regions (temporary) committees provide other examples of efforts to share responsibilities between police, public prosecutor and especially local government. These committees are charged mostly with the temporary but important task within the region of, for example, drawing up proposals for reduction of the number of districts, for redeploying manpower or for necessary cuts in expenditures. These kinds of measures can have serious impact on the governance of safety in each separate town. Therefore it is important to involve local government early and actively in decision-making processes that might lead to cuts in police assistance or redistribution of police efforts. Informal arrangements help to smooth the functioning of the formal police region and bring together the many actors that are participating in the local safety networks (Huberts, 2004; Terpstra en Kouwenhoven, 2004).

On the local level itself there is also a need for new arrangements. After all the fragmentation and increasing complexity of the governance of local safety is being felt especially on that level. One way to do this is to bring them together in new and mostly informal arrangements. Working closely together within an arrangement like the judicial case consultation, as it is called in Rotterdam, on youthful offenders - meant to withhold them from a more serious criminal career by offering early and integrated intervention (cf Doodkorte, 2004) - will hopefully breed trust and the willingness to continue and intensify cooperation.

Working with so-called intervention teams in the city of Rotterdam is another example of bringing together many different actors to execute jointly a complex common task (see also Tops a.o., 2007). Intervention teams, introduced in 2001, consist of representatives of various local authorities, such as the department of safety and security, social care, employment and urban housing as well as the police. These teams pay unexpected visits to local homes and buildings in order to signal and address problems such as illegal housing, citizens illegally receiving governmental support, and violation of fire safety measurements. Although there is some critique on the violation of private spheres, nevertheless local politicians and administrators considered this instrument combining enforcement of law and social care effective and efficient. Over the years, intervention teams have been expanded with more actors and consequentially topics, such as tax agencies and private electricity companies.

#### *Making many work together: direction*

Governmental organizations on different levels are involved in the development and execution of local safety policies (Prins and Cachet, 2009). But many semi-governmental or even non-governmental or private actors are involved too. Bringing them all together and steering and co-ordinating their actions in accordance with agreed upon safety policies is a new and challenging governance task for local government. Hierarchical top down steering will not do the job any longer due to the quite extensive autonomy most organizations cherish. Local government now has to bring the many different actors

4. "Only", while the Dutch mayor is not directly elected by the citizens but a - pointed by the Home Office or the national cabinet. During the past years, however, city councils influence on who is appointed increased drastically, ensuring a minimum of democratic legitimacy for the appointed mayor.

together, to convince them, seduce them etc. Local government is not totally in command.

In the Dutch "consensual" democracy it has always been rather difficult to have decisions being made and - even more importantly - implemented. Neither policy nor new arrangements guarantee that now in themselves. Nevertheless (local) governance of security now needs direction (in Dutch: *regie*) more than ever: that is leadership that brings together the many actors in a heavily fragmented field and makes them work towards joint goals. In the Netherlands, like in many other countries, many people ask for strong and decisive leadership by local government and especially the mayor to avoid standstill or deadlock (Karsten, Cachet and Schaap, 2010). In many ways Dutch mayors now provide that kind of leadership. Unlike for example in England and Wales, Dutch mayors play a substantial rather than a merely symbolic role. Some of them primarily use their own personal, charismatic, authority, like for example former mayors in Rotterdam (Opstelten; cf Tops, 2007) and Maastricht (Leers). Others use their traditional position as an appointed official "above" political parties. They also use traditional powers with respect to public order and safety that Dutch mayors have based on many laws (Muller a.o., 2007) but especially on the municipal law (*Gemeentewet*). Direction also is exercised as a consequence of many new powers that were attributed by national government to mayors, during the past decade (Sackers, 2010). And at this current moment Dutch government is considering a bill to give these kinds of direction a formal basis in law.

#### *Preliminary conclusions*

The number of different actors involved in developing and executing local safety policies has increased tremendously. Increasing pressures due to a rather large increase in order and safety problems certainly played a role. But a general tendency in society and public administration towards differentiation, division of labor and specialization also contributed. Rather simple and easily manageable chains were replaced by complex, difficult to survey and much more difficult manageable networks. This fragmentation of law and order maintenance or governance of safety increased the need for well-considered ordering and steering of so many actors.

### 3. Public safety governance in Belgium

#### *Introduction*

From 1830 on, the year in which Belgium became independent, the problem of safety was considered as a national task, as well as a local one. This balance of power between national and local policy was to a large extent the heritage of the Napoleonic period.

On the one hand, the existence of a "municipal autonomy" is a central theme in Belgian history. Local democracy is considered important for the maintenance of public order in terms of public tranquillity, safety and health. Municipal election culminates in the formation of a coalition, which translates itself in a majority that delivers the mayor. In other words mayors are not designated by the crown (as e.g. in the Netherlands), but are the emanation of local elections in Belgium. The mayor is personally responsible for public order in the municipality. This is the reason why the mayor personally is considered as the authority of the local police.

On the other hand, national government is considered as responsible for safety and public order throughout the country. In this context reference is mostly made to interventions at the occasion of mass events, demonstrations and riots. In this respect, national police forces (the "gendarmerie national") acted in the past as the "praetorian guard" of the state and the democratic regime. In relation to this task, mobility was a crucial factor. National forces displaced

themselves from their barracks at the border of big cities to other (more rural) municipalities on the territory, to maintain public order. After the police reform of 1998, this relation changed dramatically.

**Table 1: Comparison of territories on which administrative and judicial authorities are competent**

TERRITORY	ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITIES	JUDICIAL AUTHORITIES
Country	Federal government	Council of Attorney-Generals
Region	Regional government	
Territory of the Court of Appeal		Attorney-General
Province	Governor	
Territorial Jurisdiction		Public Prosecutor
Pluri-municipality police zone	President of the Police Council	
(Mono-)municipality police zone	Mayor	

Apart from this dominant balance of power, some specific characteristics of the Belgian institutional framework determine to a large extent the way safety governance gets its shape. Let us examine these.

#### *Lack of interconnectedness of traditional functions*

The Napoleonic conception of safety in "administrative" and "judicial" functions is still one of the fundamental features of the state organisation (see table 1). The Belgian territory is divided differently according to both functionalities. It is remarkable and particular that the levels of geographical aggregation do *not* coincide at any level at all. The consequence hereof is that administrative and judicial authorities have no counterpart on the same geographical scale. The smallest scale in this organisational framework is the municipality.

Systematic consultation between administrative and judicial authorities is only installed at the level of the police zone and at the national level. After the police reform of 1998, the police system was redesigned at both levels.

At the federal level, the former supra-local branches of the "national gendarmerie" and the "criminal police" were integrated in the federal police, in essence as support-units for the global police system. Important parts of this federal police were deconcentrated to the level of a territorial jurisdiction ( $n=27$ ). We can find here the federal investigating police and the federal co-ordination of public order maintenance. It is at federal level that the national security plan is developed, in the federal police council, implying representatives of all administrative and judicial authorities. After the drafting of the plan, the Ministers of Interior and of Justice give their approval and the plan is submitted to Parliament.

At the local level, the municipal police was transformed into a local (zonal) police ( $n=196$ ), absorbing parts of the local branches of the former gendarmerie. The territory of a police zone is in average an aggregation of three municipalities. In bigger cities a zone is identical to the territory of the city (mono-municipal zones), in more rural areas a zone contains more municipal territories (pluri-municipal zones). It is at this zonal level that local security plans are developed, implying the mayor(s), the public prosecutor, the chief of the local police and a delegate of the federal police. Zonal security plans have to take into account the priorities set by the national security plan. They can

include new local priorities or exclude national priorities, as long as this decision is substantiated.

Table 2: Relationship between local and federal plans		
	FEDERAL	LOCAL
Integral safety (sensu lato)	Federal Integral Safety Plan ↓	???
Police Security (sensu stricto)	National Security Plan	Local (zonal) Security Plan

Both security plans (local and national) have their legal base in the new law on the integrated police (1998). A legal base on an integral safety policy, broader than mere police matters, does not exist in Belgium (Ponsaers, 2001a). In spite of that, recent governments took the initiative to draw federal integral safety plans after national elections during the formation of a new coalition. These plans tried to cover a much broader safety domain, outside the strict policing approach. On a local level such an integral safety policy is neither legally based, nor often applied (Ponsaers, 2001b). Local integral safety plans are exceptions, but exist. If they are formulated, they focus on the municipality and not on the broader territory of the zone, voted by the municipal council.

#### *Fragmentation of the state*

Since 1970 Belgium has evolved more and more towards a federal state. A lot of former national competences were delegated to the level of the three regional governments, which do not have by necessity the same political composition as federal government. Contradictory to the state-reform, at the occasion of the *police-reform* in 1998, the political class did not decide to install a regional police system, familiar to, for example, the German system. One of the scarce national competences stayed with the police, under supervision of the federal Ministers of Interior and of Justice. Nevertheless, a lot of competences that are *interconnected* with the broader problem of safety (e.g. traffic, environment, medical and therapeutic care for drug users and minors and such like) are situated at regional level. Political consultation between the federal and regional level is problematic. This is one of the main reasons why local integral safety plans are difficult to develop, and are dependent on parallel federal and regional steering.

#### *Local patchwork of safety agencies*

At the municipal level a patchwork of safety agencies developed during recent years, relatively independently from the security infrastructure on the level of the police zone (Ponsaers, 2005). In first instance, the federal ministry of Interior concludes periodically so-called safety and prevention contracts with different cities. These contracts provide substantial additional funding for preventive measures and support for the development of local integral safety measures. Within the framework of these contracts, a multitude of new safety functions was created. A number of these functions can be situated on the level of co-ordination, policy support and evaluation. These functions are to a large extent created as an interface between the local police force of the zone and municipal administrations (e.g. infrastructure, social wellbeing, mobility, neighbourhood development). Recently a few cities created the political mandate of "deputy mayor of integral safety". These experiments were considered as failures because these deputies trespassed regularly their political competence and broke in to the competences of other deputy mayors. Today these coordination functions are increasingly taken over by municipal functionaries without political mandate and financed in the framework of the safety and prevention contracts,

but with a large degree of decision making power, getting political coverage by the mayor himself. Their job is considered as a transversal function, running through the global municipal administration. Nonetheless, in more rural areas, it is the zonal police chief who stays the centre of local safety leadership (Bisschop et al., 2010).

#### *Increased local functional surveillance*

Besides that, most of these functions are executive jobs in public space (e.g. stewards, animators, city guards, city coaches, municipal supervisors, etc.) (Verwee et al., 2007). To a large extent, these functions aim to increase local social cohesion and control, which can be summarized as forms of "functional surveillance" on public transport, social housing blocks, trade centres, public gardens, shopping malls, etc. During the last period of office, federal government tried to regroup this multitude of functions into one category, the so-called "community guards". To a certain degree, these guards execute tasks that are considered as traditional tasks of the police, more precisely those of the officer on the beat. The local (zonal) police attempts to decrease these low-profile surveillance activities, advocating that they do not represent central police tasks. In acting so, the police decreases the opportunities to contact the local population, essential within a community (oriented) policing (COP) approach, while COP is precisely considered as the main and official vision on policing in Belgium (Vandevoorde et al., 2003). Some observers argue in the meanwhile that these guards can be considered as the anticipation of a new form of municipal police (see the similar development of "police community support officers" in England and Wales under the umbrella of the "new neighbourhood, reassurance policing in 2000s, Hughes and Rowe, 2007 and below).

#### *Regional policies co-exist*

The federal contract policy of the Ministry of Interior is partly sustained on regional level. The regions of Brussels and Wallonia contract as well with cities in the framework of safety and crime prevention. This is not the case in Flanders, where the regional administration develops itself a *own* city policy, more directed towards welfare, well-being, quality of life and liveability, resulting in a even more pronounced proliferation of new functions. Here we can find functions as mediators, street corner workers, educators, therapists and social workers, situated in the broad domain of safety. This specific positioning in Flanders leads more frequently to frictions between the police and these new functions, who are not eager to share their professional information on "clients" or "buddies" with the police. Cooperation between these two groups, more precisely on the level of information exchange, is manifestly hindered by opposite professional ideologies. It is clear that two contradictory logics (federal and regional) co-exist on local level.

#### *The local level: bridge between traditional functions*

In recent years, federal government developed an important new instrument for local safety policy : the so-called "Municipal Administrative Sanctions" (MAS) (Devroe et al., 2007). This system provides municipalities the opportunity to decree regulations on the territory of the municipality (and thus *not* of the police zone) concerning forms of incivilities and small forms of social disorder. MAS permits municipalities to report these nuisances and to sanction them in an administrative way (mostly with a fine), which means that it is the municipal administration that can treat these cases outside the penal court. In some cases the public prosecutor can intervene, in others not. The reporting of the violations of the municipal regulations can be realized by the police, but can also be handed over to municipal functionaries, as e.g. the "community guards" (see *supra*). Evaluation studies suggest that in most of the cases the workload in the framework of MAS is realised by the local police



(90%). MAS has been massively implemented and applied during last years by municipalities, most dominantly by bigger cities. Again the MAS-instrument functions as communicating vessels between the local police and new municipal safety functions, which increases to a large extent the fragmented picture of the local safety approach.

#### *Preliminary conclusions*

In Belgium, both fragmentation and interconnectedness of the safety infrastructure on the local level can be observed. Most of the time, these characteristics are articulated in relation to the local police. At the same time, it is clear that there is an important interconnectedness with federal and regional policy. In spite of the fact that the regional level has no formal competences in the domain of security, the broader integral safety approach is (partially) adopted and has important consequences for the development of local safety networks and infrastructure. Formal co-ordination between federal and regional operational arrangements is left to a large extent to the discretion of local mayors.

It is clear that the problems related to this local texture do not situate themselves in the heart of the organisations and in the hard core of the competences of administrative and judicial authorities. Problems arise when safety is geared to other geographical levels or other institutional settings (Ponsaers, 2010). The problem is not to realise the regular security tasks, it becomes complicated when there is a shift between levels and institutions.

It is precisely at the organisational boundaries and geographical limits that not enough effort is invested to manage comfortably operational cooperation, consultation and information exchange. To "handle" safety is rather common, to "hand it over" is much more problematic.

Local safety councils do exist on the level of police zones, but they only include mayors, public prosecutors and police representatives. A more extensive process of co-ordination with other actors in the field of the broad integral public safety is not formalised. This is also the case on the intermediate level between the federal and zonal police, where so-called co-ordinators (as well in relation to criminal matters and administrative matters) function exclusively inside the police-organisation.

## 4. Public Safety Governance in England and Wales<sup>5</sup>

Developments with regard to the governance of local public safety in England in the past three decades point to both intense bouts of "political inventiveness" and consequences which may be termed "governmental instabilities" (Hughes 2007, Edwards and Hughes, 2009). In turn they are boldly illustrative of the simultaneous centripetal and centrifugal processes in the late modern "managerial state" (Clarke and Newman, 1997) or what we term fragmentation and interconnectedness in this paper.

#### *The crisis of traditional criminal justice approaches to crime and disorder*

The last decades of the twentieth century witnessed a growing strain on the criminal justice system. The combined crisis of the criminal

justice system's and welfare state's responses to crime and disorder was captured by the following indicators:

- the increasing rate of recorded crime and the numbers of people passing through the different parts of the system;
- overload combined with a crisis of efficiency (e.g. the declining clear-up rates of the police, overloaded courts and the overcrowding of prisons);
- a growing awareness of extensive social and economic costs of crime; and, crucially, the increasing recognition that formal processes of criminal justice (i.e. detection, apprehension, prosecution, sentencing and punishment of offenders) have only a limited effect on controlling crime (Hughes and McLaughlin, 2002).

In response to the widespread acknowledgement of this crisis of criminal justice as well as state-run social welfare approaches to crime and disorder, two preventive ways of thinking, or "logics", have come to the fore since the 1980s and become embedded in much of the work of local community safety partnerships, namely situational crime prevention and social crime prevention (Hughes, 1998). Situational crime prevention - for which "British model is famous, chiefly concerns "designing out" crime via opportunity reduction, such as the installation of preventive technologies like CCTV and "alley gates" in both private and public spaces. Social crime prevention, on the other hand, is focused chiefly on changing targeted social environments and the motivations of offenders, and promoting "community" development initiatives. Common to both elements of situational and social crime prevention is their claim to be both less damaging and more effective (because "proactive") than traditional (reactive "law and order") criminal justice approaches.

#### *Community safety: the career of a free-floating signifier*

Let us examine in brief the particular career of community safety in England since the 1980s. The origins of community safety in the 1980s are suggestive of the mixed parentage of this policy signifier. We should note, for example, the very first appropriations of the term by "radical" Metropolitan Police Authorities in the late 1970s and early 1980s who formulated local community safety plans as a self-conscious counterweight to the perceived narrow and repressive public police-driven notions of public safety. However, the real political and policy turning point at the national dimension in this decade was the Home Office Circular 8/84: this document being the first explicit official recognition of the limits to "go-it-alone", policing and the capacity of constabularies to effectively prevent problems of crime without drawing on the resources (including different expertises) of other key statutory partners and the wider public. The technique of "inter-connected" multi-agency, co-ordinated partnership working was thus promoted as a means of overcoming isolated service responses and in turn probable fragmentation of service delivery.

The next key moment in community safety's recent history was the 1991 Morgan Report *Delivering Safer Communities* (Home Office, 1991) with its social democratic ambition to conceptualise and manage holistically and *inter-connectedly* crime and disorder, and fear of crime and disorder, and their deeper roots in sensibilities regarding local safety. This ambitious policy project sought to promote "safer communities" through creative, democratically sensitive partnership arrangements led by local authorities rather than the police. This report reflected an emergent consensus amongst academics and policy-makers that the ideal approach to prevention combines a package of both precipitating factors and predisposing influences. Equally importantly it gave the new approach a nationally-recognisable "brand name", community safety. However, its ambition to "knock" the police off its dominant pedestal was never achieved in

5. Note it is impossible to discuss whole of the UK or indeed England and Wales as if they are synonymous and illustrative of what is often (incorrectly) termed the "Anglo-Saxon" model of crime prevention and community safety. Given the uneven processes of political devolution across the UK, comparative analysis of community safety, youth justice and the preventive turn across localities is itself indicative of the dual occurrence of fragmentation and interconnectedness in this burgeoning policy field (see Edwards and Hughes, 2009, Goldson and Hughes, 2010).



subsequent legislation and policy developments over the subsequent twenty years.

Following the Morgan agenda which was widely and influentially, if unevenly and in often fragmented ways, taken up locally, the third key moment in the recent history of community safety in England and Wales was the *Crime and Disorder Act* (CDA) in 1998. In retrospect the CDA helped inaugurate the "New" Labour governments' "modernisation" project associated with the three appeals to *managerialism*, *governance through partnership*, and *communitarianism* between 1997-2010 (Hughes, 2007, Edwards and Hughes, 2009). This period witnessed both linguistic turns and policy decisions to shift the focus from "community safety" to "crime and disorder reduction" made tangible as locally calculable yet centrally defined, targeted performance measures. This focus was further consolidated in the decade of 2000s by the much publicised flood of further crime and anti-social behaviour legislation alongside a communitarian-inspired crusade around "Respect" and the drive for moral authoritarian interventions against anti-social behaviour and to address public fears of crime and disorder (see Hughes 2007: 119-25).

#### *Scientism and populism in community safety work*

CSPs and their key actors provide a particularly useful empirical focus for research into evidence-based practice and the use of scientific intelligence in crime control and policing. This is because these actors have been publicly exhorted and explicitly required, following cognate developments in "intelligence led policing" (Maguire and John, 2006), to organise control around the identification, measurement, interpretation and reduction of patterns of offending and victimisation; to adopt, in the argot of the Home Office, an "intelligence-led" and "problem-oriented" approach<sup>1</sup> that explicitly requires controllers to relate "rational", "scientific" crime control theory to local practice.

Community safety strategies represent embattled experiments in governing crime and disorder "beyond" the state. Leading commentators on the preventive turn in crime control identify the prominence of community safety in the control talk of advanced liberal democracies (Garland, 2001, Hughes 2007). In holding out the promise of a rational, problem-solving approach, these strategies have been counterpoised to the punitive populism of much crime control politics. However, concerns about the capacity of community safety partnerships to facilitate a rational-scientific, problem-oriented approach, in part revealed through the experience of the Home Office Crime Reduction Programme (1999-2002) resulted in a major review of their work in the mid-2000s. The explicit aim of this review was to improve performance through the establishment of several national minimum standards, later watered down to recommended "hallmarks" of successful partnership working.

The Home Office review team (supported by criminological experts, including one of the authors here), concluded that there was some telling, even damning, deficits across a range of dimensions to community safety work. The main concerns were grouped around two perceived "deficits". On the one hand, it was noted that leadership, organisational, and analytical capacities were underdeveloped if not deficient in most community safety partnerships (CSPs). Despite a decade of Home Office advocacy of evidence-based problem-solving, it was recognised that adoption of this "scientific" approach had been limited "on the ground" locally. On the other hand, CSPs were also seen to be failing in terms of their "engagement" of local communities in crime control, in order to focus government around the concerns and priorities of citizens. This perceived failure in populist communitarian co-production of improved safety and justice

provoked a major report into citizen engagement led by Louise Casey, policy advisor to the Labour administration in Westminster (Cabinet Office, 2008)<sup>2</sup>.

The Home Office Review reveals a basic tension between the rational-bureaucratic drivers of crime control, epitomised in the narratives of "crime science", and a populist-democratic concern with community engagement and citizen-focussed government epitomised by Casey's report and Blair's communitarianism. This tension can be discerned throughout the six hallmarks of best practice that were recommended by the Review and especially with regard to (ii) and (iv) below:

- i) empowered and effective leadership;
- ii) intelligence-led business processes;
- iii) effective and responsive delivery structures;
- iv) engaged communities;
- v) visible and constructive accountability; and
- vi) appropriate skills and knowledge.

These six hallmarks were designed originally to "establish a consistent approach to partnership working across all CSPs and for which compliance was to be compulsory" (Home Office, 2006). In themselves, these hallmarks remain valuable standards for partnerships to aspire towards; unfortunately there would be no additional resources made available to CSPs for attaining these demanding standards of public service. Furthermore, the tension between the rational-bureaucratic and populist-democratic impulses behind the Home Office Review continues to characterize not just the work of community safety partnerships but criminal justice policy more broadly in England and Wales.

#### *"Crime control" or "social policy"? Local public safety as a "hybrid" policy*

Local public safety as a policy approach sits at the intersection of attempts by the state to deliver both welfare and security, and policing and control in local communities (Hughes, 2009). It was noted earlier that community safety first emerged in the 1980s as a local government strategy that sought to move beyond the traditionally police-driven agenda of crime prevention. Apart from seeking to involve other "social" agencies in crime prevention and in turn moving from single to multi-agency, or inter-connected activities, community safety has also been associated with more aspirational claims. One particular claim has been to generate greater participation and leadership or perhaps more accurately attempted "responsibilisation" from residential communities in promoting "quality of life" not just tackling those social harms classified as "crimes". As a long-term outcome, community safety is often linked to the "communitarian" ambition of replacing fragile, atomised, fearful and insecure communities with ones confident enough to take responsibility for their own safety. At the same time, in the national politics of the 1990s and 2000s in Britain, "creating safer communities" has been a crucial component of the former, pre-2010, Labour administration's promotion of policies that could be "tough on crime, tough on the causes of crime". In this sense, community safety straddles the fault line of repressive crime control ("tough on crime") and more preventive, welfare-oriented, interventions ("tough on the causes of crime").

#### *The local institutional architecture of community safety in England and Wales*

In the discussion that follows the main features of the institutional infrastructure of community safety are sketched in brief. As will be evident from the earlier discussion, it is difficult to deny that there

has been a highly prescriptive and directive central government agenda from Whitehall shaping of the contemporary local preventive infrastructure in England, and to a lesser extent and less "successfully", in Wales<sup>6</sup> throughout the first decade of the 2000s. This is indicative of a "sovereign" state strategy which stresses greater central control ("steering") alongside both the diffusion and probable fragmentation of responsibility for the delivery of crime control and the promotion of safer communities ("rowing") to a wide array of agencies and groups, both public and private, voluntary and statutory in character (Hughes, 2007).

Between 1998 and 2008 all 376 statutory partnerships in England and Wales were legally obliged and empowered to:

- carry out audits of local crime and disorder problems;
- consult with all sections of the local community;
- publish three year crime and disorder reduction strategies based on the findings of the audits;
- identify targets and performance indicators for each part of the strategy, with specified time scales;
- publish the audit, strategy and the targets;
- report annually on progress against the targets.

Since 2009 community safety partnerships are no longer required to produce tri-annual strategies but instead must produce annual strategic assessments of their shared local priorities.

Most community safety partnerships (CSPs) have been characterised by very similar formal organisational structures. For example, there is a formal strategic/operational division; there are usually specific thematic or geographically based "action" teams; the key statutory partners or "responsible" authorities are made up of public agencies ranging from the local authority, police, fire, police authority, health and (since 2010) probation alongside co-opted agencies from both the statutory and voluntary sector. The key promoter of this partnership working and its "joined-up" expertise, has been *de facto* if not *de jure*, the local community safety manager in the local authority (Hughes and Gilling, 2004; Hughes, 2007). Meanwhile, the "community" is usually presented in the local strategies as a spatial and moral concept, emphasising locality and belonging and unity (albeit across consensual diversity in terms of life style, cultural identity etc). However, there is also a common tendency to place certain groups outside the community due to their "anti-social" activities, pointing to the key role of boundary and exclusion in representations of community. In turn, the community is usually "passively" present in terms of being "consulted" rather than an active participant in the planning and delivery of community safety (Hughes 2009).

The primary focus of community safety partnerships (CSPs) in terms of their stated priorities since the CDA has thus been on crime and disorder (and fear of crime) reduction rather than more broadly defined "harm reduction and safety promotion". On the surface this suggests that CSPs are primarily engaged in local crime control rather than social policy work. However the actual outcomes of such control work may be preventive in character rather than purely repressive and enforcement-oriented when examined in terms of its problem-solving orientation and when studied empirically "on the ground" (Hughes, 2007).

Such processes have seen an ever increasing number of multi-agency community safety teams - managers, officers, project workers, police secondees, "drug action/substance misuse teams", anti-social

behaviour units etc. - which now form an increasingly salient, if still fragile, part of local government structures and processes<sup>7</sup>. As a relatively novel set of institutions and experts, community safety work appeared set to remain a key feature of the local governance of crime, disorder and security in England until the current public sector expenditure cuts by a rampant neo-liberal government. Even before these cut-backs there are major challenges that lie in wait, not least those associated with innovations in the local policing of the terror threat and "radicalisation"; additionally, tensions exist with regard to the nature and form of neighbourhood policing and the uneasy, unstable and fragmented relations between such "public police" initiatives and local government-led community safety, multi-agency policy (see Hughes and Rowe, 2007).

#### *Unsettling the "nation" as a unit of analysis*

The negotiation of, and resistance to the central government policy agenda on local public safety is apparent at the local sites of policy implementation across England and Wales. This finding alerts us to the importance of the "sub-national" as brought to life in specific geo-historical contexts and local practices and politics in situ, which at times results in new trends in both fragmentation and inter-connectivity. For example, comparative, trans-local research on English CSPs (Hughes and Gilling, 2004, Hughes, 2007) showed that the occupation and work of community safety managers was often a tortuous process of bargaining between implacable, fragmented local partners, especially with regard to the politically visceral and culturally emotive issue of governing young people's use of public space. In occupying this position, community safety managers were not in a position to act as some simple interlocutor for the Home Office's "crime and disorder" agenda, or foot-soldier for the Government's "Respect" unit, if they wanted to retain the involvement of those partners primarily concerned with the welfare of children and young people. Such uneven contestation emphasises the local political agency of community safety managers and the partnerships they co-ordinate, the consequences of which cannot be articulated within the smooth narratives of disorder that have predominated in both official and academic discourses (Edwards and Hughes, 2009).

#### *Preliminary conclusions*

The recent history of community safety as policy and practice in England and Wales confirms supports the simultaneous processes of both fragmentation and interconnection previously observed in the cases of Belgium and the Netherlands. There is no denying that the terrain of local crime control has been reshaped in the last three decades across Britain, not least given the rise to prominence of local multi-agency community safety partnerships. The public police are no longer the sole arbiter of public safety and local authorities have certainly joined the police in what we may term the dominant "duopoly" for managing public safety today. At the same time, conflicts and power struggles between agencies and authorities remain, both intra-locally and between local and national government bodies. The terrain and what may be termed "the preventive turn" (Edwards and Hughes, 2009) in England and Wales is thus characterized by both fragmentation and inter-connectedness and with all the future challenges this implies for policy and practice and the role of social science in the crafting of a new governmental savoir.

6. The story of Wales is in important ways distinct from that of England, not least to the partial devolution of power to the Welsh Assembly. For a fuller discussion, see Edwards and Hughes, 2008, 2009.

7. At the time of writing this and given severe cutbacks in the public sector by the Coalition Government in this era of austerity (at least for most citizens, excluding bankers and such like), the future of such teams is precarious and indeed is the local infrastructure of community safety more broadly.

## 5. Deciphering the challenges of fragmentation & interconnectedness and imagining new public safety agendas

The following overview presents an explicitly "ideal-typical" overview of the emergent features of the new public safety regime emergent in the three countries we have examined in depth but also more speculatively across a greater number of late modern social formations. It focuses on isolating the master patterns which may be discerned from the much more complex and messy realities of institutional developments in any actual country, region or urban or rural locality. In one important sense this overview offers an imagined/imaginative blue-print for a new governmental agenda, not yet realized across all the institutional sites and practices we have explored but nonetheless discernible in these historical trends and empirical particulars. And of course to "imagine" our security, welfare and justice futures in an important area of contributory social scientific expertise: not least in opening up other ways in which we may be governed (Edwards and Hughes, 2008; Hughes, 1998b, Wood and Shearing, 2007)

### *Mapping the complex problems causing fragmentation*

Over the years, problems endangering local public safety have changed. Late modernity has provided the majority of citizens in Western European societies with a certain amount of wealth and stability. Citizens are nowadays assured of their most elementary needs such as food and shelter and as a consequence focus their concerns and fears more on "higher" forms of security and safety. Late modernity has thus highlighted new fears, risks and problems (Hughes, 1998). Processes of modernization, globalization/globalization and cognate technological developments have created new local public safety problems of a highly complex character. Furthermore, the range of issues being considered as problems of public safety have broadened rapidly. Where traditionally only crime and disturbances of public order were addressed as matters of local public safety governance, nowadays (local) public safety policies, actors and instruments focus on a wide variety of problems including a toxic mix of fears and perceived risks (about crime, disorder, insecurity etc.), stretching across and beyond both local or national boundaries

Furthermore, traditionally local authorities were held responsible for controlling the public safety situation within the boundaries of their city or municipality. These new problems of public safety have offered a real challenge to the local administrative authorities and the local police and in turn highlighted their limited powers and capacities. Complex or "wicked" problems cut across the "jurisdictions of organizations and cross the traditional boundaries between the private and the public sector" (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2006: 1). Given the changing character of public safety problems, the traditional actors are no longer capable of handling them effectively all by themselves. The mono-disciplinary approach has come under increasing pressure to be changed into a multidisciplinary approach which consequently paved the way for new policing actors.

On the general level of the current provision of safety and security, one could characterise this as de-coupling of policing and the state. (National) Governments no longer hold a monopolistic position in handling public safety and no longer are the police the sole responsible actor for fighting crime and restoring public order, and reassuring an anxious public about their fears. We now deliberately speak about public safety *governance* (not government) settings wherein various actors are dealing with public safety issues (Hughes, 2007). Policing is more adequately defined as "all explicit efforts to

create visible agents of crime control, whether by government or by non governmental institutions" (Bayley and Shearing, 1996: 715).

### *Fragmentation and pluralisation in governing public safety*

During the past two decades "state power" [for public order maintenance] is being relinquished in various ways - "outwards" to burgeoning commercial markets in policing and security, "downwards" to private organizations and municipal authorities and to "responsibilized" consumers and citizens and "upwards" to new sites of international police cooperation and transnational policing forms" (Loader and Walker 2001:10). As a result, governing local public safety has become fragmented in terms of the range of actors involved. In addition to local authorities and the public police, a lot of other actors have started to address public safety problems, such as other governmental actors, quasi governmental actors and also citizens, voluntary organizations and private commercial actors.

In these pluralized settings of public safety governance, governments and other actors all face the same challenge: namely how to effectively handle new, changing and complex problems of public safety. Dealing with this challenge, difficulties come to the front, such as the inefficiency in separately addressing the same problems, clashes between organizations, uncertainties about organizational strategies and institutional backgrounds and fuzzy political-administrative arrangements (Hughes 2007: chapters 3 and 4).

In networked settings and partnership working, like public safety governance, actors are mutually dependent in terms of resources, such as information, powers and instruments, for solving problems (Edwards and Hughes, 2005; Koppenjan & Klijn, 2006). Logically, such actors are mutually dependent on each other for achieving the goal (governing public safety) which results in new, if fragile, interaction patterns around policy problems. The challenge of effectively and commonly addressing public safety problems fuels the need for new forms of connection. After all, to achieve satisfactory outcomes, these mutually dependent actors ("partners" in common Anglophone parlance) must in principle co-operate. Again logically, fragmentation had soon to be followed by interconnection.

### *Interconnection in public safety governance*

Ideally, we may presume interconnection to be established in, at least, three different ways.

- First, by bringing about a kind of working consensus on the subject matter, new forms of policy and management emerge.
- Second, once consensus is established, personal or institutional leadership may hold substantive "connective" capacity.
- And third, there are the many new (structural) arrangements, operational as well as political-administrative, bringing together all those separate actors, approaches and interests, in a more or less concerted approach.

Let us now briefly elaborate on each of these ideal typical developments.

On a collective policy or management level, actors start to harmonize the content of their individual activities regarding public safety problems in both informal ways (practical guidelines and "soft" policies) and formal ways ("hard" policy and law). Common priorities are set and actors design their own policies more or less in accordance with common schemes and timelines in order to co-ordinate, harmonize and to some extent maximize their individual and common efforts. Plans, objectives, priorities and activities of individual actors need to be organized in such a way that they would most effectively address public safety. An example of this type of connection is the "integrated" policy approach to public

safety problems, that was once popular in Belgium and especially in the Netherlands. Various actors and public safety problems became enrolled into and united in the so called "integral safety policies" (in Dutch: integraal veiligheidsbeleid). These policies form guidelines for actors from national, local, public, civic or private backgrounds for pooling their resources in addressing prioritized problems of public safety. Integrated safety policies deliberately combine various objects of governance broadly referred to as "societal" and "physical" public safety problems. The establishment of local statutory community safety partnerships - aimed at both combating (the fear of) crime and disorder and promoting community safety in England and Wales since 1998 also highlights such ambitions (Hughes, 2007).

Second and on a more individual level, through leadership, whether of the innovating, hierarchical/traditional or more personal kind, coordination, connection and steering can be brought about in the fragmented field of public safety governance. After all, the complexity of public safety policies and the complexity of organizations surrounding it asks for "leaders who can pull the shifting framework of local decision-making together, act as entrepreneurs in the highly competitive environment and be the people whom the public can identify as responsible for decisions affecting local areas" (Reynaert en Steyvers in Ponsaers, 2005:109). Leadership in public safety governance implies signaling fragmentation and initiating solutions by connecting actors, creating common structures, and coordinating policy implementation or getting the most out of co-operating within existing arrangements. In many of the institutional settings of public safety governance in Belgium and the Netherlands, the mayor is the traditional and institutional leader. However, leadership of multi-level worlds such as public safety governance is not necessarily reserved for the mayor alone. We are also witnessing attempts from national governments and ministers to stimulate or direct local public safety policies (see for example the emergence of locally elected Police and Crime Commissioners amid much controversy in England and Wales in 2011).

Third, and both on the operational level of public safety governance and the politico-administrative level, various new arrangements in addressing public safety problems have emerged. After all, actors connected through policy content or by leaders have to implement public safety policy by joint action. In these arrangements actors start to co-operate - however cautiously- in actively designing and implementing public safety policy together. These still fragile arrangements on the operational level may be, for example, characterized as "multi-agency partnerships" (Hughes, 1998, 2007) and "safety networks" (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2006, Terpstra en Kouwenhoven, 2004). Herein public-private collaboration takes place and new practical connections arise on local or regional level between, for example, private security companies, the police, local governments and housing corporations and judicial actors. Also civic actors are recruited to cooperate in these arrangements. Community policing, for example, claims to connect citizens, local society and policing actors. In such arrangements the public is activated to contribute and actors are activated to work with the public in addressing public safety problems. In noting these trends, we should not of course underestimate the threats to legal accountability and elected democratic control that may emerge in such "security" networks. This sobering conclusion must not be lost sight of in any debate which this deliberately optimistic account has in truth side-stepped.

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## Endnotes

1. As exemplified in the annual "Tilley Awards" granted to local community safety partnerships in England and Wales that demonstrate best practice in problem-oriented crime reduction (see: <http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/crime/tilley-awards/>).
2. This approach is exemplified in the following "sound-bite" at the beginning of the Casey report: "Most of all I would urge policy makers, professionals, lobby groups and law makers to take note of one thing - the public are not daft. They know what's wrong, they know what's right, and they know what they want on crime and justice. And its time action was taken on their terms".

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## C' BOOK REVIEW

**"(In)security, punitiveness and criminal policy"**

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Ant. N. Sakkoula Publ., Centre for Penal and Criminological Research, v.18, Athens-Komotini, 2009, p.173\*.

By Anastasia Chalkia, Sociologist, MA Criminology, PhD Candidate, Panteion University

The current edition, as mentioned in the introduction, is indicative not only of the common objectives shared by the authors but also of the originality of the research project in Greek academia. It highlights important relations between (in)security and punitiveness in modern Greek society and propose a rational criminal policy, based on scientific findings.

Key research themes were the in-depth exploration of the citizens' attitudes regarding (in)security in correlation to punitiveness as well as the contributing factors that shape the two concepts.

The citizens' (in)security surveyed in the context of its intensity and under the prism of the factors that shape it. The research is mainly based on valid methodological procedure which has been followed in previous scientific experience.

Importantly, the sample was asked directly for the reasons of its unsafety and insecurity and it is found that different factors interact and contribute to the formation of the aforementioned concepts.

In addition, the research shows that insecurity is associated with the perception of the crime problem and with the general reflexion on the quality of life which is one of the determinant factors of insecurity.

On the other hand, victimization (direct/indirect) and its effect on fear of crime are researched deeply. Moreover, attitudes towards the criminal justice were explored and, actually, the lack of confidence towards the formal institutions of social control seems to feed the feelings of insecurity.

The sample believes that outlaw criteria shape the judges' decisions. When the sample perceives that judges' decisions are lenient towards sex crime, street crime and corruption, it adopts tougher attitudes. Plus, tougher attitudes were adopted towards offenders with different socio-demographic characteristics compared to sex, age, nationality et cetera.

As far as punitiveness is concerned, it is found that different factors effect on it by shaping its different aspects.

Specifically, punitiveness is studied simultaneously in a specific and in a general level and the research analyzed not only the whole sample

but also the sample from each research area separately, as determined by particular socio-economic and environmental characteristics.

In the context of a general approach of punitiveness issue, except from the socio-demographics characteristics of the sample and the fear of crime that determine in a high level the punitive attitudes, the reasons of insecurity, the perception of crime problem and of quality of life as well as the experience of victimization are also analyzed deeply.

Above all, the most important finding is that punitiveness in its particular dimension (tightening the existing criminal penalties) is associated with insecurity resulting from every day crime whereas, on the other hand, punitiveness in its general dimension (purposes of punishment) is connected to the vulnerability issue in personal and social level. By taking into consideration this second dimension, punitiveness accrues on a 'network' of attitudes concerning the worldviews of the individual.

The concept of punitiveness itself is quite complex and it is not uniquely linked to the criminal phenomenon but also it is associated with the socio-ideological orientation of the individual as a component of one's personality.

As a result the effect of insecurity on punitiveness declines when punitiveness is related to broader aspects such as the purposes of punishment. In this case, the answers reflect the broader socio-ideological orientation of the individual and it is not associated with the perception of crime as a daily threat but as a social phenomenon.

It is worth mentioning that the socio-demographics characteristics of the sample vary according to the two different aspects of punitiveness. The only exception is the low education level which is consistently linked to punitive attitudes.

Therefore, the study of punitiveness requires complex methods and research approaches, both quantitative and qualitative.

Finally, it is examined the role of mass media and its influence in punitive attitudes. In addition, the sample was asked to evaluate itself which reason considers most important in shaping its views on the leniency/severity of sentences.

It should also be noted that this research very early in Greek society addressed the issues of increased crime, racism and xenophobia in the context of the relationship between insecurity and punitiveness.

At the end, the book focuses on the necessity of a rational criminal policy that stays away from the expansion of law enforcement and surveillance as well as from "what people wants" issue which can lead to populist measures against the crime and the offender.

This edition continues the tradition of the research on the fear of crime by going further in its relationship with punitiveness. For the first time in Greek literature they are risen relations that were hitherto invisible and it is proved that criminological research may help to emerge important aspects of Greek society and therefore the possible ways to deal successfully with them. That's one of the most important reasons that criminological research has to be strengthen further.

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